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Succession Process in a Large Canadian Family Business: A Longitudinal Case 
Study of the Molson Family Business: 1786-2007 
Jose Lam, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2009 
This study explores and examines the succession process in the Molson 
family business. The major goal of the research is to examine the characteristics 
of effective multi-generational successions in this particular family business. 
Family businesses represent the most prevalent type of business in North 
America; and succession in family firms is an emerging area of study within 
family business research because of demographic and social trends, combined 
with the high probability of succession failure. This research identified and 
evaluated the critical events and processes that have led to several family 
business successions in the Molson family business. The research design 
involved qualitative methodology. A single in-depth longitudinal case study 
created a narrative of the Molson family business, from the founder to the current 
sixth generation leader. 
The findings revealed that by ensuring grooming of the offspring, a mutual 
role adjustment between the older and younger generations, and selection of 
next-generation leader based on abilities and competencies, the Molson family 
business survived for over 220 years. Effective succession planning in this family 
business also involved minimizing conflicts and being able to separate the family 
and business systems. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Background 
Over 90% of all businesses in North America are family firms. These 
family businesses come in all sizes and shapes, from the typical 'mom and pop' 
restaurant to the large multinationals. Family businesses not only represent the 
most prevalent type of business in North America, but also play an important role 
in the global economy. Some family businesses have grown to become large 
corporations that have an influential role in particular industries; for example, 
IKEA (furniture), Ford (car manufacturing), Michelin (tire manufacturing), Cargill 
(commodities), Molson (beer), Bombardier (transportation), and others. Also, 
family businesses are not just small closely held private firms. It is estimated that 
about one-third of Fortune 500 companies are considered family businesses 
(Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Stein, 2001; Lank, Owens, Martinez, Reidel, de 
Visscher and Bruel, 1994; Rosenblatt, de Mik, Anderson and Johnson, 1985). 
Astrachan and Shanker (2003) reported that family businesses employ between 
27%-62% of the US workforce and account for between 29%-59% of the US 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to Ibrahim and Ellis (1994), family 
businesses in Canada employ approximately 48% of the workforce and represent 
nearly 50% of Canada's gross domestic product. 
Despite the importance of family businesses in a nation's economy, 
relatively little attention has been devoted in management research to the family 
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firm's unique and complex issues (Litz, 1997; Hoy and Verser, 1994; Brockhaus, 
1994). According to family business expert, Leon Danco: 
The family-owned business is so much more than a business. It's 
a boiling pot of human concerns, a stew of family relationships, 
both of love and resentment- of opportunity and entitlement- all 
masked by the more obvious ingredients of jobs, money, taxes, 
products, markets, and benefits. No wonder it has a tendency to 
boil over.1 
Family business research is an emerging academic field (Astrachan, 
2003). Early research focused on the identity of a family business and its 
characteristics vis-a-vis non-family businesses. However, recent trends point 
towards conceptual frameworks and theory building not only within the family 
business field, but also in relation to other fields (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Zahra 
and Sharma, 2004; Chrisman, Chua and Litz, 2003; Chrisman, Chua and Steier, 
2003; Wortman, 1994). Dyer Jr. and Sanchez (1998) reported that during the 
1990's researchers focused on the following topics: interpersonal family 
dynamics, succession, business performance, and consulting to family firms. 
Other topics covered were gender and ethnicity studies, legal and fiscal issues, 
estate issues, organizational change, as well as governance. Aronoff (1998) 
stressed the importance of studying the succession process from a 
multigenerational transition point of view, rather than just focusing on the 
L. Danco, "Inside the Family Business," Agency Sales Magazine, August, 1993, p. 51. 
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succession-planning event. Aronoff also highlighted leadership and ownership 
issues that can help in understanding family businesses. 
Bird, Welsch, Astrachan and Pistrui (2003) noted that major topics on 
family business issues that have been covered by researchers are: succession, 
distinctiveness of family business, conflict, management/ strategy, helping family 
business, and macro issues (economics, policy). Sharma (2004) noted in her 
review of the literature that the field is still in a preparadigmatic stage, where 
research has been undertaken at four different levels of analysis: individual 
(founders, next-generation, women, and/or non-family employees); 
interpersonal/group (agency theory, stewardship theory, interpersonal conflicts, 
and/or intergeneration transition); organizational (governance, strategic 
management, strategic decision-making, performance, and/or resource based 
view); and societal (macro-economic and/or environmental). 
The literature review in Chapter 2 starts with a general broad picture of the 
state of the art in family business research in order to help us understand this 
emerging field of research. This is followed by a review of the literature of 
succession in family business. Succession has been and still is one of the most 
important events and processes in a family business. It is a topic that is widely 
reported in the popular media, as well as researched in the field, as noted by the 
scholarly attention described above. Family business succession is expected to 
become a major issue over the next 20 years. It is estimated that over $15 trillion 
in assets will pass from one generation to the next, as baby boomers who own 
family businesses reach retirement age (Zaudtke and Ammerman, 1997). 
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Research also shows that only 30% of these family businesses will be 
successfully transferred to the next generation, 12% will be successfully 
transferred to the third generation, and only about 3% survive to the fourth 
generation and beyond (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Kets de Vries, 1993; 
Ward, 1987; Birley, 1986; Dyer, 1986; Beckhard and Dyer, 1983a & b). Ibrahim 
and Ellis (1994) noted that the transference of leadership from one generation to 
the next represents one of the most critical issues facing large family firms; and 
that the failure of family businesses can result in loss of assets, jobs, and family 
relationships. 
There has been an increased interest in learning more about family 
businesses, not just from a general social point of view, but also from a scholarly 
perspective. Litz (1997) addressed the issue of the lack of research on family 
business in business schools and pointed out the opportunities that exist in 
exploring this new field. The use of qualitative studies (such as case studies) can 
be used to build further understanding of family firms (Bird, Welsch, Astrachan 
and Pistrui, 2003; Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Ibrahim, Soufani and McGuire, in 
press). Litz (1997) also recommended the use of methodologies that "nurture 
long-term, mutually beneficial linkages with family firms that might facilitate in-
depth longitudinal analysis."2 Murray (2003) used this longitudinal case method 
analysis to describe the succession transition process as a journey that may be 
categorized as evolutionary or revolutionary, depending on the business 
structure and ownership in place in the family business. Goffee (1996) 
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recommended the use of longitudinal case method analysis to explore and study 
in greater depth the complex relationships between ownership and managerial 
control in family businesses. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore and examine the succession process in 
the Molson family business. The major goal of the research is to examine the 
characteristics of effective multi-generational successions in this particular family 
business. The theoretical approaches used to explain family business succession 
and selection of successor in family businesses were reviewed first, followed by 
a historical description from John Molson & Sons Ltd. to the current reincarnation 
of the business as Molson-Coors Brewing Company. This research uses 
qualitative methodologies that have been previously used by researchers in the 
field. The data collected was simultaneously triangulated to build an exploratory 
longitudinal case study. 
The author's past research involved developing case studies on family 
firms such as Quebecor (Ibrahim, Soufani, and Lam, 2001) and Artelite (Ibrahim, 
Lam, Soufani, and Poutziouris, 2004). These cases explored and described the 
role of business founders and their offspring within the context of family-owned 
firms. While, the Quebecor case dealt with succession from the founder to the 
next generation, a subsequent study on the T. Eaton Co. tracked the transfer of 
leadership through five generations, from its inception by its founder, Timothy 
2
 R. Litz, "The Family firm's exclusion from business school research: Explaining the 
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Eaton in 1869, until the company's demise in 1999 (Ibrahim, Soufani, Lam, and 
Poutziouris, 2004). This study shed some light on critical issues facing family 
firms such as succession planning, offspring's level of involvement in the 
business, the importance of grooming offspring and successor selection. 
Significance of the Study 
Succession in family firms is an emerging area of study within the field of family 
business research because of demographic and social trends, combined with the 
high probability of succession failure. Moreover, research in family business is 
challenging because of the overlap between two distinct fields, the business side 
characterized by objectivity and the family side characterized by emotions. A 
longitudinal case study analysis of the Molson family business' successions may 
shed knowledge on how the company has successfully undergone five 
leadership transitions. The significance of this research will further augment our 
understanding of succession in family firms and provide a basis for further 
research on multi-generational transitions in family business dynasties. 
void, addressing the opportunity," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 21(3) (1997): 155. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Literature Review of Family Business Research 
Although family businesses have been in existence for thousands of 
years, it was only in the past forty years that researchers have become interested 
in family business as a separate discipline and a topic of scholarly inquiry. From 
a research perspective, very little research on family business exists prior to the 
1970's. In 1954, Schwartz published a conceptual article dealing with succession 
documentation and in 1961, Trow used empirical methods to study the 
performance of succession planning and found that succession is delayed when 
there is a perception of incompetence in the son. In 1964, Donnelley studied the 
uniqueness of the family business and the challenges of these firms, including 
nepotism and lack of managerial talent. Davis in 1968 empirically studied the 
relationship of a strong father-weak son and conservative father-progressive son. 
The research of Davis was significant in that it contributed knowledge about the 
types of conflicts that exist in family businesses. 
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, much of the family business 
research focused on the owner-founder, ownership, definition, and comparative 
studies distinguishing family businesses from non-family businesses. Many of 
these studies were descriptive in nature and used qualitative analysis, including 
ethnographic studies and case studies. Also, it is important to note that many of 
the earlier studies were from researchers in other disciplines who studied family 
business with the goal toward developing prescriptive remedies to family 
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business problems observed through management and consulting practice. 
Several key researchers stand out. 
Levinson in 1971 built on the work of Davis. He looked at father-son, as 
well as sibling conflicts; and in 1974 he published a conceptual research 
describing the advantages of family business and father-son relationships. In 
1976, the empirical work of Barnes and Hershon advanced the field further. 
According to these two researchers, the succession issue is a non-market based 
transfer of power, where the company undergoes a process from an 
entrepreneurial to specialized function, to divisional operations. The seminal work 
of Barnes and Hershon laid out the foundations for the emergence of a family 
business paradigm. In addition, Longenecker and Schoen in 1978 suggested in a 
conceptual paper that succession was a process rather than an event and that 
successors need to be prepared to take over the leadership of the business. 
Alcorn (1982) used case study methodology to study success and survival 
in small and medium sized family businesses in the United States. Alcorn 
observed that family businesses were the most prevalent type of businesses, yet 
the problems and issues associated with these businesses received little 
attention from academics and government. Alcorn's study raised many of the 
issues characteristic of family businesses, such as succession, which after 
twenty-five years, still dominates research in the family business field. However, 
while succession is indeed one of the key issues in family business research, 
given that statistics show that many family businesses do not survive into the 
second generation, Alcorn's study also explored other important issues that 
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would build some of the assumptions of the emerging paradigms in family 
business. 
Some of the topics of interest to researchers are the characteristics of the 
founder-entrepreneur, the role of the family on the business, the involvement of 
children in the business, the overpowering father, the underachieving, as well as 
the overachieving son, the role of the daughter, conflicts between members of 
the family, social and ownership structure of the family business, culture and 
vision of the founder, governance, succession planning, leadership transfer, 
reluctance to let go of the business, non-family executives, and others. Alcorn's 
contribution to the research on succession is the construct of 'letting the son 
shine in' after waiting patiently for his turn to run the business. According to 
Alcorn, collaborative management between the father and the son is the key to 
the succession process; however, as time goes by, the degree of this 
collaborative relationship deteriorates and leads to a crossroads where either the 
relationship improves or the relationship is characterized by total conflict and 
irreconcilable differences. 
Beckhard and Dyer (1983a) looked at the key steps that need to be 
considered during succession and Beckhard and Dyer (1983b) studied the 
dynamics of family businesses, as well as the founder's priorities when managing 
continuity of the firm. Two other notable researchers were Davis (1983) who 
studied the types of families and their businesses and Lansberg (1983) who 
suggested that the succession process should also involve professional non-
family members and that succession involves both economic and emotional 
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issues. Barach (1984) found that key members of the Board play an important 
role in the succession process; however, when the process is paralyzed by 
conflicts, the end result may be one group of the family buying the other group 
out or the firm undergoes a restructuring process to solve the problem. 
Rosenblatt, de Mik, Anderson and Johnson (1985), brought a more 
systematic approach towards family business research. The backgrounds of 
these researchers were in psychology and social family science. In their study, 
they obtained a random sample of family business listed in the yellow pages, 
followed by structured interviews. The results of their conceptual research 
suggested the foundation of the family business paradigm; that is, that family 
business is a result of the overlap of two systems: the family and the business 
system. 
Dyer Jr. (1986) built upon the previous studies of researchers (such as 
Hershon) that had looked at the life cycle of the business to suggest a conceptual 
framework to explain the nature of family business. The life cycle approach 
suggests that family business goes through four stages: 
Stage 1 the entrepreneur founds the business and is the dominant 
character. The founder's vision and philosophy drive the business. 
In Stage 2, the firm experience growth and development and conflicts 
appear associated with ownership, control issues, and the advancement of family 
members. 
Stage 3 is characterized by succession to the next generation. Typically, 
the business is handed down to the primogeniture and/or to the son. 
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Stage 4 is characterized by familial or external negative events that affect 
the performance of the firm, resulting in public ownership and the hiring of 
outside professionals to manage the business. 
Scholars such as Dyer Jr. (1986 & 1988) were driven by the goal to 
explore and understand the nature of family business; and in particular to answer 
the question 'Why do some family businesses succeed, and others fail?' Dyer 
Jr.'s conceptual framework proposed that interactions among the family, the 
business and the governing board provided the culture that could help the family 
business manage change. According to Dyer Jr. (1988) the culture of the family 
business often prevents the business from adapting to changes in the 
environment. However, family businesses where leaders have the ability to adapt 
to changes have a greater likelihood to survive and succeed into the next 
generation. 
Dyer Jr. (1986) developed basic assumptions for each of the three cultural 
components and the combinations of the patterns of the family, the business, and 
governance culture may lead to a particular type of leadership that result in 
continuity or failure of the family firm. The business culture may be characterized 
by paternalistic, laissez-faire, participative or professional patterns, the family 
culture may be patriarchal, collaborative or conflicted, and the governance 
culture follows a four-stage evolution. In the first stage, the family business is 
governed by a paper board made up of family members to meet the 
requirements of the law. In the second stage, the 'rubber-stamp board' is made 
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up of family members and friends who basically support the decisions of the 
family. The third stage, the 'advisory board', occurs after the business goes 
public. Here outside directors have more influence on the decisions and their 
responsibility is to help protect the interests of shareholders. The last stage is the 
'overseer board' where strategic decisions are made by the board and the family 
does not have majority control of the shares. 
Even though family businesses are the most prevalent type of businesses 
in North America, only few of them survive into the next generation. Birley (1986) 
and Ward (1987) reported that 30% of family businesses survive to the second 
generation and only 10-15% made it to the third generation. While many family 
businesses fail because of marketing, financing, and/or other reasons associated 
with small and medium-sized businesses, family firms have also have a unique 
characteristic- the family, and they fail because of problems in succession 
planning (Lansberg, 1988). According to Ward (1987) the strategic planning 
process should ensure that the interests of the family are taken into 
consideration, as well as the financial situation of the business. While the main 
goal of the strategic planning is to ensure that the business maintains and 
continues to be competitive, it should also ensure a smooth transition of 
leadership to the next generation. Churchill and Hatten (1987) proposed that the 
family business goes through four transitional stages (owner-manager, training 
and development of the new generation, partnership between generations, and 
actual transfer of power). 
13 
Operational Definition of Family Business 
A major issue in the field has been the lack of consensus among scholars 
to establish a clear conceptual and operational definition of a family business that 
can assist in theoretical advancement. There have been attempts by various 
scholars (Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 1999; Litz, 1995; Handler, 1989b) to 
develop a consensus on definition; however, this area has been characterized 
often by conflicts and disagreements. 
There are various definitions of family business used by social science 
researchers. Handler (1990) defines it broadly as a business run by at least one 
family member, while Churchill and Hatten (1987) added another 
operationalization, the anticipation of succession. According to these 
researchers, a family business is a founder-operated business where there is 
anticipation that the business will be passed to the next generation. However, 
this definition limits family businesses to firms that were started by entrepreneurs 
and excludes firms that were acquired by entrepreneurs. According to Ibrahim 
and Ellis (1994, 2004), a family business is defined as one "in which at least 51 
percent of the business is owned by a single family; and at least two family 
members are involved in the management of the business. In addition, transfer of 
leadership to the next generation is anticipated."3 
In spite of the recent focus towards reaching an operational and 
theoretical definition of family business (Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 1999; 
3
 A. B. Ibrahim and W. H. Ellis, Family Business Management: Concepts and Practice, 2nd ed. 
(Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 2004) p. 5. 
Westhead and Cowling, 1998; Litz, 1997, 1995; Brockhaus, 1994), Rosenblatt's 
definition is one that has been generally accepted. Rosenblatt defined a family 
business as one where the family has majority ownership in the firm and where 
one or more than one family member is involved in the management (Rosenblatt, 
de Mik, Anderson and Johnson, 1985). Furthermore, this definition also implies 
that a family business is one that is perpetuated from one generation to the next; 
in other words, a succession process is anticipated. 
The Dual Identity of Family Firms 
Family businesses are characterized by an overlap between the family 
(emotional) and business (rational) systems. This dual identity refers to a 
reciprocal relationship between the social system (family) and the business 
system (family business) and differentiates a family business from a non-family 
business (Figure 1). The simultaneous interaction between the family and the 
business systems creates many competitive advantages that are usually 
intangible and unique such as the high level of employee commitment and 
motivation, flexible, informal, faster decision making process, and a common goal 
(Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004). Nonetheless, there is relative agreement amongst 
scholars of the view that the family business is further characterized by an 
overlap of three subsystems: ownership, management and family as seen in 
Figure 2 (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996) and the presence of a dual identity that 
creates a unique type of organization (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004, 1994). 
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Figure 1. Dual Identity of Family and Business 
According to Ibrahim and Ellis (1994) 
/ / 
Social / Family/ ^Business \ Economic 
System: / / \ \ System: 
Biological \ \ 
\ \ 
Belonging \ 





Figure 2. Three Subsystems Identified by Tagiuri and Davis (1996) 
Family / I \ \ Business 
Ownership 
Churchill and Hatten (1987) argue that it is this social dimension -
involvement of family members in the business, as well as non-market based 
transfer of power and leadership from one generation to the next- that gives 
family businesses its distinctiveness. For instance, Aldrich and Cliff (2003) have 
noted the importance of the effects of the family system on the business system. 
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They also suggest that family dimensions play an important role in 
entrepreneurial processes. 
Chrisman, Chua and Sharma (2003) note the idea that the family is the 
critical variable in the study of family business. Some scholars suggest that 
family businesses' competitive advantage resides in the combination of the 
business's traditional physical and human resources, as well as the family's 
unique identity (Habbershorn and Williams, 1999). According to Habbershom, 
Williams and McMillan (2003), the family business system consists of the 
interactions of the family unit, the business unit, and the individual family 
members. Zahra (2003) argue that it is the family's impact on the business that 
provides the advantage. 
The Succession Process: Conceptual Background 
A major area of research in the field during the past twenty years has 
been and still is the issue of succession in family businesses. Succession -or 
passing the baton to the next generation- is one of the main characteristics that 
distinguish family from non-family firms and can be viewed as a process that 
involves many factors and evolves over a period of time (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; 
Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, 1998; Gallo, 1995). The research by Handler 
(1989a, 1990, 1992) contributed further knowledge to our understanding of the 
succession process. According to Handler, the quality of the succession is 
affected by the individual and relational influences, and the succession process 
requires a mutual role adjustment between the father and the son. 
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There is general consensus amongst researchers that succession is a 
process (Davis and Harveston, 1998; Rubenson and Gupta, 1996; Handler, 
1990; Friedman and Singh, 1989). In a recent study, Davis and Harveston (1998) 
concluded that first-generation owners play an important influence in succession 
issues. On the other hand, the family exerted a greater influence on succession 
issues when the business has already passed through a succession process, 
although the influence of the family is not evenly distributed across generations. 
The authors suggested further areas of research, notably that "a developed 
conception of the structure of family relationships may provide a useful point of 
departure for future explorations."4 
Issues that affect the succession process include lack of a succession 
plan, lack of interest from the offspring in taking over the business, family feud, 
and successors that lack skills and qualifications (Zaudtke and Ammerman, 
1997). Even though succession is such a critical issue in family firms, founders 
tend to neglect or brush off the issue. According to Manfred Kets de Vries, 
"Raising that topic [succession] would be a hostile act, one potentially interpreted 
by the man in charge as a wish to have him dead."5 
A review of the literature on family business succession has identified 
several factors that influence the succession process. These factors include the 
structure of the family, interpersonal family relationships, the role of the founders 
4
 P. S. Davis, and P. D. Harveston, "The influence of family on the family business 
succession process: A multi-generational perspective," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 
(Spring, 1998): 31-49. 
5
 M. R. Kets de Vries, Family Business: Human Dilemmas in the Family Firm, (London: 
Thomson Business Press, 1996), p. 65. 
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and offspring, life-stage of the founders and offspring, birth order, gender and 
culture (Ibrahim and Ellis, 1994). 
Davis and Tagiuri (1989) empirical work found that the quality of the 
father-son work relationship is affected by their respective life stages. According 
to Davis and Tagiuri, the father should gradually relinquish some control to the 
son, while the sons should be given increasing responsibilities in the company. 
Ward (1990) suggested that the succession planning is a long-term process (15-
20 years) and that the founder should prepare the successor gradually through 
teaching and mentorship. The term 'corporeuthanasia' has been suggested to 
highlight the difficulty that many family firms face in the succession process 
(Danco,1992) . 
Dumas (1989) studied the differences in problems faced between male 
and female inheritors and suggested that sons have a desire for autonomy which 
can lead to conflicts, while daughters were more submissive and relatively 
conflict-free. Owner-managers see daughters as 'daddy's little girl', which 
influences their decision not to consider the daughter as a potential successor 
(Ibrahim and Ellis, 1994). Other researchers have continued to explore the role of 
daughters and women in family firms (Upton and Sexton, 1987; Salganicoff, 
1990). 
Structure and Relationships 
Although researchers have studied the role of family members in a family 
firm (Dyer and Handler, 1994; Freudenberger, Freeheim and Kurtz, 1989; Dyer, 
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1986), relatively few studies have looked at the influences of family structure and 
relationships on succession. Davis and Harveston (1998) noted that measuring 
family (group-level) influence has been difficult because of the lack of widely 
accepted scales to measure the effects. Nonetheless, some researchers have 
looked at the issue. Gundry and Welsch (1994) found that increasing the number 
of family members in the business could play an influential role in the decision-
making processes of the family firm, while Astrachan (1988) and Dyer (1986) 
argued that family members, just because they have high power, do not 
necessarily influence decision-making. 
Cole (2000) studied the family business as a unit of analysis; that is, all 
family members were present during the interview. Cole concluded that family 
business expectation from family members, from outsiders, and from key 
employees seemed to be an important variable. Although not directly dealt with, 
the issue of succession may be affected by the expectations from these groups. 
Founder's Reluctance to Let Go 
According to Ibrahim and Ellis (1994), the founder's reluctance to plan for 
a succession has been attributed to a number of factors including: the founder's 
strong sense of attachment to the business, fear of retirement and death, and 
lack of other interests (Rubenson and Gupta, 1996; Seymour, 1993; Handler, 
1990; Lansberg, 1988; Jacobs, 1986; Dyer, 1986; Zaleznik and Kets de Vries, 
1985; Alcorn, 1982; Barnes and Hershon, 1976; Levinson, 1971). Furthermore, 
the founder's reluctance to let go may discourage the offspring from joining in 
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and taking over the leadership role in the family firm (Stavrou, 1999; Handler, 
1989a; Lansberg, 1988). 
Using Sonnenfeld (1988)'s typology of retiring CEOs, Lansberg (1999) 
noted that when preparing to let go, leaders fall under four types of exit 
strategies: monarchs, generals, ambassadors, and governors. Both monarchs 
and generals have similar styles in that they are reluctant to let go (retire), and 
both tend to have autocratic leadership styles to help them stay in control for as 
long as possible. Moreover, monarchs and generals may pick weak succcessors 
in order to create a environment of dependency. One difference between the 
monarch and the general is that the monarch remains in power until his/her 
death, while the general may use sutble ploys with the intention to come back 
and regain power and the leadership position. Ambassadors and governors, on 
the other hand, nurture and grooms successors, and may use a consultative 
approach to select the most capable successor. After retirement, ambassadors 
remain in the firm as consultants, while governors leave the firm to pursue other 
interests. 
Birth Order Factors and Life Stage 
Handler (1990) describes the succession process as a 'mutual role 
adjustment' between the older and younger generations. Handler suggested a 
gradual role adjustment divided into four phases. In the first phase, the 
entrepreneur is the sole operator of the business. In the second phase, the 
younger generation enters the business and helps the founder, whose role is that 
21 
of a monarch. In the third phase, the younger generation become managers, 
while the founder becomes an overseer/delegator. In the fourth phase, the next-
generation successor becomes the leader, while the founder remains in the 
family business as a consultant. Hunt and Handler (1999), Rubenson and Gupta 
(1996) and Seymour (1993) have studied the role of the founder on the 
succession process. Research also suggests that an offspring's competence 
(Lansberg and Astrachan, 1994; Osborne, 1991; Barnes, 1988; Danco, 1982), as 
well as their personality traits (Goldberg and Wooldridge, 1993; Malone and 
Jenster, 1992; Levinson, 1971) are critical attributes that influence the choice of a 
successor in family firms. 
Other research has also examined a number of factors related to the 
offspring's intention to join and take over the leadership role in family firm. These 
factors include offspring life-stage (Davis and Tagiuri, 1989; Ward, 1987; Davis, 
1968), and their gender and birth order (Goldberg and Wooldridge, 1993; 
Handler, 1991; Lansberg, 1988; Alcorn, 1982). Moreover, family firms may be 
compared to monarchies in which the eldest son becomes the uncontested 
successor (Alcorn, 1982). 
Gender Factors 
An emerging area of research has been to examine the influence of 
gender factors on the choice of the successor. A study by Kuratko, Hornsby and 
Montagno (1993) revealed that the majority of family business owners chose 
their sons over their daughters, as potential successors, even though as Ayres 
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(1990) suggested, the daughter may be more suitable. Moreover, Stavrou (1999) 
summarized in her paper previous studies which found that when the business 
owner is male, he would not include the daughter in major business decisions, 
such as succession issues, even if the daughter were capable of running the 
business. Other researchers have looked at the issue of integrating the daughter 
and women into the family business (Cole, 1997; Dumas, 1992; Hollander and 
Bukowitz, 1990; Salganicoff, 1990). 
Family Size 
A neglected area in the family business succession field is the lack of 
studies on the factors influencing the succession process in family firms 
characterized by large families, as well as by extended family members. Danco 
(1991) used the term 'machetunim' to describe the extended family, the 
daughters-in-law, the sons-in-law, grandchildren, children from second or third 
marriages, and other in-laws. Davis and Harveston (1998) examined the 
relationship between large family businesses and the succession process. The 
authors found that there was no support for the claim that the larger the family 
business, the more extensive the succession planning process. Nonetheless, this 
study was unique because the researchers noted the lack of studies focusing on 
the family (group-level) as a variable. 
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Succession Planning 
Research studies have often noted the importance of succession planning 
in family businesses (Kets de Vries, 1993; Handler, 1990; Ward, 1987). A survey 
conducted by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) in 2005 reported 
that about one fifth of Canadian small business owners (more than 500,000 
entrepreneurs) are ready to retire by 2010 and another 30% will retire by 2020 
(Tal, 2005). According to this survey, more than $1.2 trillion will be passed from 
one generation to the next, yet only 7% of these businesses have a formal 
succession plan. Handler (1990) cited lack of succession planning as the major 
reason for the high mortality in family firms. The lack of succession planning can 
be attributed to factors related to the founder (Kets de Vries, 1993) and 
offsprings' competence (Astrachan and Kolenko, 1994; Handler, 1989a; 
Rosenblatt, de Mik, Anderson and Johnson, 1985; Davis, 1968). 
Ibrahim and Ellis (2004) and Gallo (1995) noted that succession is a 
complex process involving many factors and evolving over a long period of time. 
Research on succession in family firms has widely acknowledged the importance 
of succession planning to the survival of family firms (Ibrahim, Soufani and Lam, 
2001; Wortman, 1994; Kets de Vries, 1993; Handler, 1992, 1990). 
Several studies suggest that family businesses that have undergone a 
succession process are better prepared for future family succession transfers 
(Handler, 1992; Levinson, 1971) and that the succession process should be 
initiated very early in the offspring's life (Stavrou, 1999; Ward 1987; Davis, 1968). 
Ibrahim, McGuire, Ismail and Dumas (1999) and Ward (1987) have argued that a 
24 
proper succession process allows family firms the opportunity to select effective 
leaders who are capable of managing the business after the retirement of the 
founder. Lansberg (1999) suggested that succesion in the family business may 
follow an evolutionary path going from a owner-controlled firm to a sibling 
partnership in the second generation, and to a cousin consortium in the third 
generation. In other cases, devolutionary succession may also occur; for 
example, going from a sibling partnership to an owner-controlled firm or from a 
cousin consortium to a family branch or to an owner-controlled firm, although 
according to Lansberg (1999) these cases are rare. 
Scholars have suggested that the succession process involves three 
important steps. First, the offspring is prepared for leadership roles at an early 
age before joining the family business, next the offspring is integrated into 
various positions within the business, and the last step is the transfer of the 
leadership role in the firm (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Stavrou, 1999; Handler, 1994, 
1990, 1989a; Churchill and Hatten, 1987; Ibrahim, Soufani, Poutziouris, and 
Lam, 2004; Fox, Nikalantand Hamilton, 1986). 
Effective Leadership 
Studies have shown that leadership is the most important element in the 
success or failure of organizations and that leadership is a process that involves 
creating visions, articulating those visions as goals and objectives, and 
transforming followers so that those goals and objectives are attained (Bass, 
1990; Bass, 1985). Maccoby (1979) noted that effective leadership is critical to 
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organizations' ability to respond competitively to changing environments. Drucker 
stated that: 
What distinguishes the leader from the misleader are his goals. 
Whether the compromise he makes with constraints of reality-
which may involve political, economic, financial or people 
problems- are compatible with his mission and goals or lead away 
from them determines whether he is an effective leader. And 
whether he holds fast to a few basic standards (exemplifying them 
in his own conduct), or whether "standards" for him are what he 
can get away with it, determines whether the leader has followers 
or only hypocritical time-servers.6 
In the family business field, research on leadership has mainly focused on 
the founder-entrepreneur. Hoy and Verser (1994) note that effective leadership 
involves communicating the vision by the founder to other members of the 
business, including family members and that leadership and culture are 
interrelated (Ward, 1987). 
Hunt and Handler (1999) found that effective family firm leaders are 
motivated by a need for achievement and need for affiliation. In addition, as the 
business goes from one stage of development to the next, effective leadership 
requires different management styles and practices. Some studies show that 
family business leaders have a longer tenure than leaders in non-family firms; 
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and this may be explained by a combination of individual traits, family structure 
and vision, as well as other internal and external factors (Sharma, 2004; Gomez-
Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez, 2001; Keynon-Rouvinez, 2001; McConaughy, 
2000; Sharma, Chrisman and Chua, 1997). 
Multigenerational Survival 
Recently, there has been an increased interest amongst family business 
scholars to study and learn more about long-lived family business "dynasties" 
and their intergenerational transfer (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Jaffe and 
Lane, 2004; Miller, Steier and Le Breton-Miller, 2003). This interest in family 
firms' longevity not ony focuses on large companies, but also small ones. For 
example, Ibrahim, Mcguire, and Soufani (2008) explored factors that contribute to 
the longevity of small family firms. 
According to Jaffe and Lane (2004), global family business dynasties 
control a major share of the world's wealth and serve as the backbone of 
economies in many developing countries and they exercise influence over large 
public corporations. A family business dynasty is one where the multi-generation 
family keeps its family fortune together within a single business or jointly owned 
investment (Hutcheson, Lane, and Jaffe, 2003). Landes (2006) defines a family 
business dynasty as one that has undergone at least three successive 
generations of family control and characterized by continuity of identity and 
interest. 
6
 P. Drucker, Managing for the future: The 1990's and Beyond (New York, NY: Truman 
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Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg (1997) suggested that the 
complexity in the family business increases as the business evolves from an 
owner-operated venture to a cousin consortium. Moreover, these authors noted 
that ownership gets diluted as the family business undergoes multigenerational 
transitions and that by the third generation, the family business may be ruled by 
one branch of the family (management control) while other branches play an 
allied role to the ruling branch. However, as the number of family branches 
increases in multigenerational family firms, the emotional side of the family 
subsystem manifests itself in family conflicts, feuds and rivalries that may have 
been carried over from previous generations. 
As stated previously, only about 10-15% of family businesses make it to 
the third generation (Ward, 1987); and in countries such as the United Kingdom, 
family business dynasties are a dying breed (Moules, 2004). The popular 
American expression 'from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations' 
symbolizes the challenge of family businesses surviving beyond the third 
generation. This expression referred to entrepreneurs who became very 
successful and wealthy in the United States in the late 1800's. When the 
business and wealth was passed down to the next generation- usually sons- they 
squandered most of their money so that their grandsons had to work in 
shirtsleeves again. 
In some cases, a family business ends because of lack of biological 
continuity. The Guggenheim family business, started by Meyer Guggenheim in 
the United States, did not go beyond the third generation because his five sons 
Tatley Books/Dutton, 1992), p. 121. 
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did not produce enough capable heirs (Simpson, 1980; Holbrook, 1954). The 
same fate struck the Astor family business when sixth generation Vincent Astor 
died childless in 1959 (Otten, 1980). 
By the time the family business reaches the third generation, the children 
prefer to enjoy the wealth, rather than continue working in the business. In 
addition, when the family business has investors or is a public company, the 
control of the business is diluted with each generation, as the family sells greater 
control of the company in order to pay inheritance taxes (Otten, 1980). There 
could also be a cultural variable that discourages the continuity of family 
businesses in the United States, and encourages individual success. Robert 
Sobol, Professor of business history at Hofstra University in Hempstead, New 
York stated that, "The old line, 'Son, some day all this will be yours,' is more 
European than American. The wealthy American father tells his son that 
someday he will be able to do whatever he wants."7 
When a cousin consortium of the Du Pont family business took the 
company public , this also marked the first time that the company incorporated 
formal organizational management structures and hired professional managers 
to run the company's operations. Beforehand, the top leader seldom disclosed 
any financial information about the business, but with the new structure, the 
company set up a Board that included family and non-family members, as well as 
an Executive Committee to oversee strategic direction and a Financial Board that 
had veto powers over management decisions (Dutton, 1942). Family leadership 
7
 Frederick C. Klein, "The Sears," in American Dynasties Today, The Wall Street Journal, ed. (New York, 
NY: Dow Jones-Irwin Inc., 1980), p. 47. 
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at Du Pont ended in 1971 when Lammont Du Pont Copeland resigned the 
chairmanship; and with the resignation of senior Vice President Irenee Du Pont 
Jr. in 1978, the company did not have any more Du Ponts in their top 
management ranks (Machalaba and Martin, 1980). 
Compared to the United States, Canada has few family business 
dynasties. The Molsons (described in Chapter 4) has been referred to as 
Canada's 'first family' and is considered the oldest family controlled business and 
the third oldest company in Canada (O'Hara, 2004). In addition to the Molsons, 
The Eaton's family business dynasty was once labelled Canada's "Royal Family" 
(McQueen, 1999). Timothy Eaton, an Irish immigrant who came to Canada in the 
1850's founded the T. Eaton & Co retail shop in 1869. He built it into a Canadian 
retail icon that helped shaped the image of the young nation. 
The demise in 1999 of Eaton's highlighted a common factor that affects 
family business: the lack of appropriate governance systems and lack of strategic 
and succession planning (Ibrahim, Soufani, Lam, and Poutziouris, 2004). John 
Davidson Eaton, the third generation heir who took over the company in 1942, 
lacked the vision and commitment to run the company and only assumed the 
leadership reluctantly. When he died in 1969, he did not name a successor 
amongst his five sons, who decided to run the company by committee and 
mismanaged the business into bankruptcy. 
There is some similarity between the Du Ponts and the Eatons. Both 
companies were started by European immigrants where a common theme, the 
concept of the monarchy, runs in many family dynasties. In private family owned 
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firms, the succession process is often a reflection of family governance that 
dictates that the business is a patrimony that serves the family; thus it should be 
handed down to one successor. This type of governance is typical of the old 
European feudal system, and partially explains the reason for the greater number 
of successful family business dynasties that exist in Europe. For example, one of 
the oldest Italian family firms is Marchesi Antinori SrLb headed by Piero Antinori 
of the 25th generation. Family business succession in this particular business, like 
in other private family businesses, follows primogeniture. The eldest son has 
always been in charge of the business, while other sons or daughters are given 
assistance to pursue their own interests (O'Hara, 2004). 
The previous examples of failure and success in long-lived family firms 
highlighted some factors that may have contributed to the firms' longevity. Jaffe 
and Lane (2004) discussed in their study key issues that multigenerational 
dynasties face and proposed a governance infrastructure that could assist these 
family firms in dealing with the firm's internal and external environments, as well 
stakeholders, in order to ensure the continuity of the family business. 
Moreover, Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and Steier (2004) and Lambrecht 
(2005) proposed succession models that could explain multigenerational 
transition in family firms. According to Lambrecht, survival of multigenerational 
family firms may depend on sound governance as the fundamental principle. 
Lansberg (1999) suggested also that the longevity of the family firm depends not 
only on governance structures and processes, but also on the vision or shared 
dream that keeps the family focused on its values and aspirations. Miller and Le 
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Breton-Miller (2005) added that longevity of multigenerational family firms may 
also be explained by the family adherence to a long-term vision and the 
establishment of a clanlike organizational culture that motivates both family and 
non-family members towards the embracement and pursuit of strong values. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Qualitative Methodology 
The design of a study starts with the selection of a topic and paradigm. In 
the social sciences, paradigms help us understand phenomena by advancing 
assumptions about the social world, how scientific research should be 
conducted, and what constitutes problems, solutions and criteria of proof 
(Creswell, 1998). Paradigms cover both theories and methods; and the two most 
common paradigms are the quantitative and the qualitative. A qualitative 
paradigm is an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem 
based on building a complex picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views 
of informants, and conducted in a natural setting. On the other hand, the 
quantitative paradigm is an inquiry into a social or human problem, based on 
testing a theory, using variables, measured with numbers, analyzed with 
statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the predictive 
generalizations of the theory hold true. In quantitative research, reality is treated 
as objective, while in qualitative research, it is treated as subjective and multiple 
as seen by the participants in the study. 
The present study uses a qualitative paradigm and interpretive approach 
as an exploratory inquiry process to understanding a sociological and 
organizational phenomenon- succession process in a family business over 
several generations. The paradigm in the present qualitative research is referred 
to as constructivist, naturalistic, and interpretive approach. In other words, 
qualitative methods use inductive logic, where categories emerge from 
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informants leading to patterns or theories that help explain a phenomenon 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
In qualitative research, there are several strategies available to the 
researcher. These research strategies include case study, phenomenology, 
ethnography, grounded theory, biographical research, historical research, 
participatory and clinical research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Moreover, the 
qualitative researcher may use a variety of methods such as interviews, focus 
groups, observation, and analysis of documents to collect and analyze the data 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
Goffee (1996) has suggested that qualitative research is an appropriate 
method of inquiry to study family businesses because of the complex relationship 
that exists between family and management. Moreover, Goffee suggests that the 
use of case study, including participant and non-participant observation, provides 
an advantage over surveys in order to study these complex relationships 
between family and the business system. 
Grounded theory has also been used a qualitative research strategy, 
together with case studies and ethnographic studies to study sociological 
phenomena. Glaser and Strauss (1967) proposed the use of grounded theory as 
an approach in generating theory. According to Glaser and Strauss, the 
researcher does not test a priori theories and/or assumptions, but instead using 
comparative studies, the researcher uses the data (and not assumptions) 
simultaneously and continuously to generate theory through a process of 
induction. For example in the case of using a one-case study, Glaser and 
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Strauss, suggests that comparison of data starts with specifying the unit of 
analysis and that "this is done by specifying the dimensions of the concept 
designating the unit. To make certain the reader understands what a given 
monograph will be about, in comparison with seemingly similar units, the author 
compares his unit of analysis with these other units. His comparison brings out 
the distinctive elements or nature of the case he has studied."8 
Case study research has been used to study the characteristics of family 
firms; for example, Alcorn (1982) used case studies to study key issues facing 
small and medium-sized family firms in America. Dunn (1995) studied 
relationships amongst family members in Scottish family firms and Santiago 
(2000) studied the experiences of successors in Philippine family firms. Tsang 
(2001) used a single case to study internationalization issues in a Chinese firm, 
as well as comparative case studies to study the organizational learning 
experience in overseas Chinese family firms (Tsang, 2002). Abetti and Phan 
(2004) used case study to track the growth of a single firm over a 83-year period 
(from 1919 to 2001) by studying critical events during the evolution of the firm, 
including succession issues. In effect, case study research has also been used to 
study family business succession. Barach and Ganitsky (1995) used case study 
research to study a successful succession in one Canadian retail firm, Dyck, 
Mauws, Starke, and Mischke (2002) studied the succession process in one 
American manufacturing firm, Murray (2003) used longitudinal case study to 
study the succession process in five American family firms, and Miller, Steier, 
8
 Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research, (Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1967), p. 25. 
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and Le Breton-Miller (2003) studied intergenerational succession and failure in 
family business successions. 
The use of case studies have also been used in dissertations focused on 
family business issues; for example Hershon (1975) used comparative case 
studies to explore the difficulties encountered in family business succession. 
Holland's dissertation (1981) used cross-case study to explore strategic 
management in family firms. Hollander's dissertation (1983) used case study 
research to study family business as a system and Legler's dissertation (1988) 
used case study to develop a framework to evaluate family business planning. 
More recently, Cater Ill's dissertation (2006) used a cross-case study to study the 
leadership qualities of successors and Hunt's dissertation (2006) used case 
study to study the factors that affect succession in African American family-
owned businesses. 
Case Study Research 
Case study research is a common type of qualitative method used in the 
social sciences. Stake (2005) stated that the "case study is not a methodological 
choice, but a choice of what is to be studied".9 In other words, the researcher 
uses the case study method because of an interest in an individual case (and 
what can be learned from this particular case), rather than being interested in a 
particular method of inquiry. Here the researcher chooses a single case for study 
9
 Robert E. Stake. Qualitative Case Studies. In: The Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, 3rd Edition. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Editors (Thousand Oaks, 
California, 2005), p. 443. 
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and is driven by the epistemological question, "what can be learned from the 
single case"? The advantage of the case study method is that it allows the 
researcher to optimize understanding of the research question(s). Case studies 
can be exploratory, descriptive, and/or explanatory in nature. 
Gerring (2007) defines case study research as an intensive study of a 
single case where "the purpose of the study is- at least in part- to shed light on a 
larger class of cases (a population)."10 Gerring suggests that case study 
research may involve a sample of one or few cases (classified as a case study) 
or a sample of many cases or multiple cases (classified as a cross-case study). 
Gerring also argues that there is "a movement in the social sciences away from a 
variable-centered approach to causality and towards a case-based approach."11 
Yin (1994, 1984) analyzed and evaluated case studies and found that this 
method offers researchers results that may be obtained from qualitative studies 
and used to bring expert knowledge of the phenomena studied, round up 
relevant data, and ponder and probe the degree to which the findings have 
implications elsewhere. Furthermore, case study research allows an investigation 
that retains holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as life 
cycles, organizational and managerial processes, international relations, and 
maturation of industries. 
Case study research can be used as an exploration that can lead to 
generalization-producing studies, or even as an occasional early step towards 
10
 J. Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 20. 
11
 Ibid, p. 3. 
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theory building (Stake, 2005, 1994). Vaughan (1992) has argued that an intrinsic 
case study can be seen as a small step toward grand generalization, though 
generalization should not be seen as the emphasis of the case study research 
method because it may draw the researcher away from features that are 
important about the case study, and according to Stake (1994), not everything 
about a case can be understood. Flyvbjerg (2006) further argued that "formal 
generalization is only one of many ways by which people gain and accumulate 
knowledge. That knowledge cannot be formally generalized does not mean that it 
cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given 
field or in a society."12 Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that case studies may be used 
to provide desciption, to test theory, and/or generate theory. 
According to Yin (1994), there has been confusion as to the strengths of 
the case study method. He suggested that some common flaws were to treat 
case study as an exploratory research strategy, often being confused with 
ethnographic and participant-observer methods. Yin argues that the case study is 
an empirical study that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. According to 
Yin, "case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations or universes."13 Yin (1984) argues that the strengths and 
weaknesses of the case study method have been misunderstood by researchers. 
12
 B. Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research," Qualitative Inquiry, 
(April, 2006): p. 227. 
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The continued use of case study as a research strategy in the social sciences 
(sociology, business, psychology, etc) suggests that this method has merits. 
Eisenhardt (1989) proposed a process to build theories from case studies. 
This process uses inductive logic to analyze data and build theories from the 
case study. According to Eisenhardt, the research process includes the use of 
grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), case research design (Yin, 1984), 
and data codification (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Gerring (2007) suggests that 
the case under study always provides at least two observations for analysis. For 
example, in the case of a family business succession, a researcher may observe 
changes over time, or focus on variables before and after the succession has 
taken place. In a cross-case study, the researcher may study one variable across 
several cases. Thus in a study of a single or few cases (a sample), the 
researcher focuses on within-case variations, while in a cross-study sample, the 
researcher focuses on cross-case variation. Moreover, a research design that 
focuses on one case implies an intensive study of the phenomeon. Conversely, a 
research design that incorporates the analysis of several cases suggests a less 
intensive study of each case. According to Gerring, a study that consists of 
multiple cases may provide more confidence in some boader aspect of the 
population; however, "the sample of cases (large or small) rests within a 
population of cases to which a given proposition refers."14 Nonetheless, a 
13
 R. K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed., (Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1994), p. 10. 
14
 Gerring, p. 22. 
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research design may focus on a single case or on multiple cases, depending on 
the purpose of the study. 
Gerring (2007) has proposed that case study research design can be 
classified according to "(a) the number of cases that they encompass (one, 
several, or many), (b) the kind of X/Y variation that they exploit (spatial or 
temporal), and (c) the location of that variation (cross-case or within-case)."15 
Table 1 shows Gerring's case research design typology. According to Gerring, 
there are ten possible case research designs, of which five types (type 2 to type 
6) can be applied to case study and the other possibilities to cross-case study. 
Type 2, 3, and 4 are of special interest to the present study. Type 2 refers to a 
single case study with variation over time (diachronic), type 3 is a single case 
study with within-variation at a single point of time (synchronic), and type 4 is a 
combination of both diachronic and synchronic analysis. 








Cross-case & within-case 
Cross-case 
Cross-case & within-case 
Temporal Variation 
No 
1. [Logically impossible] 
3. Single-case study 
(synchronic) 




2. Single-case study 
(diachronic) 
4. Single-case study 
Synchronic + diachronic) 
6. Comparative-historical 
8. Time-series cross-sectional 
10. Hierarchical time-series 
15
 Gerring, p. 27. 
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A weakness of case study research has been the issue of accuracy and 
precision of the information and the validity of the results. Stake (2005, 1994) and 
Yin (1994, 1984) suggest that to reduce bias and misinterpretation, information 
can be verified with informants or by triangulation of the information from different 
sources of data. Triangulation may be seen as a process of verifying the 
repeatability of an observation or interpretation by using multiple perceptions to 
clarify the meaning. 
The issue of validity is important in research. Yin (1994) argues that case 
study researchers can use several tactics to enhance the validity of their 
research. The case study tactics are: construct validity (use triangulation in data 
collection), internal validity (used for explanatory studies by showing causal 
relationship), external validity (use analytic generalization to determine whether 
findings are generalizable), and reliability (to reduce errors and biases in the 
study by creating an operational procedure that allows for someone else to 
replicate the case). In other words, the researcher can reduce flaws in the study 
by corroborating information through triangulation of strategies, settings for data, 
and sources of data. Scandura and Williams (2000) noted the use of triangulation 
as a tool for internal, external, construct, and statistical validity. 
Research Design of Current Study 
The present research is historical case study research to evaluate the 
succession process in the oldest Canadian family business, the Molson family 
16
 Ibid, p. 28. 
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business. This research identified and examined the critical events and 
processes that have led to several family business successions and a case 
research study was built consistent with Gerring (2007) and Yin (1994, 1984). 
The approach is to build a single in-depth longitudinal case study and create a 
narrative of the Molson family business from its inception by the founder, John 
Molson in 1786 to the present sixth-generation leader Eric Molson and his sons 
(Chapter 4). Menard (1991) suggests that longitudinal research can be used to 
describe patterns of change over a period of time, as well as to provide more 
understanding about casual relationships. According to Menard, time refers to 
chronological time (historical) and age (biological time for subjects). 
The case study research evaluates the succession processes at the 
Molson family business before and after each leadership transfer and also at the 
point of succession (Gerring, 2007). A narrative form is used to build a single 
case that focuses on lives of individuals, as well as critical business and family 
incidents and/or events related to the firm's succession processes. 
Research Questions 
Eisenhardt (1989) proposed that a focused and defined research question 
is similar to hypothesis-testing reseach. For example, she cites the study by 
Mintzberg & McHugh (1985) that used one single case to research strategy 
formulation in an adhocracy, the National Film Board of Canada over six periods 
(from 1939-1975). Mintzberg and McHugh collected data from archives and from 
some interviews and concluded with a model of strategy formulation. Mintzberg 
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and Waters (1982) also used a single case study to track strategy in an 
entrepreneurial firm, retail chain Steinberg's, over a period of 60 years of its 
history (from its start in the 1920's to the mid-1970's). Mintzberg and Waters 
research process involved four steps: (1) collection of basic data and 
chronological events that influenced the firm's organizational history; (2) 
inference of patterns and periods that influenced strategy decision-making in the 
firm; (3) an investigation of the transition from one period to the next, as well as 
analysis of tangible and soft data; (4) building theory using an inductive process 
focused on conceptual issues arising from the research. 
The main purpose in this dissertation is to explore and examine the 
succession processes and planning that have taken place in the Molson family 
business over the past six generations, starting from the founder in 1786 to the 
current generation running the business. How were the successions carried out 
in this particular family business? How has the Molson family business been able 
to survive seven generations, while other family business fail after one or two 
generations? In order to find answers to these questions, the case study 
research evaluates critical factors associated with effective succession. 
Furthermore, based on the literature review on family business and succession 
process, the researcher examined the following research questions: 
1. How has the Molson family managed the overlap between the family 
system and the business system? 
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2. How did the founder/leader prepare for succession? 
3. What are the characteristics of the founder and leaders of the Molson 
family business? 
4. How has resistance to succession planning been manifested in the 
founder and/or in subsequent leaders of the family business? 
5. How were the roles of offspring defined within the family business? 
6. What kind of grooming process exist in the family business? 
7. How has the Molson family business selected the next-generation 
leaders? 
In order to answer these questions, the research examined variables that 
have been commonly cited by other researchers in the family business field and 
which seems to be identified as critical factors associated with effective 
succession planning (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Ibrahim, Soufani, Lam, and 
Poutziouris, 2004; Ibrahim, Soufani, and Lam, 2001; Davis and Harveston, 1998; 
Rubenson and Gupta, 1996; Gallo, 1995; Kets de Vries, 1993; Handler, 1992 & 
1990; Ward, 1987; Beckhard and Dyer, 1983a; Lansberg, 1983; Longenecker 
and Schoen, 1978; Barnes and Hershon, 1976). These variables are: role of the 
founder/leader, resistance to succession planning, selection of next-generation 
leader, grooming of the next-generation members, and conflict management. 
Table 2 shows the research mapping of variables associated with succession 
planning. 
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Table 2. Individual and Group Level Factors Associated with Succession Planning 
Obs 1 (role of 
founder/leader) 
Obs 1.1 (T1) 
Obs 1.2 (T2) 
Obs 1.3 (T3) 
Obs 1.4 (T4) 
Obs 1.5 (T5) 




Obs 2.1 (T1) 
Obs 2.2 (T2) 
Obs 2.3 (T3) 
Obs 2.4 (T4) 
Obs 2.5 (T5) 




Obs 3.1 (T1) 
Obs 3.2 (T2) 
Obs 3.3 (T3) 
Obs 3.4 (T4) 
Obs 3.5 (T5) 






Obs 4.1 (T1) 
Obs 4.2 (T2) 
Obs 4.3 (T3) 
Obs 4.4 (T4) 
Obs 4.5 (T5) 






Obs 5.1 (T1) 
Obs 5.2 (T2) 
Obs 5.3 (T3) 
Obs 5.4 (T4) 
Obs 5.5 (T5) 














































Scholars have suggested that reluctance to let go of the business can be 
manifested in the leader's emotional attachment to the business, the leader's 
mistrust in the competence or abilities of offspring, fear of retirement and/or lack 
of outside interests (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Stavrou, 1999; Rubenson and 
Gupta, 1996; Sharma, Chrisman and Chua,1996; Astrachan and Kolenko, 1994; 
Seymour, 1993; Handler, 1990; Lansberg, 1988; Jacobs, 1986; Dyer, 1986; 
Zaleznik and Kets de Vries, 1985; Rosenblatt, de Mik, Andreson, and Johnson, 
1985; Beckhard and Dyer, 1983a; Alcorn, 1982; Barnes and Hershon, 1976; 
Levinson, 1971; Davis, 1968). 
Succession is a process that last over a long period of time, rather than a 
single event of passing the baton to the next-generation (Aronoff; 1998; Davis 
and Harveston, 1998; Ward, 1990; Davis and Tagiurui, 1989; Churchill and 
Hatten, 1987). Succession planning starts with grooming of the offspring for 
leadership positions in the family business (Handler, 1992; Levinson, 1971). 
Factors associated with the grooming process include the preparation of younger 
members for entry into the family business and mutual role adjustment between 
the older and the younger generation whereby the older generation relinquishes 
gradually responsibilities to the younger generation (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; 
Ibrahim, Soufani, and Lam, 2003; Stavrou, 1999; Zaudtke and Ammerman, 1997; 
Handler, 1994, 1992, 1990, & 1989a; Churchill and Hatten, 1987; Fox, Nikalant 
and Hamilton, 1986; Alcorn, 1982). 
Family businesses that are able to decouple the family-business system in 
an objective manner may reduce conflicts that can affect the succession process 
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(Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004). Moreover, decoupling the family-business system also 
involves the offspring setting their own paths of self-validation associated with 
their roles in the family business (Levinson, 1971). The relationships between 
fathers and sons, as well as the relationships amongst siblings and extended 
family members may create carry-over conflicts that affect the family business 
(Danco, 1991; Friedman, 1991; Handler, 1990; Davis and Tagiuri, 1989; Barach, 
1984; Alcorn, 1982; Levinson, 1971; Davis, 1968). 
Family businesses resemble monarchies in which the eldest son 
(primogeniture) is the heir to the business (Goldberg and Woolbridge, 1993; 
Dyer, 1986; Alcorn, 1982). The selection of the next generation leader is a key 
step in succession planning (Hunt and Handler, 1999; Ibrahim, McGuire, Ismail, 
and Dumas, 1999; Hoy and Verser, 1994; Lansberg and Astrachan, 1994; 
Malone and Jenster, 1992; Ward, 1987; Barach, 1984; Lansberg, 1983; Danco, 
1982; Longenecker and Schoen, 1978). In addition, nepotism plays a role in the 
selection of the successor (Lansberg and Astrachan, 1994; Goldberg and 
Wooldridge, 1993; Osborne, 1991; Barnes, 1988; Danco, 1982; Alcorn, 1982; 
Levinson, 1971; Donnelley, 1964). 
Data Collection 
Data collection involved the study of documentation of historical and 
contemporary data published in annual reports, books, monographs, and 
periodicals about the Molson company and family members, in accordance to 
guidelines suggested by qualitative researchers (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 2005; 
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Creswell, 1998; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). The fieldwork 
research involved access to company and family documents dating back to 1786 
and stored at the Molson Archives at Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa. 
Access to the Molson Archives is restricted and requires approval from the 
family. The Molson family granted permission for the researcher to access these 
archives. 
Prior (2004, 2003) suggests that documents have content and serve as 
active agents of human interaction. According to Prior, the researcher may need 
to take into consideration how the documents are manufactured and used in 
organizational settings. In the present research, an examination of archived 
documents included business memoranda, market reports, as well as family 
documents, including personal diaries, family letters, wills and testaments. 
In addition, the researcher interviewed Mr. Patrick Kelley, former Senior 
Vice President for International Brewing Strategy for Molson Inc. and consultant 
to the Molson family, to gather additional information about the current 
generation (see Appendix 1 for interview questions). The research involving 
human subjects was approved by the research ethics committee at John Molson 
School of Business. The interview process involved contacting Mr. Kelley by 
telephone to inform him of the purpose of the study, as well as sending him a 
copy of the interview questions beforehand for preview. Mr. Kelley agreed to 
participate and was given the opportunity to remain anonymous, which he 
declined. The interview was conducted in an informal manner in Mr. Kelley's 
office and a digital recorder was used to tape the interview questions, which were 
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qualitative and open-ended answers. Mr. Kelley was reminded by the researcher 
that should he object to the taping or felt uneasy about the interview, the 
researcher would turn off the recording device. An electronic file of the interview 
was labeled and transcribed. A copy of the raw transcription was sent to Mr. 
Kelley for review and/or corrections. The electronic file has been stored in the 
JMSB's network and only the researcher and his thesis supervisor has access to 
this file. 
Data Analysis 
The reseacher used the data collected from the study of archived 
documentation and from the interview to build a historical case study focused on 
major events that shaped the family business. This data was analyzed and the 
results were triangulated using the case study research method suggested by 
Gerring (2007), Stake (2005), Eisenhardt (1989), and Yin (1984), in order to 
explore and better understand the succession process at the Molson family 
business. The case study used chronological time to split the company's history 
into six generations. 
In Chapter 5, the within-case data analysis focused on factors related to 
effective succession process in each generation as identified in Table 2. Here, 
the researcher used four data analysis strategies17: content analysis to study the 
characteristics from family and non-family members, event structure analysis to 
discover patterns in the succession process, reflective phenomenology in order 
17
 Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA, 1994), p. 7. 
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to better understand the commonalities and uniquenesss of succession 
processes in the Molson family business, and interpretion of the results from the 
longitudinal historical case study to identify critical events and actions, as well as 
to highlight evidence supporting the factors associated with effective succession 
planning identified in the research questions. Also, the analysis of the data were 
at the individual (founders, next generation members, and non-family members) 
and group level (interpersonal conflicts and intergenerational transition), 
consistent with the family business research (Sharma, 2004). 
These critical events and actions were coded, labelled and filed according 
to recurring themes associated with effective succesion process in a separate file 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Moreover by using a context-driven approach, the 
researcher used an inductive coding technique to collect and write-up the data, 
followed by a careful review of lines and paragraphs to generate categories 
related to succession process and planning (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Observations emerging from these categories were then coded according to 
patterns and these patterns matched and grounded against the variables 
identified in the research questions (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). 
Based on the content analysis of the data, open categories emerged from 
the case study research, and these were grouped under individual and group 
levels of analysis. Each level was further subdivided into sub-categories 
associated with succession planning (Appendix 2). From, this analysis, the 
researcher inferred common patterns, similarities, and unifying themes present in 
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each generation of the Molson family business. The case study and its analysis 
focused on the Molson family and the branch that has controlled and run the 
brewing business. 
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Chapter 4: The Molson Family Business Case Research 
The Founder and Patriarch: John Molson 
John Molson was 18 years old when he first came to visit Canada in 1782. 
Woods (1983) painted a picture of a young man, who encouraged by his uncle 
Robinson Elsdale took a sea trip to visit Canada and explore opportunities in this 
new land. John Molson was born in Lincolnshire near the east coast of England; 
and his family were farmers and landowners. At the age of six, tragedy struck the 
young boy when his father (also named John Molson) died at age 40; this was 
followed by the death of his mother two years later (Molson, 2001; Hunter, 2001, 
Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955). 
Hunter (2001) reported that when John's mother died he became the main 
beneficiary of his father's estate, which included 38 acres of land; John's two 
sisters (Mary and Martha) and youngest brother (Thomas) also received smaller 
parcels of land, while his younger brother (Samuel) received £100. The five 
orphans were now under the care of their maternal grandfather Samuel Elsdale. 
Molson (2001) and Hunter (2001) described the relationship between John 
Molson and his grandfather as conflictual. At the time, John had to wait until he 
turned 21 in order to receive the benefits of his father's inheritance and his 
grandfather kept a tight hold on the finances of the estate throughout his youth. 
Shortly after his arrival in Montreal, John Molson decided to make this city 
his new home and wrote back to his grandfather to tell him of his decision. While 
in Montreal, John stayed with a family friend, Thomas Lloyd who had emigrated 
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earlier and had settled in the city.18 Mr. Lloyd was planning to start a small 
brewery to service the growing numbers of British soldiers. Molson (2001) and 
Hunter (2001) noted that John likely had some basic knowledge of brewing and 
recognizing that Mr. Lloyd needed assistance to get the brewery going, he 
became a partner in the new enterprise in September 1783. 
Towards the end of 1784, the two partners were sued by an employee, 
John Waite, for unpaid wages. In turn, John Molson sued Thomas Lloyd for an 
unpaid debt and the brewery was seized and placed at auction in December, 
which attracted no buyers (Hunter 2001). In January of 1785, the brewery was 
placed again at an auction and John Molson bought it (Woods, 1983).19 
With full title to the brewery, John Molson started the process of 
formalizing its operations. In 1785 he went back to England to settle the state of 
his father and mother. He liquidated his assets in England and proceeded to 
purchase brewing equipment and barley seeds to bring back to Canada (Hunter 
2001; Molson 2001). Woods (1983) and Denison (1955) speculate that John 
Molson likely had a chance to tour the Whitbread brewery which was located not 
far from where he was staying in London, as well as to witness the operation of 
the steam engine (developed by James Watt) to grind and malt the barley. In 
Different authors have spelled the name differently. Hunter (2001) and Denison (1955) 
spelled it Loid, Woods (1983) spelled it Loyd, and Molson (2001) spelled it Lloyd. See: M. 
Denison, The Barley and the Stream: The Molson Story, (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart 
Ltd., 1955). 
19
 Note that Hunter (2001), Woods (1983), Denison (1955), and Sandwell (1933) write 
that there was probably a prior agreement between Thomas Lloyd and John Molson concerning 
the brewery operation. Because John Molson was still a minor in 1784, he was not entitled to own 
such an operation. However, by January 1785, John Molson had reached majority. John Molson 
would later bequeath to Thomas Lloyd land that he owned in Vermont. 
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addition to buying brewing equipment, John Molson also purchased barley seeds 
because during his brief time in Montreal he had noted the poor quality of barley 
grown in this area (Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955). 
Another key event happened while John Molson was in London. He 
purchased two books, Theoretical Hints On An Improved Practice Of Brewing by 
John Richardson and Lord Chesterfield's Letters To His Son by Lord 
Chesterfield.20 These guides played critical roles not only in the future 
development of the business, but also in the development of his personal 
character and those of future generations (Hunter, 2001; Molson, 2001; Woods, 
1983; Denison, 1955). The book by John Richardson was an important one 
because at the time brewing was still considered a mystery; and this treatise was 
one of the first to deal with the scientific aspect of brewing (Woods, 1983). 
According to Woods (1983), Lord Chesterfield's Letters to His Son 
imparted to the young John Molson high standards for achievement, common 
sense, personal perfection, morals, ethics, honesty, dedication to work, and the 
need for knowledge; many of these traits were manifested in later generations. 
Upon his return to Montreal, John Molson started repairing and working on the 
brewery right away and quickly distributed the barley seeds to farmers telling 
them to grow it and that he would buy the barley within the year. With confidence, 
he wrote to his attorney in London "Good ales is all I want, plenty of Customers & 
Good profits will immediately follow- have not the least doubt about my making 
Philip Dormer Stanhope Chesterfield, Lord Chesterfield: Letters to his Son and Others, 
(London: J.M. Dent & Sons; New York: E.P. Dutton, 1929). 
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Good Ale."21 Hunter (2001) also notes that Lord Chesterfield's book was 
beginning to have an impact on the young man by instilling in him the confidence 
to succeed. For example, on July 28, 1786, Molson wrote in his journal "Bought 8 
Bushels of Barley to Malt first this Season- [My] Commencement on the Grand 
Stage of the World."22 The initial production was 4 hogsheads per week.23 
Woods (1983) suggested that four hogshead per week was not sufficient 
to make a good profit or to meet the increasing demand for Molson's beer. On 
December 13, 1786, John Molson wrote his first annual report to his attorney 
Philip Ashley, "The speculation now is beginning to show in good Ale and Table 
Beer- can acquaint my friend that my beer has the readiest sale and orders are 
by one half more than can execute."24 For the next several years, the primary 
focus of John Molson's correspondence to his attorney was to get the money 
from his inheritance as soon as possible in order to expand the brewery 
operations and production capacity (Hunter, 2001; Woods, 1983). During this 
period, John Molson also hired Sarah Vaughan to assist him in the business; and 
she later became his wife (Molson, 2006). 
In the summer of 1787, the brewery had doubled its production capacity 
(first year production was estimated to be about 5,000 gallons25), even more 
21
 Hunter, p. 180. 
22
 Ibid., p. 181. 
23
 A hogshead is a large barrel cask that holds 52.5 imperial gallons (or 63 American 
gallons) of liquid. 
24
 Woods, p. 23. 
25
 Ibid., p. 27. 
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important was the birth of his eldest son, John Molson Junior (John Jr.). In 1791, 
John Sr.'s second son Thomas was born followed in 1793 by his third son, 
William (see Figure 3 for details of the Molson family tree). By 1791, production 
capacity had reached 30,000 gallons and output of 27,000 gallons (Denison, 
1955). Further expansion of the brewery facilities in 1795 brought annual 
production to 50,000-54,000 gallons (Woods, 1983, Denison, 1955). 
The inheritance battles involving John Sr. and his siblings in England 
consumed some of his time and likely affected the context of a will he wrote 
January 1, 1795 (Hunter, 2001). He broke from old traditions and primogeniture 
and dictated that the brewery and other properties be shared equally amongst his 
wife and three sons (or four children if his wife were to be pregnant when he 
died). However in 1801 when John Sr. and Sarah Vaughan officially married, the 
marriage contract specified that the brewery would reside with John Sr.'s estate 
and that Sarah would be entitled to an annuity in lieu of share of the property. 
This was done to circumvent Quebec Civil Code provision for community of 
property, that is, Sarah would inherit the bulk of the estate if John were to die 
before her (Woods, 1983). In Montreal, Anglican John Sr. attended St. Gabriel's 
Presbyterian Church on a regular basis and his three sons also followed the 
Protestant faith. In 1841, Thomas, who was a very devout Anglican, broke with 
Anglican norms and established his own unconsecrated Anglican church, St. 
Thomas Church, next to the brewery (Denison, 1955).26 
Denison (1955) and Woods (1983) note that this church was later destroyed in a fire 
and rebuilt. It was demolished by the next generation to make way for expansion to the brewery. 
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Figure 3. The Molson Family 
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Of the three sons, John Jr. resembled his father in character and 
personality (Molson, 2001). He was driven with a high need to achieve, was 
reserved, and wanted to please his father. At the age of fourteen, John Jr. started 
his apprenticeship at the brewery. Eventually he became John Sr.'s right-hand 
man. Thomas was the opposite of John Jr.; he was more of a perfectionist, very 
detailed-oriented, innovative and technology-minded. He was also highly 
competitive against his older brother and this led to sibling conflict. William, the 
youngest son, was good in arithmetic and art. 
During the early 1800's, John Sr. expanded his real estate holdings into 
the growing Upper Canada region (including properties in York). It was 
suggested that John Sr. likely had intentions to expand brewing activities to the 
city of York (Toronto) as a means to providing a legacy for each of his three 
sons, but that it was not clear to John Sr. how he could manage the business 
from Montreal (Hunter, 2001; Denison, 1955). Instead, John Sr. became 
fascinated by the news of the launch of The Clermont, a steamboat built by 
Boulton & Watt in England, which traveled from New York City to Albany. John 
Sr. used the profits generated by the brewing activities to finance the 
construction of Canada's first steamboat, The Accommodation, which according 
to Denison (1955) was used initially as a public service for travel between 
Quebec City and Montreal. Over the next 20 years, John Sr. became known as 
the 'Bourgeois de Steamboats' as he built several more steamboats (the 
Swiftsure, the Malsham, the Lady Sherbrooke, and the New Swiftsure) to 
compete in the growing transportation industry linking (Quebec City to Montreal, 
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to Ottawa, and Kingston) which he had created. In addition to passenger 
transportation, the steamboats were also used to distribute beer and to serve as 
a floating commercial bank. 
By 1809, John Sr.'s interests were more focused on the steamboat and 
the banking business, even though the brewery was doing well and producing 
about 75,000 gallons of ale and beer. His eldest son, John Jr. had already been 
actively involved in all facets of the brewing, steamboat, and banking business. 
The second son Thomas was working at the brewery. Prior to a trip to England in 
1810, John Sr. drew up a new will where he reverted back to the concept of 
primogeniture and appointed John Jr. as designated heir-apparent, attorney and 
chief beneficiary of all his properties. He included the proviso that Thomas and 
William would have the opportunity to join the brewery business, as well as 
receive an annuity of £250 (Hunter, 2001; Woods, 1983). 
In doing so, John Sr. upheld British Common Law traditions of hierarchy of 
birth, where the eldest (just as John Sr. himself had benefited from his father's 
estate) would receive the majority of the estate, and in the event of the eldest 
son's death, the next son would be the prime beneficiary, and so on (Hunter, 
2001). 
After John Sr.'s return from England in 1811, both Thomas and William 
joined the business; but during the War of 1812, Thomas was put in charge of 
the family business, while John Sr., John Jr., and William enlisted in the army. 
After the end of the War in 1814, the business underwent a restructuring, with 
John Jr. taking care of the steamboat and banking business, Thomas managing 
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the real estate, and William replacing Thomas at the brewery. Meanwhile, John 
Sr., with estimated personal assets of £127,000, decided to focus his energies on 
new challenges. In 1816, he was elected to the Quebec Legislative Assembly 
representing East Montreal. In addition, he worked on one of his pet projects- the 
creation of a public hospital, the Montreal General Hospital which was founded in 
1819. All four Molsons were appointed Governors of the hospital, and John Sr. 
later served as President. Also, in 1817 John Sr. declined an offer to join other 
investors to establish the Bank of Montreal (Woods 1983). 
The Second Generation: Family Partnerships, Cooperation and Feuds 
In December of 1815, John Sr. addressed both John Jr. and Thomas on 
the subject of marriage and informed them that their two cousins back in 
Lincolnshire, Mary Anne and Martha were potential brides, who had inherited the 
estate of Thomas Molson (John Sr. younger brother) (Molson, 2001 ).27 According 
to Woods (1983), all three sons were dutiful, obedient, independent, and 
ambitious and had approached their father previously on the subject of setting up 
a partnership. All three also worked for the benefit of the family business without 
taking any compensation. Hunter (2001) suggested that the marriages were 
carried out by the sons to put more pressure on their father to form a formal 
family business partnership. On December 14, 1816, John Sr. agreed to a formal 
agreement where he contributed most of the assets, while John Jr. contributed 
the Swiftsure steamboat. The business was renamed John Molson & Sons. The 
60 
contract, with its term of seven years, called for 6% return to be paid for the 
assets and any profits above the 6% split equally amongst the four partners. This 
contract effectively shifted the management control of the business to the three 
sons, who were motivated to work harder. Annual production increased to 
100,000 gallons, as well, the quality of the product improved with Thomas as the 
brewmaster (Hunter 2001; Woods, 1983). In addition, other business projects 
were undertaken. One was the establishment of the first luxury hotel in Montreal 
at the time, the Mansion House Hotel, and the other was the creation of an 
industrial grain-distillery, which produced whiskey and spirits. It remained the 
largest distillery in Canada until the 1860's (Denison, 1955). 
According to Hunter (2001) Thomas' marriage to his cousin Martha in 
England without a legal contract was a 'grave miscalculation' and noted that: 
Thomas marriage paralyzed the estate. In the absence of a 
marriage contract, the civil code of the province dictated that 
half of any interest Thomas was given in the brewery was 
automatically the property of Martha; and in her own will, she 
could leave her share to whomever she pleased. This 
threatened John Senior's ambitions to keep the enterprise he 
had so painstakingly built within the direct control of his 
descendants. Thomas presented the worst possible scenario for 
his father. While being the son the best suited to carry on the 
brewing business, he was also the son who could ultimately 
cause the family to lose outright control of it.28 
From 1815 to 1822, the steamboat business generated over half of the 
company's profits, but with the arrival of new competitors, the transportation 
market became a cutthroat business, with all players building stronger boats. 
Note also that both Woods (1983) and Hunter (2001) thought it inconceivable that 
John Sr. might have arranged the marriages while he was visiting England in 1811. 
Hunter, p. 371. 
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However by 1822, steamboat companies including the Molsons' steamboats, 
consolidated into the St. Lawrence Steamboat Company, with John Sr. as the 
majority shareholder (Hunter, 2001; Woods, 1983). In 1822, at age 59, John Sr. 
was ready to retire and had already purchased an island facing the brewery 
where he planned to pursue his horticulture hobby. However, serious conflicts 
between John Jr. and Thomas over strategic direction of the company threatened 
the partnership. Thomas had added distilling to the brewery business and wanted 
to continue growing the distilled spirits division of the business, while John Jr. 
wanted to concentrate on steamboats and banking (Woods, 1983). Hunter (2001) 
noted that: 
John Junior had an implicit veto as the partnership came up for 
renewal; everything was going to be left to him by their father, 
and he would not tolerate any divergence from the basic 
business plan that could deteriorate the value of the underlying 
assets. But having returned to Quebec City in 1822 to run the 
steamboat company with William, John Junior was completely 
removed from the day-to-day affairs of the brewery, which had 
fallen to Thomas. And by 1823, Thomas clearly was unhappy 
with his position, not only within the partnership but within his 
father's estate.29 
Furthermore, John Sr. was aware that Martha intended to exercise her 
rights according to provincial law to dispose of Thomas' assets as she wished in 
her own will. She had bequeathed her assets to the children of her brother 
Thomas in Lincolnshire, England. This created a problem to John Sr., who 
wanted to be fair to Thomas, yet he could not bequeath to him the brewery 
assets. Even after legal consultation, John Sr. was not able to find a proper 
solution to Thomas' marriage oversight (Hunter 2001). 
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The conflict between John Jr. and Thomas was irreconcilable (though they 
still remained on friendly terms); and the fact that both John Sr. and William had 
remained neutral over the distillery issue led to Thomas quitting the partnership. 
On December 2, 1823, a new partnership was signed among John Sr., John Jr., 
and William (Hunter, 2001; Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955). Soon after quitting the 
partnership, Thomas went to England to explore opportunities. In a letter written 
to Thomas in early January 1824, John Sr. expressed his unhappiness: 
... Our friends think it wrong that we should have separated-1 
know that but had it not been for your reasons I should not have 
listened to it... to me you are all alike; I shall act as nearly equal 
to you all as I can. Whatever you decide on or whatever you do, 
may it turn out for the best...30 
Ultimately, Thomas decided to relocate to Kingston, Ontario where he built 
a small brewery and distillery. He remained there for almost a decade (Molson, 
2001). Prior to Thomas departure from the business, a decision had been made 
to hire the first outsider as brewmaster to help Thomas at the brewery, but he did 
not last long before being let go. After Thomas left, both John Sr. and William 
alternated the brewmaster duties, and that brewery output, on the other hand, 
had remained constant without any increase because of the emergence of the 
temperance movement whose goal was the prohibition of sales of alcoholic 
beverages (Denison, 1955). 
On July 1, 1828, the old partnership (John Molson & Sons) was renewed 
with John Sr. holding two shares, and both John Jr. and William holding one 
Ibid., p. 378. 
Woods, p. 81. 
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share each. Once again, the brewery assets were leased to the partnership at an 
annual rent of 6% on an agreed valuation of about £18,000 (Denison, 1955). By 
now John Sr. was 65 yrs old. He reduced his business activities while focusing 
on public service activities. In April 1829 a few weeks after Sarah's death, John 
Jr. withdrew from the partnership to start a business in retail and import/export. 
Hunter (2001) suggested that Sarah may have been the glue that bounded the 
family business together.31 A new partnership was set up between John Sr. and 
William to continue operating the brewery; but a year later, William also set up an 
import/export business in partnership with his brother-in-law, John Badgley, while 
at the same time being the sole manager of the brewery (Woods, 1983; Denison, 
1955). 
In 1830, John Sr. wrote a new will where he once again treated all three 
sons equally. John Jr. and Thomas were to inherit the majority of his real estate 
properties. William was to inherit the brewery and if he had no heirs, then the 
brewery would go to John Jr. and Thomas (Hunter, 2001). Hunter (2001) also 
noted that as John Sr.'s sons drifted away into their own ventures, he could 
envision his sons likely getting rid of the brewery, just as he had done with his 
father's estate in Lincolnshire. In 1832, John Jr. became the President of the 
Champlain and St. Lawrence Railroad Company, with William as one of the 
directors. Although John Sr. was a major shareholder of the new railroad 
company, he was not active in its operations because he had been appointed in 
31
 Note that little evidence is identified of women involvement in the succession process in the Molson 
family business. 
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January 1832 to the Legislative Council in Quebec City, which advised the 
Governor General on government policies (Woods, 1983). 
During the early 1830's, several cholera epidemics had swept Upper and 
Lower Canada, claiming in January 1834 the life of Thomas' eldest son, also 
named Thomas.32 As John Sr.'s health deteriorated, he wrote a letter to Thomas 
in August asking him to come back to Montreal and take care of the brewery, 
which had not been upgraded over the past 10 years (Woods, 1983).33 Thomas 
accepted his father's invitation without hesitation, though Hunter (2001) 
suggested that the prodigal son decision to return to Montreal was likely 
influenced by a major economic downturn that had affected Upper Canada in 
1833-1834. In February 1835, the new partnership John Molson & Sons was 
established to run the brewing and distilling business, with Thomas and William 
holding three shares each and John Sr. holding two shares (Woods, 1983; 
Denison, 1955). 
In the winter of 1835 John Sr. kept up with his Legislative Council duties, 
but in January 1836 he caught a bad cold (Hunter, 2001; Woods, 1983). On his 
death bed on January 7, he asked for a notary to write a new will for he was 
worried about the future of the brewery as well as failing his promise to his son 
Thomas than of dying (Hunter, 2001). In this, his last will, John Sr. made John Jr. 
the main beneficiary of his estate, leaving him most of his real estate properties 
around the Montreal area; and to William, John Sr. left all his properties in 
Hunter (2001) noted that Thomas' first two children, John and Sarah Anne had died as 
infants in Montreal. 
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Quebec City. Yet, for Thomas, the brewer of the family, he could not leave him 
the brewery, so he reached to the third generation, as follows: 
I give and bequeath to my Grandson John Molson, son of 
Thomas Molson, the whole of those extensive buildings 
comprising brewery, houses, stores (old and new) with the lot of 
ground whereon the same erected. If my Grandson should not 
survive to the age of twenty-one years or that he shall not be 
brought up to follow the brewing business- then I do give and 
bequeath the same to my next Grandson named John Molson, 
and should he die before the age of twenty-one years, or not be 
brought up and follow the brewing business, then I direct that the 
said last mentioned premises shall go into & form part of the 
residue of my Estate- In the meantime, however, the said 
premises to be enjoyed by my two sons Thomas and William in 
Copartnership which shall be conducted and continued under the 
terms of the Memorandum of Copartnership before Griffin, Notary 
Public dated the twenty-first of February, 1835 which partnership 
shall be continued for the benefit of my three sons in the 
proportions therein set forth.34 
According to Molson (2001), in four previous wills, John Sr. had 
bequeathed the brewery to William, but changed his mind at the last minute; and 
that for John Sr. keeping the brewery intact was important for he "had known its 
[brewery] profitability was sound and would stand the test of time. He believed it 
would be his children's only enduring link to him, and therefore considered the 
brewery separate from the estate."35 There was also a request in the will that his 
portrait (painted while he was in London in 1810-1811) hang in the boardroom of 
the brewery for as long as the brewery was owned by family members. However, 
Ibid. The reason for John Sr. to write to Thomas was likely because William was more 
interested in the railway and banking concerns. 
34
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if the brewery were to pass to strangers, then the portrait would pass to William 
and his descendants (Hunter, 2001; Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). 
Hunter (2001) and Woods (1983) suggested that both Thomas and 
William were unhappy because the will did not specify what would happen to 
John Sr.'s two shares in the 1835 partnership, which legally made John Jr. a 
silent partner with 25% interest in the business. The will was full of ambiguities 
about the partnership because though it specified that it should be continued for 
the benefit of his three sons, it did not specify what would happen to the 
brewery's profits under trusteeship until an heir came of age (Hunter, 2001). In 
addition, a feud ensued amongst the three brothers, executors and notary over 
the will's specification about what would happen and who would benefit from the 
rent, if there were supposed to be any, of the brewery properties. Hunter (2001) 
wrote that these uncertainties led John Jr. to launch legal action against his two 
brothers. This feud over the estate lasted for over a year. The litigation was 
settled eventually in John Jr.s' favour and shortly afterwards Thomas and William 
bought out John Jr.'s interests in the brewery (Woods, 1983; Denison; 1955). 
Thomas was also concerned about his nine year-old son John Henry 
Robinson Molson whose health at that time was not perfect. He was not sure if 
he would live to age 21, while John Jr.'s son John Molson III was a healthy boy. 
To resolve the dilemma, Thomas named his next son John Thomas Molson, 
which according to Thomas the will did not specify which "John Molson son of 
Thomas Molson" (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). 
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The Third Generation: Father-Son Conflicts and Family Duty 
At the age of 16 in 1843, John Henry Robinson (JHR), who had inherited 
his grandfather's traits of innovation, perseverance, and calculated risk-taking, 
finished his studies at Upper Canada College (Toronto) and returned to Montreal 
to start his apprenticeship at the brewery for a term of about three and a half 
years. Both Thomas and William took their responsibility to train JHR in the 
science of brewing seriously and had drafted a notarized agreement spelling out 
the terms of the apprenticeship, compensation benefits, expectations from the 
apprentice, duties, and responsibilities. The agreement stated: 
Thomas and William Molson Company... do hereby promise and 
agree to instruct... the said apprentice in the science and 
business of a Brewer, to allow him access to such books from 
their library and the use of such apparatus as the said Thomas 
and William Molson Company may think proper... and further to 
pay him for each and every year of said term, the sum of Fifteen 
Pounds currency.36 
Thomas (who was in charge of production) behaved in a most autocratic 
and authoritarian manner with his children and he was especially hard on JHR, 
often monitoring the quality of his eldest son's work harshly (Molson, 2001; 
Denison, 1955). Woods (1983) suggested that instead of a father-son 
relationship, it was more of a master-servant relationship. In addition, JHR was 
compensated fairly neither during his apprenticeship, nor after. After JHR 
reached majority age, he was not invited into the partnership right away, although 
he did receive an increase in his benefits. The issue of fair compensation led to 
confrontations between father and son. Their relationship was tense and civil, 
Woods, 122-123. 
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and the rift between father and son continued until Thomas' death. Although 
Thomas' relationship with all his children was poor, he favoured William 
Markland, his second son. Markland became the main beneficiary of Thomas' 
estate, while JHR received only £5 (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). Molson (2001) 
stated that Martha, who was aware of Thomas' will, put a condition in her will that 
her estate would go to Thomas if his estate were to be distributed more equally 
amongst the children. Despite the animosity between the father and the sons, 
Thomas ensured that all three boys were educated in business and humanities. 
He schooled them in the brewing techniques from Richardson's manual and in 
the moral instructions from Lord Chesterfield's book (Denison, 1955). 
On July 1, 1848, a new partnership was drawn-up and JHR became a 
partner of Thomas and William Molson & Company. Thomas and William each 
held five shares, while JHR held two shares. JHR contributed the brewery assets 
to the partnership, while Thomas and William contributed the distillery and capital 
(Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955). 
As the distillery business became less profitable.Thomas and William 
diversified their financial investments and became major shareholders of New 
City Gas Company.37 New City competed with Montreal Gas Light Company 
wherein John Jr. was a major shareholder (Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955). In 
addition, Thomas explored the Toronto market for possible expansion of the 
Denison (1955) noted that Thomas Molson was appointed President in 1857 because 
of his technical expertise after an explosion in one of the facilities. 
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brewery and distillery business, but failed to get approval by the City. In the end 
he acquired a small brewery in Port Hope, Ontario (Denison, 1955). 
In contrast, William invested in railroads, but became increasingly focused 
on the banking business (at the time, he was a Board member along with John 
Jr. of the Bank of Montreal). As a result, in 1852, William served notice to 
Thomas of his intention to quit the partnership so that he could concentrate on 
his banking venture. Thomas and William disagreed over the exit terms. 
Negotiations dragged on until William threatened to sell his interests in the 
distillery to a third party. In the end, Thomas agreed to William's original demand 
of £8,000 for William's share. From this point on, the control of the distillery and 
brewery business resided with Thomas Molson and his descendants. After 
resigning from the Board of the Bank of Montreal in 1853, William and John Jr. 
established Molson's Bank as a private bank in 1854, which included Thomas 
and JHR as shareholders and directors (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983; Denison, 
1955). William became President and John Jr. Vice President of the Molson's 
Bank. Molson's Bank operated successfully by the three Molson family branches 
until the 1925 merger with the Bank of Montreal. 
On June 30, 1853, Thomas and JHR formed a new 10-year partnership, 
where Thomas would contribute the distillery and JHR the brewery. In the first 
three years of the partnership Thomas received 2/3 interest, thereafter profits 
and losses were shared equally. Woods (1983) noted the following clause about 
responsibilities in the partnership, "Thomas Molson shall only give such time and 
attention to the business of the said co-partnership as he may find convenient, 
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but John Henry Robinson shall devote his whole time and attention to the affairs 
of the co-partnership to the exclusion of all others."38 Five months after the start 
of the new partnership, Thomas' second son, Markland who was trained as a 
distiller in Boston, joined the business as an employee. Molson (2001) and 
Woods (1983) noted that the two brothers did not get along well, and soon after 
when the two brothers approached their father to suggest improvements to the 
business, Thomas reacted harshly by writing a letter to JHR suggesting they 
dissolve the partnership, which JHR tactfully declined. In 1859 at age 68, 
Thomas started to slow down most of his business activities. Nonetheless, in 
spite of his disagreements with JHR, Thomas renewed the partnership. Thomas 
and JHR each held 5 shares in the company. Markland, who had become the 
brewmaster, was given two shares (Woods, 1983). Under Markland's direction, 
the brewery increased its production output to 200,000 gallons. 
Following the trend that had been set by their father, John Jr., Thomas, 
and William continued to donate generously to several organizations and causes, 
of which McGill University was a prime beneficiary (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983; 
Denison, 1955). This dedication to community enhancement continues in the 
current sixth generation (Molson, 2001). In 1860, John Jr. passed away and JHR 
took over his uncle's position as VP of the Molson's Bank. After the death of his 
older brother, Thomas became increasingly aware of his own mortality and his 
own religious faith, when he questioned himself, "Can a distiller enter the 
Woods, pp. 147-148. 
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Kingdom of Heaven?"39 In 1861, Thomas decided to retire altogether and 
dissolved Thomas and William Molson & Company and the 1859 partnership. 
Woods (1983) wrote that on the same day, a new company and partnership with 
a term of seven years was established, John H. R. Molson & Bros, which 
included the brewery, the distillery (leased from Thomas to the partnership), as 
well as a loan from Thomas of £160,000 for a term of seven years and seven 
percent annual interest. The partnership consisted of the three brothers JHR with 
six shares, Markland with four shares, and John Thomas, who at age 22 had just 
completed his training as a distiller, with two shares. About 17 months after 
retiring from the family business, Thomas passed away from a stroke on 
February 22, 1863 (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983, Denison, 1955). 
In his will Thomas bequeathed to Markland all his properties in Port Hope 
and to John Thomas and his heirs the real estate in Montreal known as the 
Molson's distillery.40 As expected, JHR only received £1000 originally from his 
mother's estate (Woods, 1983); nonetheless, JHR was appointed one of the 
executors of the estate (which he later renounced) and he and his descendants 
in order of primogeniture were also given the responsibility of approving the 
reverend of St. Thomas Church, which was bequeathed to the Church of 
England. In addition the will contained a condition that all his children "have 
family prayer every morning and evening daily in their houses continually during 
Ibid., p.165. 
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their lives. The settlement of Thomas' estate was not smooth, as feuds ensued 
between the brothers and Thomas' second wife, as well as between the brothers 
and their sisters (Woods, 1983). 
A year after Thomas' death, John Thomas sold the distillery interests to 
JHR. Woods (1983) noted that the two brothers developed a close relationship 
and that both were "quiet-spoken and conscientious men." In contrast, the 
relationship between JHR and Markland was not always the best, especially 
because Markland was viewed as somewhat dishonest and without good 
business acumen. Hunter (2001) suggested that the settlement of his father's 
estate, plus his experience with Markland and his sisters took a toll not only on 
JHR, but also on John Thomas who had been appointed co-executor. In 1866 at 
age 40, JHR, unmarried and with no heirs, wrote the following letter to John 
Thomas, 
I have bequeathed everything I possess to you in a will which has 
been drawn up by Abbott and I have written it all in my own hand... 
I leave you everything as I think you are the best entitled to it my 
brother Markland's ingratitude, untruthfulness and dishonesty 
making my bequest to him not to be thought of. I hope what I leave 
you with what you now have make you perfectly independent in 
every way. I leave my sisters nothing as I consider they took 
advantage of my father's will to obtain a large sum of money which 
my father never intended them to have. You therefore have all... I 
would wish the brewery property not to pass out of your hands if 
you can help it. I do not wish Markland to ever possess it. This 
paper is not a will but merely a letter to you to let you know my 




 Woods, p. 173. 
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In 1866 the three brothers decided to close the distillery even though it still 
generated a large portion of the business sales and demand for whiskey was still 
growing. Woods (1983) noted that taxes on manufacture of whiskey had 
quadrupled from 1864 to 1866 and that "The Molsons had paid their taxes, but 
many of their competitors had evaded them by falsifying their returns. This 
placed the Molsons, who were not prepared to compromise their principles, at a 
competitive disadvantage."43 Other factors that influenced the decision to close 
the distillery related to the growing temperance movement, as well as the stress 
that John Thomas, who was the manager of the distillery, suffered after the 
untimely death of his young wife during childbirth. In addition, a year earlier in 
1865, the three brothers had already closed the distillery in Longue Pointe 
(outside of Montreal) and that Markland had persuaded his two brothers to 
convert the old distillery into a sugar refinery (Woods, 1983; Denison,1955). This 
venture became a source of conflict amongst the three brothers because of its 
inability to generate profits, and when Markland had suggested making 
management changes, JHR objected wrongly to the recommendations (Woods, 
1983; Denison, 1955). 
In 1868 the partnership expired. Both Markland and John Thomas quit the 
family business and JHR became its sole proprietor. Denison (1955) suggested 
that John Thomas left the business on friendly terms with JHR. John Thomas 
who at age 31 was a widower and father to a baby girl, decided to go on a self-
imposed exile which lasted about twelve years. Most of his time was spent 
Ibid., p. 177. 
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yachting around the world (Molson, 2001; Hunter, 2001). In contrast, the 
departure of Markland was characterized by the bitter disagreements and 
confrontations between JHR and Markland over both business and personal 
affairs. Hunter (2001) and Woods (1983) noted that after the settlement of the 
original loan from Thomas to the business, Markland subsequently lost most of 
his fortune speculating in mining and other ventures. Although the relationship 
between Markland and his brothers had been characterized by disagreements, 
this did not stop JHR and Thomas from helping Markland financially after he 
declared personal bankruptcy in 1877. With the money from his brothers, 
Markland made a fresh start; he moved to Oregon with his second son Fred and 
stayed several years (Woods, 1983). 
The 1870's brought new changes to the business and the Molson families. 
In 1871, after years of operational losses, JHR closed the sugar refinery and sold 
its assets to its larger competitor, Redpath & Son. Woods (1983) noted that 
John H. R. had worked doggedly to make a success of the 
refinery, and had even travelled to Cuba to learn more about the 
sugar business, but the refinery had never shown a profit. This 
failure reminded John H. R. that the cornerstone of the family 
fortune was, and always had been, the brewery. Henceforth he 
would stick to making beer.44 
Another change to the business occurred in 1872, when JHR invited 
Adam Skaife the chief clerk and bookkeeper who had been working with the 
company since 1852, to join the business as a partner with one-sixth interest 
(Molson, 2001). According to Woods (1983), this gave JHR more free time and 
allowed him to get married to the daughter of a wealthy Montreal merchant, 
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Louisa Frothingham, whom he had courted for thirty years. Also, John Thomas 
wed for the second time in 1873 to Jane (Jennie) Butler whose family were 
loyalists who had settled in the Eastern Townships; their first son Herbert was 
born in May 1875. In 1880, John Thomas, with a growing family of five small 
children plus his daughter from his first marriage, gave up his carefree lifestyle 
and returned to the brewery. In the new partnership, JHR controlled 50%, while 
John Thomas and Adam Skaife45 each controlled 25% (Woods, 1983). After the 
return of Thomas, JHR hired a brewmaster, John Hyde, to take over these 
responsibilities at the brewery. 
Following in the footsteps of his grandfather, during the 1880's JHR relied 
on John Thomas to manage the brewery, while he devoted more of his time to 
family, public and community service. Although JHR and Markland did not keep 
in touch, JHR took special interest to mentor both of Markland's sons Harry and 
Fred (Molson 2001; Denison, 1955). Harry was an executive at the Molson's 
Bank; and Fred who worked for another family business, the Consumer's 
Cordage Company owned by his cousins (from his mother's side) in Port Hope 
had recently been transferred to manage the Montreal headquarters. In addition 
to his duties at the Bank and at the brewery, JHR was also involved as a 
Governor at McGill University and in 1888 he was offered the chancellorship, 
^ Ibid., p. 180. 
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profits; however, his interest was not treated as equity, which he could sell or pass down to his 
descendants. 
76 
which he declined in favour of Sir Donald A. Smith. During JHR's time at McGill, 
the university continued to increase its reputation.46 
In 1897, JHR died of a kidney inflammation. Molson (2001) and Woods 
(1983) noted that in addition to being generous with all his relatives and friends, 
JHR asked Fred to write down the following words to pass to family members: 
The Molson family has maintained and preserved its position and 
influence by steady, patient industry, and every member should be 
a real worker and not rely on what has been. All that is good and 
great should not be underground. Your private life should be pure. 
Make no compromise with vice; be able to say 'no' in a firm, manly 
manner. Character is the real test of manhood. Live within your 
income, no matter how small it may be. Permanent wealth is 
maintained and preserved by vigilance and prudence and not by 
speculation. Be just, and generous when you have the means. 
Wealth will not take care of itself if not vigilantly cared for.47 
JHR's will did not generate the sibling feuds that had been observed with 
his father's and grandfather's estates because of a proviso specifying that any 
legatee who contested the administration or disposal of the estate would forfeit 
any benefits. All of JHR's other siblings, friends, and even some employees 
received sums of money from JHR's estate (Woods, 1983). JHR kept his word to 
his brother John Thomas and bequeathed to him the brewery (Molson, 2001; 
Hunter, 2001). Furthermore, Denison (1955) suggested that there was an 
understanding between JHR and John Thomas that the brewery would 
eventually descend to John Thomas' eldest son, Herbert Molson. JHR served as 
a father and mentor to both Harry and Fred and was pleased in the way that both 
Through the initiative of Molson members, such as Anne Molson (wife of John Molson 
III), both JHR and Donald Smith supported policy changes to admit women into university 
programs (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). 
47
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nephews were unlike their father's character (Woods, 1983). JHR was also 
confident of Fred's ability as an administrator, having observed for seven years 
his work as a manager of the Consumer's Cordage Company (Molson, 2001). 
John Thomas had discussed with JHR many times the issue of extending the 
brewery partnership into the fourth generation (Molson, 2001). However, 
because Herbert was still young, JHR's will contained a special request to extend 
an invitation to his 37-year old nephew Fred to join the family business, so that 
Fred would be "placed in a better position as well." In his will, JHR also left a sum 
of money to his estranged brother Markland. Denison (1955) suggested that this 
act consolidated the future solidarity of the family. 
The Fourth Generation: The Cousins' Consortium, Tradition and Renewal 
On July 31, 1897, a new partnership was established with John Thomas 
(50% share), Adam Skaife (25% share), Herbert (12.5% share) and Fred 
(12.5%). At age 22, Herbert who had been groomed for succession by his father 
had already completed his chemistry degree at McGill University, as well as 
further training at the United States Brewer's Academy in New York City. Brewing 
was still considered an art during the time of John Molson, yet scientific 
advances by Louis Pasteur in bacteriology, were demystifying the brewing 
process. Herbert had begun his apprenticeship at the brewery in 1896 under the 
guidance of JHR who noted that Herbert was very industrious and got along well 
with the employees. Herbert's apprenticeship at the brewery reflected "this 
tradition -of Molsons starting at the bottom and working their way up through the 
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ranks- has rarely been violated in the last two hundred years. It serves both as a 
screening process and as a practical way of ensuring that those who are 
destined for authority really know the business."48 However because John 
Thomas had developed Parkinson's disease in 1892 and was slowly becoming 
incapacitated, Herbert had already assumed the family responsibilities. He had 
good management skills and an eye for efficiency (Woods, 1983). There was a 
good relationship between the two cousins; and although initially Fred hesitated 
in joining the brewery, given that he would have to give up his job and share the 
risks in the partnership, he was persuaded by Herbert to join the family business 
(Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). 
Fred was a strict disciplinarian who was obsessed with punctuality, 
efficiency, and control not just at work with employees, but also at home with his 
wife and children (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). Before joining the brewery, Fred 
was already an experienced business manager and his strengths were in 
finance, sales management, and administration. Fred's serious character might 
have been influenced by his upbringing, growing up fast under the shadows of 
his father, Markland, and although he did not enjoy the same privileges as those 
of his uncles or cousins, he earned their respect and the confidence of his uncle 
JHR (Woods, 1983). From the first day at the new job, Fred did a tour of the 
entire brewery and suggested areas for improvement (Molson, 2001). Both Fred 
and Herbert worked well together and under their combined management, the 
brewery underwent a modernization phase that included everything from 
Woods, p. 195. 
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switching the lightning system from gas to electricity, to replacing outdated 
machinery, and equipment, introducing refrigeration systems, and developing 
new products. For example in 1902, the company introduced Export Ale, which 
today is still considered one of the company's flagship beers. 
Following the marriage of Herbert, a new partnership was drawn-up in 
1901, where John Thomas relinquished some of his interests in favour of Fred 
and Herbert. In the new agreement, John Thomas held 5 shares out of 16 
(31.25%), Adam Skaife maintained his 25% interest (4 shares), Fred now held 
25% (4 shares), and Herbert held 3 shares (18.75%). Woods (1983) suggested 
that John Thomas rewarded Fred with additional interest after seeing the work 
that had been done in modernizing the plant. 
In 1910, John Thomas passed away; and just like JHR's will, John 
Thomas' will had a provision to discourage anyone from challenging or interfering 
with the disposal of the estate. John Thomas had drafted his will in 1891 and this 
will was amended in 1898 and 1906 (Woods, 1983). The brewery and adjacent 
properties were left to his eldest son, Herbert. Molson (2001) stated that "Like 
others before him in the family, John Thomas's first consideration when 
preparing his will was the wishes of his ancestors," and for this reason, St. 
Thomas' Church which stood next to the brewery was moved before his death to 
another location in Montreal in order to allow room for expansion to the 
brewery.49 Each of his four sons and four daughters (Herbert, Kenneth, Percival, 
Walter, Lily, Naomi, Evelyn, and Mabel) also received shares of the estate. 
Molson, p. 307. 
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However the share distribution favoured his sons with each receiving two shares 
while each daughter received one share. 
After the death of his father, Herbert became President and transformed 
the company from a partnership into a joint-stock limited company on September 
1, 1911 (Woods, 1983). The joint-stock company had a capitalization of 3000 
common shares @ $100 each and $500,000 in short term bonds. Herbert, who 
contributed the brewery and adjacent properties, retained 2000 shares. Fred who 
had contributed the properties he inherited, received the other 1000 shares. Mr. 
Skaife who did not contribute any physical assets, also received a portion of the 
bonds and a share of 25% of the profits for life and continued as a director 
(Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955). Thus, after a period of 75 years, all of John 
Molson's original properties were once again under a single ownership. In 
addition, Fred's eldest son Herbert "Bert" Molson, who was 28 at the time, quit 
his job in a brokerage house to join the brewery. Bert had inherited many of the 
characteristics of his father and understood from a young age his responsibilities 
to the family and to the business (Woods, 1983). 
Just prior to World War I, the brewery had reached production of close to 
3,000,000 gallons; and while most of the family members were fighting in the 
war, Fred and his eldest son Bert (who had enlisted in the army as well but never 
served) managed the brewery and took care of other family members (Molson, 
2001). By the time the war ended, Herbert who had been promoted to the rank of 
Colonel, rejoined the brewery to fight another war, the prohibition movement 
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which through referenda managed to get nine provinces to vote for prohibition 
(Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). 
With the end of the prohibition threat, Herbert and Fred faced two 
additional issues. The first issue was to meet the increased demand for beer 
through expansion of the brewery's capacity from its current 5,125,000 gallons to 
10,000,000 gallons, a feat that required $2.5 million in investment (Woods, 
1983). The second issue dealt with the grooming of the next generation 
members. Fred's second son John Henry had already joined the brewery in 1919 
to work alongside his older brother Bert, who was being groomed for the General 
Manager position by Herbert and Fred. Herbert's eldest son Tom joined the 
brewery in 1923 after completing his studies at Royal Military College in 
Kingston, followed by university studies at Cambridge and brewing courses at 
University of Birmingham (Woods, 1983). Molson (2001) noted that: 
For the two cousins of the younger generation, entering the family 
business under the guidance of those formidable three could not 
have been easy. Each of the principals was as inflexible, eccentric 
and intractable as the other, yet the hierarchy was respected by 
all; the elders unquestionably made all the decisions, and business 
always came before any personal considerations. Each of the 
Molsons preserved his own privacy, each had high standards and 
each was respectful of the others. Much of what John Henry and 
Tom learned at the brewery reflected the very principles that the 
younger generation had learned through example at home.50 
Molson (2001) noted that even at a young age, Tom had already 
developed a strong opinion, as he had questioned the wisdom of the brewery 
expansion. He was a highly analytical person, who strongly favoured reason over 
emotions and was also more conservative than his elder Molsons. According to 
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Molson (2001), Tom was the youngest Molson working in the brewery in the 
1920's; and "if Tom had ideas that would challenge business tradition, he learned 
early on to bide his time; most changes in the family business were manifested 
slowly and thoughtfully."51 
Molson (2001) and Woods (1983) noted that both Herbert and Fred were 
starting to spend less time at the brewery and more time in other activities. 
Herbert, who was following in the footsteps of previous generations, was a Board 
member in other important Montreal institutions such as McGill University, the 
Bank of Montreal and the Montreal General Hospital. In 1921, Fred was 
appointed President of the brewery, while Herbert remained Chairman (Molson, 
2006). 
After Ontario repealed its prohibition law in 1927, Molson beer sales in 
that province reached a high of one million gallons and brewery production was 
already at 7.5 million gallons which led to the decision to further expand the 
brewery once more (Woods, 1983). However Fred, in charge of the expansion 
project, did not live to implement it as he died suddenly on February 5, 1929 at 
age 68. Fred's original 1000 shares in the brewery had been split ten for one 
after the war; and he bequeathed to each of his sons, Bert, Stuart, and John 
Henry 1000 shares, with the remaining 7000 shares going to the estate (Woods, 
1983). The will also contained a clause that the shares could not be sold to 
outsiders and both Bert and John Henry had an option to purchase the 7,000 
" Molson, p. 347-48. 
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shares. The bulk of the estate was left to his wife, with the residue going to his 
five children (the sons receiving 3/13 share each and his two daughters 2/13 
share each). 
After Fred's death, Herbert who was semi-retired returned to work full time 
at the brewery as President and CEO and guided the business through the 
Depression of the early 1930's. In spite of the Depression, Herbert went ahead 
with the expansion plans and appointed the younger generation, Tom and Bert, 
to manage the project (Woods, 1983). In addition to the brewery, Herbert 
maintained his commitments as Board member of the Bank of Montreal, the City 
& District Savings Bank, McGill University and the Presidency of the Montreal 
General Hospital. All these institutions were facing problems, but none more so 
than McGill University which was on the verge of bankruptcy. Herbert, Chairman 
of a committee to study the crisis, hired his second son Hartland, a chartered 
accountant working for McDonald Currie to come up with a rescue plan, which 
later stabilized the university's finances (Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955).52 
In 1931 the Royal Trust notified Herbert that three notes the trust company 
had placed on his behalf were in arrears and that Herbert was in legal position to 
call the loans and seize the collateral (Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955). These 
three notes were backed by National Breweries Ltd; and although Hartland had 
advised his father to call the loans and gain control of their larger competitor, 
Herbert decided against the idea and said, "No, monopolies are bad business-
McDonald Currie was the accounting firm handling Molson's Brewery Ltd.'s account. 
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and besides, the Dawes are my friends."53 Molson (2001) noted however that 
Herbert's decision was not entirely altruistic because Herbert had carefully 
evaluated the risks of such a takeover, and had consulted with Prime Minister R. 
B. Bennett about the matter. In the end, family factors weighted heavily on such a 
decision. Herbert... 
had considered how his ancestors would have acted in the same 
situation. Following their lead, in his public and private life, Herbert 
had always applied the same principles of decency to everything 
he did. His attitude influenced and inspired his descendants, who 
learned from him that when one had an opportunity to choose 
between power and honour, honour was more important.54 
In 1938, after a two-year battle with lung cancer, Herbert passed away. 
Herbert transformed the management style at Molson's Brewery, adopted the 
importance of advertisement and market research, and changed its product lines 
to help the company recapture by 1937 lost sales and market share (Denison, 
1955). The main Molson products Export Ale, India Pale Ale, Stock Ale, and 
Cream Porter now offered lighter and less bitter tastes. However, two business 
practices that remained the same were the paternalistic treatment of the 
brewery's employees and the commitment that had been started in the first 
generation towards product quality (Denison, 1955). The company had always 
been a bilingual business, with a workforce that was made up primarily of 
French-Canadians, dating back to the founder who was affectionately called "Le 
pere Molson." Molson (2006) and Woods (1983) reported that both Fred and 
Herbert knew all the employees by their first name, and that the Molsons were 
Woods, p. 257. 
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kindly referred to by their first name as Mr. Fred, Colonel Herbert, Mr. Bert, and 
so on. This practice dated back to John the elder. Another Molson custom was 
that every son spent time in the brewery's executive offices (Molson, 2006). 
However, this tradition was broken by Herbert's younger brothers, Kenneth and 
Walter. 
The Fifth Generation: Going Public and Geographic Expansion 
Woods (1983) reported that Herbert's eldest son became the main 
beneficiary of the bulk of the estate; and the shares of the brewery assets were 
given to Tom and Hartland, with Tom receiving a larger number. In addition, 
Herbert learned from Fred's will. He provided his wife a tax free annuity of 
$40,000, with the residue of the estate divided into seven shares, and Tom 
receiving 3 shares, Hartland 2 shares, and his two daughters 1 share each. It is 
worthwhile to note that like his ancestors had done, daughters could only receive 
the income from their shares, while the sons received the principal amount of 
their legacy. 
Tom was 37 when his father passed away. Both brothers were very 
competitive and achievement driven and both excelled at the Royal Military 
College in Kingston. Hartland, who was six years younger than Tom, was 
considered a rebel, a high risk taker, and an extrovert. Tom was very 
conservative, a low risk taker, and shy (Molson, 2006; Molson, 2001; Woods, 
1983; Denison, 1955). Molson (2006) suggested the dissimilarities between the 
Molson, pp. 365-366. 
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two brothers created a lifelong distance between them. For example, while Tom 
was deeply rooted in Molson tradition, Hartland had a disdain for tradition 
preferring instead to enjoy himself in social parties and travel. As the youngest 
child in the family, Hartland followed his own career and entrepreneurial 
interests. Although trained as an accountant, he never practiced accounting, 
preferring instead in 1933 to start a soybean processing venture, after a meeting 
with Henry Ford who had developed and was promoting the soy food processing 
technology. With funds from friends and investors (his father and brother were 
not interested), Hartland started Dominion Soya Industries in 1933; however the 
venture suffered from the beginning due to undercapitalization and equipment 
problems. In 1935, after Henry Ford developed a better machine at lower cost, 
Hartland closed the business. 
After the failure of Dominion Soya Industries, Hartland pursued one of his 
hobbies, flying. He had met the celebrated Word War I hero Billy Bishop who 
encouraged and mentored Hartland to become a private pilot. Soon after, 
Hartland with financial help from his father, brother, and John David Eaton 
(grandson of Timothy E. Eaton and future successor to the Eaton's family 
business) bought Dominion Skyways Ltd, a charter flying service doing business 
with remote communities in the north of Quebec (Molson, 2006). As President of 
the company, Hartland eventually grew the company from two aircraft to fifteen; 
however, the business generated little profit (Woods, 1983). 
Molson (2006) suggested that after Fred's death, Herbert had slowly 
started to distribute his wealth to his children. However, he was not pleased at 
87 
the way Hartland spent money frivolously. In addition by 1938, Hartland's 
marriage in 1931 to an aspiring Montreal actress and divorcee was over, with 
Hartland becoming the custodian to his three year-old daughter. According to 
Molson (2006) and Woods (1983), the return of the prodigal son to the brewery 
business occurred in a conversation at the hospital a few months before 
Herbert's death. Herbert had been thinking about succession, but was not sure if 
Hartland was fit for or had the discipline to work in the brewery business. When 
he casually mentioned these thoughts to his son, as well as wondered aloud if 
Hartland could give up his wild interests, Hartland countered by saying that at the 
Royal Military College he had taken chemistry courses over engineering, in the 
event of future work in the brewery. Shortly after, Hartland sold Dominion 
Skyways Ltd. to James Richardson, the owner of Canadian Airways Ltd. (and 
later renamed Canadian Pacific). Soon after the sale, Hartland joined the 
brewery as a full time employee and that "this pleased Colonel Herbert, who 
knew that Hartland's financial ability and vision, combined with Tom's brewing 
knowledge and technical expertise, would ensure a sound future for the family 
firm."55 
Molson (2006) and Woods (1983) noted that although Tom could have 
succeeded his father as the head of the family firm, instead Tom and Hartland 
"simply followed Molson tradition- that the welfare of the brewery must come first-
and Bert was the best man for the job."56 At age 55, Bert knew every aspect of 
Woods, p. 271. 
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the brewery having served as the General Manager for 27 years. In terms of 
management style, Bert had an obsession with time and punctuality and he was 
considered a 'benevolent despot' by the employees (Woods, 1983). Meanwhile, 
Hartland had been promoted as Executive Assistant to Bert, but did not last long 
in the position. After Britain's declaration of war against Germany in September 
of 1939, Hartland, Tom, and John Henry enlisted in the armed forces. Both John 
Henry and Tom were considered too old to fight in the frontlines, so they were 
assigned to special duties in Canada. Hartland, a qualified pilot, joined Squadron 
No.1 of the Royal Canadian Air Force and distinguished himself in the Battle of 
Britain (Molson, 2006; Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). 
In 1938 when Bert became President, production reached approximately 
9.5 million gallons of beer. As the war went on, production continued to increase 
to reach about 15 million gallons (Woods, 1983). Bert and senior managers 
including William Hyde the brewmaster and Edward Genest the sales manager 
kept the brewery operations going. Bert's younger brother Stuart managed his 
own brokerage firm (Molson and Company) and when he became invalidated 
during the war, Bert asked him and his partner Jack McGillis to join the brewery 
in 1941. Stuart was appointed as Director and Assistant Secretary, while Jack 
McGillis became Assistant Treasurer. 
The war also highlighted a serious succession duties issue for the 
Molsons. In a memorandum dated 30th April, 1940 addressed to the family's 
business accountant, G. C. McDonald (of McDonald Currie), the family stated 
that the company carried substantial amount of retained earnings and very small 
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number of outstanding common stock issue, with no preferred and no bonds; and 
that "it is not desired that any shares of the Brewery, as at present capitalized, 
should pass into the hands of parties other than members of the family."57 
In order to keep the control of the brewery in the family, two possibilities 
existed. The first was to split the current outstanding capital into two classes of 
stock. The first could have voting and other restrictions and the second could be 
common shares with voting and control rights. The second possibility was to form 
a holding company that issued preferred and common shares, whereby the 
present shareholders of the company would own all the common shares of the 
holding company, which in turn owned all the shares of the brewery, while 
preferred shares with certain rights restrictions would be available for sale by the 
owners to third parties. This solution would solve the tax problems that the 
company faced. However, the question arose as to who would want to buy 
preferred shares of a company in which they had no voting rights and no control 
over the operations of the subsidiary operating company. 
In a memorandum dated 13 December, 1940 Bert met with government 
officials (Fraser Elliot and A. H. Rowland Simpson) of the Income Tax 
department. They discussed the ramifications of the other four Molson 
shareholders (Tom, Hartland, John Henry, and Stuart) who were fighting in the 
war, and the tax implications if one were to be killed. The objective of the 
shareholders was to retain the ownership of the business in the family. However, 
it was difficult because of succession duties, the increased income taxes, and the 
Library and Archives Canada, Molson Archives, MG 28, III 57, Vol. 374. 
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excess profit taxes that would have to be paid to the government.58 Mr. Fraser 
Elliot had also pointed out the "bad dividend record of the company" was a policy 
that needed to change in the future.59 Later, in his meeting with the tax officials, 
Bert was accompanied by Mr. McDonald who tried to negotiate a solution for the 
family business to comply with the succession duties and income taxes, while 
preserving the business in the family. Nonetheless, under the federal and 
provincial taxation that existed at the time, it was impossible for the family to 
continue owning the business as they had previously. 
In a memo written on January 31, 1941 by Mr. McDonald about his 
meeting with Bert, Mr. McDonald suggested that Bert had come to the realization 
of the difficulties in keeping the present ownership of the family firm: 
I reported to Mr. Molson the substance of my discussion with Mr. 
Rowland regarding the intention of Mr. Fraser Elliot's suggestion at 
the conference in Ottawa on December 13th. Mr. Molson said that 
any such scheme didn't interest them at all. 
I further pointed out to him Mr. Rowland's suggestion about the 
shareholders voluntarily making a proposal to the Government as 
to the distribution of some part of the undistributed surplus, say the 
amount at the date of Colonel Molson's death, an indicated the 
general lines of the suggestion. Mr. Molson said that they wouldn't 
consider such a proposal, and that what they were principally 
occupied with was retaining the position of the company and 
providing for succession duties, and that neither of these proposals 
helped them in that regard. I then told him that I was becoming 
more and more of the opinion that it was quite impossible for a 




 Woods (1983) previously had noted that from the time of John Molson, profits were 
kept as retained earnings in the company to pay for the owners living expenses, expansion, 
modernization projects at the brewery, as well as diversification and other investment projects. 
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company. He intimidated that he too was coming round to that 
point of view.60 
In a memorandum dated 12 April, 1944 the Molson family evaluated 
several options to resolve the succession duties issue: 
The problem facing the shareholders of this company is the same 
as that facing all shareholders of private companies with 
substantial earned surpluses. If dividends are withdrawn at present 
rates of income tax, that tax takes everything but 2% in the high 
brackets. If a shareholder dies holding a substantial block of 
shares, a valuation on the basis of book values without taking into 
account anything in connection with the earning power threatens 
insolvency for the estate, unless there are substantial liquid assets 
outside the business. 
It has been suggested that in order to meet the succession duties 
problem and also to ensure the continuance of the business, the 
present shareholders should sell all or the major portion of their 
holdings. In this connection, it has been proposed that a sale could 
probably be made to or arranged with any one of the following:-
a. The public, through the sale of securities. 
b. National Breweries Limited. 
c. Labatt's Limited. (In this case it would be necessary for 
Labatt's and Molson's to have a joint issue of securities to the 
public. 
d. An American corporation operating an analogous class of 
business.61 
An assessment of the four options available to the Molson family, from the 
memorandum dated 30th April, 1944, pointed to the sale of the company to 
National Breweries Ltd as the simplest option, given the strong synergy and 
history between the two companies. Under this option, each Molson shareholder 
would have exchanged his shares for capital and shares of National Breweries 
Ltd. The first option implied the creation of the holding company, but there was 
Molson Archives, MG 28, III 57, Vol. 374. 
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also the risk that the government would have prohibited the transfer of the 
surplus funds. The third option, a merger with Labatt's required the creation of a 
holding company that would hold the shares of the two companies and issue new 
shares to the public. The latter option, although feasible, seemed to have less 
change of happening because of tax considerations and uncertainties with a non-
Canadian corporation.62 
By 1944, Bert had forecasted that the war would end soon in favour of the 
Allies, and that with the end of the war, there would be an increase in demand for 
beer (Molson, 2006). The business was doing well, with net profits of about $1 
million, total assets of $11 million, and shareholders' equity of $9 million. With the 
goal to further expand the brewery production, the Molson family decided to go 
public to raise additional capital, as well as to resolve the succession duties issue 
that had been the family's concern (Molson, 2006; Woods, 1983; Denison, 1955). 
Each of the existing 30,000 common shares held by the shareholders were split 
twenty-five for one, for a total capitalization of 750,000 shares. The company 
released 150,000 to be sold to the public in the Montreal Stock Exchange in 
February of 1945. Though the underwriter, Greenshields Inc. had recommended 
a price of $25/share, Bert decided to sell the shares at $20/share because he did 
not want anyone saying that they had lost money on Molson's stocks (Woods, 
1983). At the annual general meeting in 1948, management passed by-law 
XXVIII which allowed the company to alter its capital structure and to provide 
Molson Archives, MG 28, III 57, Vol. 374. 
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flexibility to make available more shares in the event that additional capital were 
required.63 
One year later Bert realized that the increasing profits put the company's 
taxes unsustainably high, so each of the common shares were split into one non-
voting A-share and one voting B-share (Molson, 2006; Woods, 1983). This was 
achieved through by-law XXIX, whereby the Board had approved the subdivision 
of each common share at the 1950 annual general meeting.64 The rationale for 
such a split, recommended by management consultant and accountant Walter 
Gordon of Clarkson Gordon, was to enable the family members and key 
shareholders to gain capital while maintaining control of the business (Molson, 
2006). The share capitalization was further increased shortly after to one million 
A-shares and one million B-shares (Molson, 2001). 
In 1945, the members of the senior management team who were in the 
war, John Henry, Tom, Hartland, and Campbell Smart returned to their duties at 
the brewery. They were also joined by eighty-eight Molson employees who had 
returned from the war. Bert, John Henry, Stuart, Tom, and Hartland made up the 
Board of Directors. John Henry and Tom each returned to their positions as co-
Vice Presidents, with Tom handling the Secretary duties as well, Stuart was 
Assistant-Secretary, Jack McGillis was Treasurer and Campbell Smart of 
Cockfield Brown joined the brewery as Assistant to the President.65 Mr. Smart, 
LAC, Molson Archives, MG 28, III 57, Vol. 373. 
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who was brought into the business to modernize its management practices, was 
"often accused of driving a wedge between the Molson family and the 
employees", but his management style improved efficiency in the operations.66 
Mr. Smart also started regular informal afternoon tea meetings where senior 
management would discuss business issues. In its first annual report as a public 
company, the company reported a net profit of $1,033,924.67 Total revenue 
amounted to about $14,878,712 and total assets were about $11.5 million.68 For 
1946, total assets and net profit had risen to about $11.9 million and $1,438,656, 
respectively, on total revenue of about $16.5 million.69 
The end of the war brought an increased demand for beer, which 
necessitated a further increase in production capacity. The brewery expansion 
project were carried out by both Hartland, who was in charge of production 
capacity and profit forecasts, and Tom who dealt with the organizational 
structure, human resource requirements, production, and operations 
management (Molson, 2006). The expansion, which was paid through retained 
earnings, was done stepwise over the course of six years and resulted in a 
tripling of the production capacity, the gross profit (from $3 million to $9 million), 
and the capital investment in buildings and machinery (from $4.4 million to $15.5 
million). While Tom and Hartland focused on the expansion and modernization of 
the equipment, their cousin John Henry worked on human resources policies that 
66
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saw the introduction of dental and medical benefits, as well as the introduction of 
a company pension plan for the employees (Woods, 1983). 
The transformation of Molson's Brewery from a private limited company to 
a public one also provided the foundations for later geographic expansion. In 
1949, the roles of the shareholders were reshuffled. Bert remained as President, 
but Tom and Hartland were now co-Vice Presidents, John Henry became 
General Manager and Stuart remained as Assistant-Secretary. Moreover, a next-
generation Molson had joined the brewery. Twenty-one year-old David, second 
son of John Henry, became an assistant to both Tom and Hartland (Molson, 
2006). In addition, 1949 marked the first time the brewery had produced one 
million barrels of beer (representing one million bottles shipped daily) under the 
watch of two brewmasters, father and son John and William Hyde. They also 
worked on the introduction of canned beer into the Quebec market.70 
By the early 1950's, the company prepared for expansion in the Toronto 
market. However, this geographic expansion was not headed by Bert because at 
age 70 he announced his resignation as President, effective in the spring of 
1953. For fifteen-years he had guided the family business from the end of the 
Depression to the beginning of the post-war economic boom. Prior to his 
resignation Bert had pondered two questions regarding who would be his 
successor and which new family member should be invited to join the 
management team (Molson, 2006). 
Molson Archives, MG 28, III 57, Vol. 373. 
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The three potential successors to take over from Bert were his brother 
John Henry, Tom and Hartland. According to Woods (1983), John Henry was the 
senior member of the family in the brewery. His responsibilities at the brewery 
were Human Resources Management, and although he knew all the operations 
of the business, he did not have the technical knowledge or the financial 
background. On the other hand, Tom who was trained as a brewer and engineer 
knew all the production and operations of the brewery. However, as a shy man, 
he stayed away from public relations. In contrast, Hartland was very outgoing 
and very good at public relations. 
Although Bert had decided which of the three would succeed him, in order 
to avoid conflict, he brought in an independent advisor, Walter Gordon who later 
became Finance Minister in the Lester B. Pearson cabinet, to assess the 
qualifications of the three candidates and recommend the successor. According 
to Molson (2006), Mr. Gordon interviewed all three candidates, as well as senior 
management colleagues in order to assess the implications of changes in 
responsibilities and how these affected the issue of succession. Mr. Gordon's 
recommendation, which was quickly implemented by the Board, was to appoint 
44 year-old Hartland as President and CEO and appoint Tom to the newly 
created position of Chairman of the Board. The control of the brewery shifted 
now to its largest shareholders.71 
Prior to the selection of the new President, the Board of Directors had 
consisted of five family members (Bert, Stuart, John Henry, Tom, and Hartland). 
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However, after Hartland's appointment, two non-family executives joined the 
Board, Edgar Genest (former Director of Sales) and Campbell Smart (former 
Assistant to the President). In addition, John Henry remained Vice-President, but 
his brother Stuart was now also Vice President and Secretary (Molson, 2006). 
Molson (2006) reported that the appointment was not an easy one for 
Hartland because he was the youngest of the three candidates and this deviated 
from the tradition of choosing the senior family member to be the head the family 
business. The decision to choose Hartland may have also created some friction 
between the three candidates: 
To some of his closest colleagues, Hartland was very open about 
how his relationship both with his cousin John and brother Tom 
changed somewhat for the worse when he was appointed in 
preference to either of them. Even with the understanding of the 
role Walter Gordon had played as an outside advisor, Hartland felt 
that Tom Molson's family particularly long resented this decision.72 
One of Hartland's first goals was to bring in new members of the next 
generation into the brewery (Molson, 2006; Woods, 1983). After Hartland, the 
next generation Molson family member was David who was considered too 
young for an executive position. Bert was childless and Tom's two sons, Eric and 
Stephen were still teenagers. Two other potential candidates of the sixth 
generation both 31 years old, John Henry's eldest son Billy and Walter's 
youngest son Percival Talbot (P.T. or Pete) who were to be invited to join the 
brewery. Billy worked as a stockbroker and P.T. was working as an assistant to 
Lester B. Pearson in the Department of External Affairs. 
K. Molson, Hartland de Montarville Molson: Man of honour (Willowdale, ON: Firefly 
Books, 2006), p. 219. 
Hartland favoured grooming P.T. as his successor because from a young 
age P.T. learned to excel in sports and school and had turned down a Rhodes 
scholarship to join the navy during World War II (Woods, 1983). At first, P.T was 
reluctant to join the brewery, but Hartland talked to Walter who was terminally ill 
and Walter agreed to Hartland proposal. Walter then told P.T. that, "he was 
needed in the family firm."73 This news placed P.T. in an agonizing position for he 
wanted to stay with External Affairs, yet he believed it was his duty to help the 
family."74 After his father's death, P.T. joined the brewery as Hartland's assistant. 
The next challenge for Hartland was to expand the business into the 
Ontario market and to compete directly with Canadian Breweries in their home 
market. Even though Bert had been reluctant about the decision to expand in the 
Toronto market, Tom and Hartland decided to build a brewery from scratch in a 
prime location near the Toronto waterfront, rather than simply buying a smaller 
brewery (Molson, 2006; Woods, 1983). The project, lasted about three years and 
came under budget. However, Bert did not live to see the inauguration of the 
Toronto brewery in August 1955, as he died of a stroke on April 11, 1955. In his 
will, Bert had left his B (voting) shares in trust to his nephews and eventually 
some of them sold their shares to Tom and Hartland (Woods, 1983). John 
Henry's sons, Billy, David and Peter kept their shares for another thirteen years 
before selling them to Tom and Hartland. 
Woods, p. 291. 
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Mr. David Chenoweth was appointed Executive Vice President to manage 
the new brewery in Toronto (Molson's Ontario Ltd), which was now considered 
the most modern in the world. At a cost of $10.5 million this new plant made 
Molson's Brewery Ltd. the largest brewer in Canada (Molson, 2006). 
Hartland was a modest person and was sad that Fred did not live to see 
his own vision of turning Molson's Brewery from a small local operation onto the 
path of becoming a national brewery (Molson, 2006). As President and CEO, 
Hartland took over a business though considered the largest brewer in Canada, it 
only had ten percent market share because of the fragmentation of the industry. 
He guided the family business over the next two decades and fulfilled Bert's 
vision of becoming a truly national brewer (Molson, 2006).75 
Molson Brewery's national expansion through acquisition continued 
unabated in the 1960's. After the acquisition of Sick's Brewery based in Western 
Canada in 1958, two years later the company acquired Fort Gary Brewery 
(Winnipeg) from the Hoeschen family. This was followed by the acquisition of 
Newfoundland Brewery Limited (St. John's) from John O'Dea. Many of these 
small breweries were often the target of Canadian Breweries or Labatt's. 
However, it was Hartland's negotiating skills and his background as a family 
business that gave him the advantage in relating to these small family 
businesses (Molson, 2006). 
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In 1958 Stuart retired as an officer from the brewery and remained as a 
member of the Board until 1966. Meanwhile his brother John Henry, Vice 
President until 1961, retired from the Board in 1963 (Woods, 1983). The pace of 
Molson's growth in the early 1960's was now fully driven by Hartland who in 
addition to his duties at the brewery was also balancing his senatorial duties in 
Ottawa and his own charitable and philanthropic projects.76 
After having completed his chemistry studies at Princeton University, in 
1959 Tom's eldest son, 22 year-old Eric joined the brewery as an apprentice. 
Tom had wanted his eldest son to be educated and trained thoroughly for a 
future career at the brewery, and like other Molson members of the brewery line, 
Eric achieved his brewmaster qualifications at the United States Brewers 
Academy in New York. Shortly after his graduation from the Brewers Academy, 
Eric's apprenticeship continued at Moosehead Breweries Limited in New 
Brunswick, owned by Philip Oland (Woods, 1983). At Moosehead Eric started 
working as a 'rubber boot' worker cleaning large vats that stored and processed 
the beer. 
Tom and Philip knew each other and had agreed on an exchange. Eric 
went to Moosehead Breweries while Philip's son did an apprenticeship at 
Molson's. After completing his apprenticeship at Moosehead Breweries, Eric 
transferred to Vancouver to continue his brewing training at a new Vancouver 
brewery (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). Then in 1962, Eric returned to Montreal 
76
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and completed an economics course at McGill University. He was promoted as 
Hartland's Assistant in 1963. Eric earned his promotions at work based on merit 
because Tom had insisted that his son followed Molson tradition and be treated 
just like any employee of the brewery (Woods, 1983).77 
The close relationship that existed between the second-cousins (Herbert's 
sons and John Henry's sons) was manifested in the way that Hartland had 
treated his cousin David. Woods (1983) described an incident in which John 
Henry and Campbell Smart had a feud in 1958 over David's lack of promotions in 
the brewery management echelons, which Mr. Smart had attributed to lack of 
competency. In order to diffuse the situation, Hartland made the decision to take 
David as his assistant and groomed him to become manager and then Vice 
President of the brewery's Quebec division. However, because David's interests 
lay in hockey, Hartland promoted him in 1964 to President of Canadian Arena 
Company, while Hartland became Chairman (Molson, 2001). 
In 1966, David and his brothers Billy and Peter proposed to Hartland to 
sell to them Canadian Arena Company. At first Tom and Hartland were reluctant 
to sell because they had planned to renovate the Montreal Forum, but after the 
renovations were done at a cost of $2 million, the transaction went through in 
1968 for $5 million in brewery shares. Tom and Hartland sold Canadian Arena 
Company to their cousins at a discounted price because they trusted them and 
they were family (Molson, 2006; Woods, 1983). It did not occur to them to put a 
clause in the contract to have the first right to repurchase in the event their 
77
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cousins decided to sell the company. As it turned out, three years later David and 
his brothers sold the company to a group led by Charles and Edgar Bronfman for 
$13 million. Prior to the sale, Hartland had heard rumours while vacationing in 
Jamaica that Canadian Arena Company was for sale, but in a conversation with 
David, he was reassured that the rumour was not true. After the sale had gone 
through, Hartland severed his relationship with David and removed his name 
from the brewery's Board of Directors at the next Annual General Meeting. 
According to Molson (2006): 
Throughout his life Hartland had believed in what he called 'good 
faith', by which he meant that giving the best of himself, he 
expected the same of those around him. And one of the things he 
took for granted was that his friends and family members shared 
the same moral code, which lauded truth, honour and duty. That 
members of another generation were defying those values was 
deeply insulting and hurtful to him.78 
Woods (1983) noted that both Tom and Hartland avoided any social 
contact with their cousins and that, "it was not the money that bothered them, but 
the realization that their trust had been betrayed."79 The value of the Canada 
Arena Company lay in the Montreal Canadiens Hockey team, which served as a 
promotion vehicle for Molson's advertising. After the sale of the company the new 
owners raised the advertising fees for the Hockey Night in Canada telecasts by 
half a million (Molson, 2006). It took until 1978, another seven years, for Hartland 
to buy it back. After a bidding war, Hartland reacquired the Montreal Canadiens 
Molson, p. 273. 
Woods, p. 325. 
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Hockey team, its subsidiaries, and the lease on the Montreal Forum from the 
Bronfmans for a price of $20 million (Woods, 1983). 
The Sixth Generation: Professional Management and Diversification 
During the early 1960's, there were as many as seven Molson family 
members in the management ranks and/or at the Board level. They were Stuart 
who had joined the brewery during World War II (WWII), John Henry who had 
joined after World War I, Tom who joined in the early 1920's, Hartland who had 
joined just before WWII, David who joined after WWII, P.T. who joined in the 
early 1950's, and Eric who had joined in the late 1950's. 
There was a good complement between members of the fifth and sixth 
generations, as the fifth generation prepared to pass the largest brewery in 
Canada to the next generation. With the retirement of both Stuart and John 
Henry and the subsequent purchase of the shares owned by John Henry's sons, 
the stewardship of the family business was now fully in the hands of the majority 
shareholders- descendants of the family line of John Thomas. Tom and Hartland 
worked well together as a team. Tom handled the brewery tours, as well as the 
behind-the-scene decisions such as the acquisition of Sick's Breweries. Hartland 
was the public face of the company. He was involved with philanthropic projects, 
and being seen in the company of politicians such as Prime Minister Pearson at 
hockey games (Woods, 1983). 
By the mid-1960's, Hartland became preoccupied with the issue of 
succession. In 1966, Tom retired as Chairman and was succeeded by Hartland. 
104 
Both David and P.T. had been groomed by Hartland since the early 1950's, but 
with the departure of David from the brewery, P.T. was the next likely candidate 
(Molson, 2001). However, a non-family executive, David Chenoweth, also had 
the qualifications for the position: 
Brewery manager David Chenoweth had the most experience and 
was most qualified, but when the Board asked him to become 
President Chenoweth demurred, protesting that that the brewery's 
new leader should be a family member. It didn't take long for 
Hartland to concur with other family members that P.T. Molson's 
was the next most deserved name to grace the position. Surely, 
Pete could carry the torch into this new era. He had done well in 
Toronto and had won praise in External Affairs. It was his turn to 
do the family proud in Montreal.80 
On July 1, 1966 P.T. was named President. However Hartland and the 
Board were not aware that P.T. suffered from depressive disorders. This 
condition combined with the stress of the new position, and a threat from his wife 
to file for divorce, led to P.T.'s suicide on September 12, 1966 (Molson, 2006; 
Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). On P.T.'s appointment to President, Molson (2001) 
noted the following about him: 
He was 44 years old, a brilliant academic and diplomat, and 
completely unsuited to the position in which he found himself. 
Those around him sensed this and took the reins of decisions from 
him, often leaving him to deal with the residue of accountability. 
Eric puts it flatly: 'Pete got kicked around'.81 
P.T.'s death was a blow to the Molson family, and especially to Hartland 
who was close to P.T. (Molson, 2006). In addition to dealing with the family 
tragedy, Hartland also had decisions to make about the family business: 




After Pete's death Dave Chenoweth became the new company 
president. The presidency of Molson's Brewery would now be 
viewed as an office distinct from ties of ownership and be given to 
the person most experienced and capable of assuming it. No 
family member has been president of the brewery since then; 
instead, Molsons fill board positions and sit as executive officers, 
such as chairman, vice-chairman and honorary chairman.82 
During the 1960's business conglomerates were becoming the new trend, 
in which companies diversified into areas that were unrelated to their core 
business (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). Molson's diversification was headed by 
David Chenoweth, who previously was President of Pepsi Cola (Canada). 
The first acquisition in 1967 was Vilas Industries Limited, a Quebec 
furniture manufacturer and supplier of equipment to the educational sector 
(Woods, 1983). In 1968, the company changed its name to Molson Industries 
Limited and acquired, for $80 million, Canada's largest conglomerate at the time, 
Anthes Imperial, a manufacturer of industrial products such as boilers, water 
heaters, and radiators (Molson, 2006; Molson, 2001). Mr. D.G. 'Bud' Willmot, 
Anthes President and major shareholder, became the new President of Molson 
Industries Limited. David Chenoweth stepped aside to become Vice-President; 
but his tenure did not last long as he passed away three months later (Woods, 
1983). 
By 1974, the company had changed its name to Molson Companies 
Limited and the Board and management team were reorganized at the Annual 
General Meeting. Tom resigned from his position of Honorary Chairman and 
retired from the company and Eric took over his father's seat at the Board. 
Ibid., p. 397. 
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Hartland assumed the Honorary Chairmanship and Bud Willmot who was deputy 
Chairman and President replaced Hartland as Chairman of the Board. 
Meanwhile, another non-family executive, J.T. 'Jim' Black became President of 
Molson Industries Limited. Nonetheless, at age 65 Hartland still was very much in 
control of the direction of the family business (Woods, 1983). 
John Henry's death in 1977 severed the last link of Fred's family line in the 
brewery. Although he had retired from the brewery, he still kept active as a Board 
member of various institutions such as the Children's Memorial Hospital and the 
provincial chapter of St. John's Ambulance. John Henry's daughter and three 
sons shared equally in his estate (Woods, 1983). 
Meanwhile, Tom who was also Vice-President of the Montreal General 
Hospital and President of Alexandra Hospital, passed away in 1978. He 
bequeathed his estate to his four children Deirdre, Cynthia, Eric, and Stephen, 
with Eric receiving two shares of the estate and his siblings receiving one share 
each (Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). The will also included provisions for the 
Montreal General Hospital, Bishop's College School, and his second wife. Eric, 
Vice President of the Brewery division, became the head of the family after his 
father's death. Woods (1983) reported that in 1975, the Molson family only 
controlled 35% of the voting stocks because of stocks dilution, as well as share 
price decline from the diversification strategy. However, Tom had started to 
switch his A-shares (non voting) for B- shares and had managed to increase 
control of the family business to 37%. After Tom's death, over the next two years, 
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Eric and his siblings continued to switch A-shares for B-shares, raising Molson's 
control to 41%, and then to 45%. 
In 1980, Eric was appointed President of Molson Breweries of Canada 
Limited and deputy Chairman. Mr. Willmot was appointed Chairman. Mr. Willmot 
who was planning to retire also accepted Eric's proposal to switch 500,000 A-
shares from the Molson family for 500,000 B-shares owned by Mr. Willmot 
(Molson, 2001; Woods, 1983). The A shares were more marketable and were 
worth more. The transaction cost $1 million to the Molson family; however, it 
gave the Molson family 55% control of the business. Woods (1983) wrote: 
The share exchange was an example of the unity that exists 
among members of the 'brewery line' of the Molson family. It also 
shows how they will work in concert to preserve the heritage that 
has been handed down through six generations. Eric Molson 
expressed the family philosophy one day when he said to a fellow 
brewery worker, 'We are not rich, we are merely guardians of 
wealth'.83 
During the 1980's, the company initiated a restructuring program to divest 
itself of non-core divisions, pay down debt, and refocus its operations on the 
brewery (Molson, 2001). In 1988, the company sold shares to Miller Brewing 
Company in the United States. This was followed by a 'merger' with Foster's 
Group of Australia, whereby the Molson family lost control of Molson's Brewery 
for a period often years (Molson, 2001). 
In 1988 Marshall A. Cohen, former President of Reichmann's Olympia & 
York Enterprises Ltd., was appointed CEO of Molson Cos. In order to revise the 
company's diversification strategy and turnaround Diversey Corp. into a 
Woods, p. 337. 
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profitable venture. Mr. Cohen's first decision was to strengthen the brewery 
division through a joint-venture with Elders IXL of Australia, which had purchased 
Carling O'Keefe in 1987. The company changed its name to Molson Breweries 
owned equally by Molson and Elders. This deal also moved Molson with 34% of 
the Canadian beer market into first the top position with 51% of the market.84 
However, Mr. Cohen was more interested in turning Molson into a diversified 
multinational, and by 1991 the company acquired DuBois Chemicals Inc. and 
merged it with Molson's Diversey operations. 
In January of 1993 Miller Brewing Co., a unit of Philip Morris Cos, bought 
20% stake in Molson for $273 million. The deal gave Miller access to sell Molson 
beers in the American market. Molson beers were the third largest import beer in 
the American market, after Corona and Heineken.85 However, after the deal, 
Coors, who had an alliance with Molson for the distribution of Coors beers in the 
Canadian market, launched a lawsuit against Miller Brewing Co., Molson 
Breweries, and Molson Cos arguing that the deal violated antitrust laws and 
prevented Coors from competing in the Canadian and American market.86 
Mr. Cohen was not able to turn around Molson's Diversey's operations 
and slowly he started to divest of the assets. By the beginning of 1996, Molson 
had decided to go back to their core business of brewing, and this was followed 
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by Mr. Cohen's retirement from the company.87 Under Mr. Cohen's tenure, 
Molson's beer market share declined from 53% in 1989 to 47.7%.88 Mr. Norman 
Seagram, a former Molson's Brewery executive was brought as the new 
President to replace Mr. Cohen.89 
During the 1980's, Hartland was still active as an Honorary Chairman in 
the brewery in addition to his duties as Director at the Bank of Montreal, and his 
senatorial duties Hartland "had long been an advocate of WASP establishment 
values, including the importance of hard work, the supremacy of family, and the 
need for personal integrity and responsibility."90 He remained a Director at 
Molson Breweries until 1988. In 1993 at age 84, he resigned as a Senator and 
slowly removed himself from public duties (Molson, 2006). 
As the elder stateman and family patriarch, Hartland took an interest in the 
welfare of the younger Molsons. He had a daughter from his first marriage, but 
no sons. During the early 1970's, he had mentored Ian Molson, son of Billy, at 
the brewery where Ian had spend summers working as an intern. Hartland had 
hoped that Ian would join the brewery one day. Instead, Ian moved to London, 
England and worked as an investment banker for Credit Suisse First Boston. In 
the mid-1990's, Hartland persuaded Ian to come back to Montreal and sold him a 
portion of his shares, so that he could be invited to join Molson's Board of 
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Directors. Ian joined the brewery in 1996 and worked on the divestiture of 
Molson's non-brewing assets.91 Although retired from public duties, Hartland kept 
busy with family and projects such as fundraising events for the National War 
Museum and passed away at the age of 95 on September 28, 2002 (Molson, 
2006). 
Mr. Seagram's tenure as President lasted less than a year and he was 
replaced by E. James Arnett, a lawyer and expert of mergers and acquisitions.92 
Eric had admitted that the company had strayed from its core business and that it 
was important that the company refocused into a 'pure play, a brewer' with the 
resources to 'conquer more and more geographic territory'.93 In addition, three 
members of the Board of Directors resigned and were replaced by four new 
Directors, and Ian Molson was appointed to lead the Executive Committee.94 
According to Eric, these changes were necessary and "will enable us to move 
decisively to distance this company from its past status as a diversified holding 
company. Our brewing activities have long been the largest source of company 
profit."95 
Eric's, and President and CEO, James Arnett's new plan involved retaking 
control of the brewery in order to bring it back to the Molson family (Molson, 
91
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2001). In addition to Foster's 40% stake in Molson Breweries, Eric and Mr. Arnett 
also had to deal with Miller, which held 20% stake in the company. In preliminary 
discussions, Foster's made it known that they were not interested in selling their 
40% stake because it considered the investment a core holding, and also wanted 
their half share of Miller's 20% stake, leaving Molson's and Foster's, each with 
50% equity.96 On November 28, 1997, Miller sold its stake to Molson Cos and 
Foster's Brewing Group for $306 million, and under the agreement, both 
Molson's and Foster's agreed to acquire from Miller 24.95% each of Molson 
USA, the distribution company of Molson beers in the United States.97 After the 
agreement with Miller, Molson's and Foster's reached also an agreement with 
Adolph Coors Co., to which they had paid a settlement of $72 million earlier in 
the year, for the brewing and sale of Coors beers in Canada.98 
Molson's continued to pursue a buyout of Foster's stake in the company. 
On June 24, 1998 Molson Cos. took full control of Molson Breweries by agreeing 
to pay close to $1 billion (US$679.4 million) for Foster's 50% stake in the 
company.99 Earlier in the year Molson Cos. had sold its stake in Home Depot for 
$375 million and was also selling the remaining of the non-brewing businesses, 
96
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such as Beaver Lumber to raise capital to pay for Foster's buyout.100 The buyout 
also forced Molson's to close a brewing plant in Barrie, Ontario and to start a 
cost- cutting program, and to invest $100 million to improve production efficiency 
in its Toronto plant.101 Molson's beers had been losing market share to Labatt's, 
but the move to gain full control of Molson Breweries was the first step in the 
company's strategy to battle Labatt's, which was 100% owned by Belgium's 
Interbrew S.A., for the loyalty of Canadian beer drinkers.102 Molson's and Labatt's 
each controlled about 47% of the Canadian beer market, with each percentage 
point worth about $15-18 million in profits.103 In 1999, Molson abandoned its 
sponsorship of Hockey Night In Canada, and Labatt's quickly took over the 
sponsorship of the hockey telecasts.104 
In order to raise additional funds to pay for the new strategy, in 2001 
Molson's sold 80% of the Montreal Canadiens Hockey franchise and the arena 
(Molson Centre) to George Gillett, Jr.105 Molson's turnaround improved its 
financial performance. In 2002 sales and profits were $2.1 billion and $209.1 
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million, respectively compared to 1998 sales of $1.6 billion and profits of $66.3 
million.106 In 2001, Molson expanded outside North America for the first time 
through the acquisition of Bavaria's Brewery in Brazil for $1.1 billion.107 The 
Bavaria Brewery acquisition gave Molson 20% of the Brazilian beer market. 
The acquisition of Bavaria Brewery proved to be a bad decision, as 
Molson was unable to turn the brewery around and started to lose market shares 
in Brazil. In addition the Brazil operation began to take profits away from the 
Canadian operations.108 
In 2003, Eric, his brother Stephen, his cousin Ian were members of the 
Board of Directors of Molson Inc. Total revenue for fiscal year 2003 reached 
$3.53 billion, up 25% from 2002 revenue of $2.83 billion and total assets in 2003 
were $3.91 billion, down from $4.5 billion in 2002.109 In addition to brewing its 
own beers, the company was also a licensed brewer producing Miller, Coors, and 
Foster's beers for the Canadian market.110 
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In 2004, Molson Inc. started discussions with America's family-owned 
Coors Brewing for a possible merger.111 Coors, founded by Adolph Coors in 
1873, was the third largest brewer in the United States, led by fifth generation 
Peter H. Coors. There was already a business relationship between the two 
brewers, as Molson's brewed Coors beers for the Canadian market. However, 
the merger plan ignited a feud over the advantages of the merger between 
Deputy Chairman, Ian, who owned 10% of the voting shares, and Chairman, Eric 
who controlled the majority of the voting shares. Ian who tried to succeed Eric as 
Chairman looked into preparing a competing bid with the help of Heineken, which 
is controlled by the Heineken family, to buy out Molson's for $4 billion.112 Outside 
investors were not fully behind the merger because no premium price was set on 
the Molson stock price, which was listed at $37/share; and "some analysts 
criticised the deal as designed primarily to entrench the Molson and Coors 
families in their long-established businesses."113 Five days before the merger 
announcement, Ian tried to find partners to submit a counter bid at 40/share, but 
was not able to do it.114 Shortly after, Ian resigned from the Board.115 Although 
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lan's ownership had gone up to 11.5% of the voting shares, he called the deal "a 
bad transaction and the status quo a better option".116 
Molson Inc. also gave directors and employees, who were holding options 
on Molson non-voting shares, the right to vote on the merger, which required 
approval of two thirds of the voting and non-voting shareholders.117 However, the 
Financial Times criticised the action to give share option holders, who had not 
paid for their shares, the right to vote because this diluted the rights of full 
shareholders.118 According to spokesperson for a Board member of Molson's, 
Sylvia Morin, giving option holders a vote was not unusual in Canada and that 
"some companies do and some do not."119 
In November of 2004, Molson offered to investors a raise in dividends 
from $3 to $3.26 to appease institutional investors who claimed that there was 
little premium on the prevailing share price after the merger. The Molson family, 
who held 45% of the voting shares, also waived its right to receive the 
dividend.120 One week before the scheduled shareholders' vote, SABMiller 
proposed that if the Coors merger is turned down, they would be interested in 
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making a proposal that would be of benefit to Molson shareholders. However, 
Eric who had veto power, stated that "this company is not for sale and the merger 
of equals with Coors is the only option on the table on January 19."121 Eric's veto 
power came from his 55.4% control of the voting shares partly through a family 
trust.122 
The merger between Molson's and Coors was, according to Eric, 
'strategically compelling merger' that would make the new company the fifth 
largest brewer in the world at the time, after Anheuser-Busch of the United 
States, SABMiller of South Africa, Interbrew Group of Belgium, and Heineken of 
the Netherlands.123 Even though there had been further criticism about the 
proposal to merge two weaker breweries, Eric argued that the deal would also 
create savings to the combined company and that Fairvest, a Toronto 
governance advocate had supported the deal, though reluctantly because the 
merged company would report a single-digit profit gain.124 Burgundy Asset 
Management, a minority shareholder had opposed the deal because "Molson 
was almost four times as profitable as Coors in terms of profit per unit of beer 
produced."125 This 'merger of equals' was finalized in February of 2005, with Eric 
remaining as Chairman, Peter H. Coors as Vice Chairman, and W. Leo Kiely III, 
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CEO of Coors as the new CEO of Molson Coors Brewing Co.126 The Board of 
Directors was reconstituted with two members of each family sitting at the new 
Board, Eric and his son Andrew T. Molson, as well as Peter H. Coors and his 
daughter Melissa E. Coors. In addition two senior executives, Daniel O'Neill and 
W. Leo Kiely III sat on the Board plus nine independent directors, including Dr. 
Francisco Bellini, Chairman and CEO of Neurochem Inc., John E. Cleghorn, 
Chairman of the Board of SNC-Lavalin, and David P. O'Brien, Chairman of 
EnCana Corporation, and Dr. Albert C. Yates, President Emeritus Colorado State 
University.127 
In its first Annual Report, Molson Coors Brewing Company reported total 
sales of $7.4 billion, net sales of $5.5 billion (after excise taxes), net income of 
$134.9 million, and total assets of $11.8 billion.128 The new company, "Molson 
Coors is indeed unique. We are one of the world's largest brewers, managed 
with the active involvement of two founding families that represent a combined 
350 years of brewing excellence."129 
The Seventh Generation: A Confederation of Families and Globalization 
As the new Molson-Coors Brewing Company prepares to compete in the 












the business striving to become a global brewing company. In a conversation 
with Patrick Kelley, former Senior Vice President for International Brewing 
Strategy for Molson Inc. and currently a consultant to the Molson family, he 
stated that the brewing industry has become more competive and that the top 
five brewers account for more than 50% of all the beer output in the world. Mr. 
Kelley says that "the industry has been driven by two external factors, 
consolidation and globalization."130 
According to Geoff Molson, VP of Marketing (Molson Canada), "the thing 
that outsiders don't understand is that the families' passion for brewing was 
'really the essential ingredient' in getting the deal done. In the past two years, 
we've had differences, identified them and figured out a way to address them 
together with the interest of building the beer business at the same time. And if 
my brother was here right now, he'd put up his hand and add the 
shareholders."131 
Geoff is Eric's youngest son and his rise to top management position at 
the company has followed in the family tradition of ensuring that only offspring 
that are capable are accepted into the business. Geoff said that "it was frustrating 
at a young age, because I wanted to work at the company so badly, but my 
father wouldn't let me. He wanted me to work somewhere else and prove 
myself."132 Also, just like his father had done by working at low level positions at 
the company, Geoff's first Summer job was "driving trucks for the company and 
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this allowed me to get to know customers."133 Geoff's professional path into the 
family business included going to the United States where he obtained an MBA 
from Babson College.134 He first worked for Coca Cola and then spent five years 
working for Molson-Coors in Colorado during the time of the merger.135 
After completing his law degree, Andrew, Eric's eldest son has also 
followed a professional path working outside the family business. As a corporate 
governance expert, he is a partner of Res Publica Consulting Group which 
specializes in public relations.136 According to Andrew, who is not an employee of 
the family business, "I always felt as though I would be contributing to the family 
business by gathering experience outside the family business. My night shift was 
talking to Geoff and my dad about the future and the next 200 years, and so I 
saw joining the board as a responsibility, and a responsibility that I'm enjoying 
immensely."137 
At age 70, Eric has been Chairman of the family busines for close to 
twenty years. About the fact that he has not been CEO of the company, Eric says 
that "we believe in having the best, and it's been outside Molson for quite a while 
now. Since P.T. [Percival Molson] in 1966."138 On the topic of family business 
succession, Eric and his sons are more reserved. "A lot of fathers have problems 
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with succession, and I have spoken to many people about that. How did we do 
it? I can't really tell you all my secrets. My son Geoff's in operations, Andrew's on 
the board, I'm chairman. We know the business inside out," says Eric.139 
In addition, Eric has groomed and instilled in his sons humility and 
responsibility from a young age. One area in which the Molson family has been 
consistent is in the way, "each generation acts as Stewarts of the business."140 
According to Geoff, the critical success factor of the family business has been its 
family own credo to ensure that products are successful and that the family is 
not in the business for personal gain, but rather to be seen as shareholders of 
the business.141 Moreover, Geoff reiterates that the family is grounded on its 
beliefs that of the many descendants of John Molson, the Molson family business 
does not show favouritism on members of the family and that only those 
members that are capable are accepted into the business.142 As Geoff s 
responsibilities continue to increase within the family business, there is a belief 
that he is being groomed for the President and CEO position, though Geoff says 
that "It's not a priority of mine to be CEO some day. I don't look at my career as if 
I want to be this or I want to be that. I look more from the perspective of building 
the beer business, and the opportunities will come."143 
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Each generation has left its mark on the family business. As the second 
oldest company in Canada and the oldest family business, the Molson family has 
played a key role not only in contributing to the economic development, through 
the success of the business, but also to the social environment through its 
commitment to community development, public service, and philanthropic 
activities. Through the Molson Foundation, the company donates about $4.4 
million a year to charitable organizations.144 With the seventh generation waiting 
to take over the leadership of the family business, both Andrew and Geoff face 
new challenges and issues, including how the Molson and Coors families work 
together towards maintaining their family identities in the business and the 
grooming of the eight generation family Molson members. 
"A Legacy of Giving," The Beaver, October-November, 2007, p. 64. 
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Chapter 5: Results and Discussion 
In this study, the goal was to explore and examine the Molson family 
business, as well as to understand how this particular business has managed to 
undergo five successful generational transitions. The historical case study built in 
Chapter 4 provided a sample of seven generations of the family and five 
succession processes. In this chapter, the analysis evaluates complex 
succession factors that emerged in each generation and these factors were 
categorized according to individual and group levels of analyses. This is 
congruent with the current state of research on family business succession that 
has been divided into five research streams: (1) succession as a process, (2) the 
founder's role, (3) the next generation's perspectives, (4) multiple levels of 
analysis (dual system), and (5) characteristics of effective successions (Handler, 
1994). 
The analysis then focuses specifically on five major common themes 
identified by other researchers in the family business field as critical success 
factors in effective succession planning: role of founder/leader, resistance to 
succession planning, the grooming process, the decoupling of the family-
business system, and the selection of next-generation leaders (Ibrahim and Ellis, 
2004; Ibrahim, Soufani, Lam, and Poutziouris, 2004; Ibrahim, Soufani, and Lam, 
2001; Davis and Harveston, 1998; Rubenson and Gupta, 1996; Gallo, 1995; Kets 
de Vries, 1993; Handler, 1992 & 1990; Ward, 1987; Beckhard and Dyer, 1983a; 
Lansberg, 1983; Longenecker and Schoen, 1978; Barnes and Hershon, 1976). 
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Role of the Founder 
In the first generation, John Molson as an entrepreneur displayed strong 
need to achieve, need for control, calculated risk taking, and innovation. Studies 
on successful entrepreneurs reveal that these individuals have traits that 
differentiate them from non-entrepreneurs. The need to achieve is a strong 
driving force observed in entrepreneurs (McClelland, 1961). This trait was 
manifested in the young John Molson who was determined to settle in Montreal 
from his native England and become a successful businessman. Moreover, this 
"precipitating event" in the life of an 18-year old young man is congruent with 
Shapero's argument that entrepreneurs are born out of displacement (Shapero, 
1975). 
Another key factor that influenced the young John Molson to become 
independent and start his own business was the power relationship that existed 
between him and his autocratic grandfather. Unresolved conflicts during 
childhood between the entrepreneur and his father have been cited as a factor 
that drives an individual to become an entrepreneur (Zaleznik and Kets de Vries, 
1985). In the case of John Molson, starting his business in Montreal was his way 
to break his ties not only from his powerful grandfather, but also from his native 
land. 
In order to bypass the fact that he was still a minor, John Molson went into 
a partnership with someone who had technical skills in brewing; however, after 
reaching majority age, he bought the business and took full control of the 
venture. It has been suggested that this internal locus of control is an important 
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predictor of entrepreneurial intentions and refers to the entrepreneur's beliefs that 
he or she can control his or her own fate (Kets de Vries, 1985, 1977; Brockhaus, 
1975; Shapero, 1975). Furthermore, one of the most important traits associated 
with entrepreneurs is the propensity to take risks (Shapero, 1975). John Molson 
not only moved to a new land, but also invested his parent's inheritance into 
growing this new business. 
Another of John Molson's traits was his ability to innovate. He did this by 
seeing and exploiting an opportunity that others did not see. At the time when 
John Molson came to Montreal in the early 1780's, the population was mainly 
from French descendants who preferred to drink wine over beer; however, John 
Molson accurately predicted an increase in beer consumption because of the 
influx of new English immigrants and loyalist from the United States. Drucker 
(1985) suggested that entrepreneurs use innovation as a tool to exploit changes 
in the market and to profit from the new opportunity by offering new products or 
services. John Molson not only introduced a new type of beer to the Montreal 
market, but also ensured that beer was of high quality. To achieve this, he 
brought raw ingredients from England and followed the latest scientific 
knowledge on the art of making beer. John Molson's innovative spirit left a 
blueprint as the competitive advantage of the company. 
During his lifetime, John Molson's business played an influential role not 
only from an economic, but also from a social and political point of view. As an 
entrepreneur, John Molson fits very well Schumpeter's view of the entrepreneur 
as an agent of socio-economic change (Schumpeter, 1934). In addition to the 
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brewery business, John Molson's business also pioneered steamboat 
transportation in the St. Lawrence River. 
Studies suggest that the founder's characteristics change from the 
energetic and visionary entrepreneur in the early years of the business into a 
tired and authority-driven family business owner (Sharma, Chrisman and Chua, 
1996). Moreover, studies have shown that the founder's management style 
becomes autocratic and authoritarian, resulting in a reluctance to share power or 
to hand power to a successor (Lansberg, 1991; Birley, 1984; Geeraerts, 1984; 
Alcorn, 1982; Levinson, 1971). This description of the founder becoming an 
autocrat and authoritarian manager was not observed in John Molson. On the 
contrary, John Molson delegated control and power of the family business to his 
three sons, as the family business diversified from brewing into transportation, 
banking and real estate activities. 
Roles of Next Generation Leaders 
After the marriages of his sons John and Thomas, John Molson set up a 
business partnership with his three sons. Lansberg (1999) noted that a family 
business succession typically goes from a controlling owner in the first 
generation to a sibling partnership in the second generation. Competition 
between John Jr. and Thomas led to a power struggle over strategic direction of 
the family business. John Jr. wanted the business to concentrate on the 
steamboats and banking operations, while Thomas wanted to continue growing 
the distilled spirits division of the business. Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and 
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Lansberg (1997) suggested that sibling partnerships can be categorized 
according to a 'shared leadership' arrangement form where all siblings work as a 
team, or a 'first amongst equals' form of arrangement, where a leader emerges 
from the group, but decisions are based on consultation and consensus. For 
example, John Jr.'s use of his implicit veto on the partnership to overrule 
Thomas' suggestions to grow the distilled spirits division suggest that John Jr.'s 
saw himself as the leader amongst the three brothers. This kind of action is 
congruent with findings comparing family businesses to monarchies, in which the 
eldest son is seen as the natural heir (Alcorn, 1982; Levinson, 1971). 
While all three of John Molson's sons were trained as brewers, only 
Thomas Molson showed a lifelong attachment to the brewing side of the 
business. Moreover, Thomas Molson's strengths were his innovation and 
technical skills. Thomas Molson was similar to his father in that both of them 
were innovative entrepreneurs that succeeded in their own ventures. As an 
entrepreneur, Thomas fit the classic portrayal of the entrepreneur with a high 
need for control and a sense for opportunities. For example, after his departure 
from the business partnership, he looked for opportunities in England and finally 
settled in Kingston (Ontario) where he built a small brewery and distillery. Kets de 
Vries (1985) noted that the entrepreneur's internal locus of control is a predictor 
of the entrepreneur's sense that he can control his own destiny. In this particular 
case, the driving force was Thomas' confidence that the distillery business 
offered new opportunities for growth. 
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However one major difference between John Molson and Thomas was 
that John Molson did not exhibit an authoritarian style, while Thomas did. 
According to Birley (1986) family business owners tend to be authoritarian. In 
particular, Thomas treated his eldest son JHR harshly and monitored his sons 
work. Although Thomas did not inherit directly the brewery after his father's 
death, he nevertheless exercised indirect control of the brewery through the 
business partnership with his eldest son, JHR. Moreover, Thomas Molson's 
management style evolved from an innovator to a tired, autocratic and 
authoritarian leader, who refused to listen to his sons' suggestions to improve the 
business and used his power to control the sons. This progression in 
management style is consistent with the findings from Sharma, Chrisman and 
Chua(1996). 
JHR's management style was also influenced by the feuding relationship 
he had with his father. After his father's death, JHR set up a partnership with his 
two brothers, where he controlled fifty percent of the shares. Although JHR 
accommodated suggestions from his brothers, a disagreement with Markland 
over the future of the sugar refinery showed that he was in control of the 
business. This is consistent with Kets de Vries (1985)'s observations that 
entrepreneurs have an internal locus of control. Nevertheless, unlike his father 
who refused to share control and power, JHR delegated management control to 
a non-family partner and later to his younger brother and heir to the brewery, 
John Thomas Molson, who had already been managing the family business for 
over ten years at the time of JHR's death. 
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John Thomas Molson's management style was based on collaboration 
and delegation. Moreover, the way he treated Markland's son Fred is an 
indication that the family looked for the best candidates. After JHR's death a new 
business partnership was set up in 1897 in which John Thomas controlled fifty 
percent of the shares and both Herbert and Fred controlled twelve and a half 
percent each. John Thomas Molson gradually gave up management control to 
his eldest son Herbert and to his nephew Fred. However, he did not show 
preference for Herbert over Fred; and in effect rewarded Fred for his work by 
giving him more equity in the business. By 1901, John Thomas only held 31.75% 
share of the company, while Herbert's share was 18.75%. Both Fred and Adam 
Skaife controlled 25% each. John Thomas's exit strategy fits the category of 
ambassador as described by Lansberg (1999) and Sonnenfeld (1988). 
The Molson family business evolved from an owner-controlled business in 
the first generation to sibling partnerships in the second and third generation. A 
cousin consortium became in charge of the business during the fourth 
generation. After the death of John Thomas, his eldest son Herbert became the 
majority owner of the brewery, while his cousin Fred managed the operations of 
the business. This family business ownership evolution concurs with previous 
findings suggesting that succession typology goes from a controlling owner to a 
sibling partnership and then to a cousin consortium (Lansberg, 1999; Gersick, 
Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg, 1997). 
Both cousins worked well together to modernize the brewery operations, 
as well as to introduce new products. After the death of John Thomas, Herbert 
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transformed the company from a limited partnership to a joint-stock company. 
Lansberg (1999) referred to this type of leadership transition as an evolutionary 
succession, where not only the business form changes (in this case the legal 
structure), but also the business operations become more complex. Moreover, 
the leadership transition from the third to the fourth generation was relatively 
smooth. Ward (1987) noted that leadership transitions might avoid problems and 
conflicts when family interests are taken into consideration. In this particular 
case, because of Herbert's participation in World War I, Fred's role became more 
critical not only because he had to manage the family business, but also because 
he had to take care of Herbert's sons. 
After the death of Herbert Molson, the next transition went also without 
any problems. Handler (1992) and Levinson (1971) suggested family businesses 
were better prepared for succession transfers after having gone already through 
a succession process. Moreover, as suggested by Lansberg (1999), the cousin 
consortium evolves into a more complex consortium that includes a larger 
number of extended family members working in the business. By the time the 
Molson family business reached the fifth generation, the top management was 
made up of a team of second cousins, Herbert's two sons Tom and Hartland, and 
Fred's three sons Bert, Stuart and John Henry. 
As a leader, Bert's management style was described as a 'benevolent 
despot'. Juts like his father, he was concerned with punctuality, efficiency, and 
control. This is consistent with the typical description of a leader with an internal 
locus of control (Kets de Vries, 1985; Brockhaus, 1975; Shapero, 1975). Bert 
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also became the first leader to retire from the presidency position while still alive. 
Lansberg (1998) and Sonnenfeld (1988) called this type of leader governors, who 
retire from the business to pursue other interests outside the family business. 
After Bert's retirement, Hartland Molson became the next President of the 
family business, while his elder brother Tom Molson was appointed Chairman. 
Tom and Hartland were both highly competitive individuals with high need for 
achievement. However, while Tom was conservative, low risk taker, Hartland 
was the opposite. He was an entrepreneur with a propensity for high risk taking, 
as evidenced by his decision early in his life to choose his own entrepreneurial 
path. In addition, during World War II, he fought in the Battle of Britain and 
became a decorated hero. Kets de Vries (1977) noted that this propensity to take 
risks not only applies to financial risks, but also to social and psychological risks. 
According to Kets de Vries, for entrepreneurs the risk of a decline in social status 
or psychological well-being is more problematic than the capital loses. However, 
in the case of Hartland, he was not afraid to take these risks; for example, not 
only did his soya bean venture fail, but also he challenged socials norms when 
he divorced his first wife in the 1930's. Under Hartland's leadership, the family 
business became a global multinational. However, his management style did not 
change much. His exit strategy from the family business fit the portrait of the 
ambassador. According to Lansberg (1999) and Sonnenfeld (1988), 
ambassadors give up control but remain as an advisor within the company. 
Hartland's tenure at the helm of the family business also represented the 
first step in a shift in the culture of the Molson family firm. Tom's leadership was 
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rooted in Molson family business tradition, where family patterns were dominated 
by patriarchal characteristics and the business patterns were paternalistic in the 
way business was conducted, as well as in the treatment of employees. Dyer Jr. 
(1986) proposed a model for cultural configuration in family business that 
evaluated business patterns, family patterns and governance patterns. According 
to Dyer Jr. (1986), paternalistic patterns in business are based on assumptions 
that focus on personal power as a means to show family domination of the 
business. 
Moreover in paternalistic culture, the family uses hierarchy as a way for 
the family to retain decision-making authority. The main characteristic of 
patriarchal family patterns is the role of the father as the dominant authority 
figure, where all decisions are followed obediently; and the patriarch dominates 
the family until his death (Dyer Jr. 1986). This model was prevalent in the Molson 
family business from the first generation to the fourth generation. For example, 
when JHR and Markland proposed to their father ways to improve the operations 
of the brewery, the response was a letter threatening to dissolve the partnership. 
Tom Molson also learned from a young age not to question the decisions of the 
elders when he challenged some of the business traditions in the family 
business. 
Hartland's role as a leader broke the hierarchy that existed in the cousin 
consortium, where the elder family member was viewed as the next leader. In 
addition during Hartland's leadership, the governance of the family business 
evolved from a 'paper board' to an 'advisory board' of directors. This is consistent 
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with Dyer Jr. (1986)'s suggestions that governance patterns in family business 
evolve from a paper board to an advisory board. 
As the sixth generation leader of the family business, Eric Molson's 
management style is a combination of old tradition and new business leadership. 
Although family patterns have changed with the times, the family still follows 
patriarchal tradition. On the other hand, the business is professionally run. Dyer 
Jr. (1986) noted that in a professional culture, family and non-family managers 
are promoted based on their motivation and merits. 
In summary, John Molson as the founder of the family business, and his 
descendants Thomas Molson, JHR Molson, John Thomas Molson, Herbert 
Molson, Fred Molson, Bert Molson, Tom Molson, Hartland Molson, and Eric 
Molson fit the portrait of successful entrepreneurs who have also played a key 
role as agents of socio-economic change in the Montreal economy and beyond. 
While each of the leaders had his own management style that evolved as the 
company grew more complex, the common thread is that their leadership was 
grounded on the founder's vision and tradition for philanthropy and service to the 
community. 
Resistance to Let Go 
As the founder of the Molson family business, John Molson played an influential 
role in the first succession to the next generation. His 'letting go' of the business 
was influenced by his desire to ensure the survival and control of the brewery by 
his descendents. This is reflected by the conditions on his will that the brewery 
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pass to descendants trained as brewers and that his portrait hang on the 
company's boardroom as long as the business is controlled by family members. 
As the central figure of the company, the entrepreneur plays a key role not only 
in the early stages of the business, but also at the later stages, when continuity of 
the business becomes the main issue (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004). According to 
Davis and Harveston (1998), the founder plays an important role in the first 
succession process, while the family exerts a greater role in the succession 
process once the business has gone through one leadership transition. In a 
family business, the succession process represents not only business continuity, 
but also biological continuity. Succession also implies the entrepreneur 'letting 
go' of the business that he or she started (Lansberg, 1999; Handler, 1994; 
Handler and Kram, 1988; Churchill and Hatten, 1987; Beckhard and Dyer, 
1983a; Alcorn, 1982; Longenecker and Schoen, 1978). 
The brewery has been the central asset of the Molson family business. 
John Molson drafted a new will on his deathbed to pass the ownership of the 
asset to the next generation. Much of the research on resistance to let go 
focused on identifying factors in founders and entrepreneurs contemplating the 
first succession process (Rubenson and Gupta, 1996; Seymour, 1993; Tagiuri 
and Davis, 1992; Lansberg, 1988; Jacobs, 1986; Dyer, 1986; Zaleznik and Kets 
deVries, 1985; Alcorn, 1982; Barnes and Hershon, 1976; Levinson, 1971). 
Building on this research, Handler and Kram (1988) proposed a model of 
resistance to succession in family business. At the individual level of analysis, 
Handler and Kram (1988) suggested that (1) good health, (2) lack of other 
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interests, (3) identity with business, (4) retention of control over time, (5) fear of 
aging, retirement, and death, (6) avoidance of self-learning, and (7) avoidance of 
technical advice and consultation are factors that promote resistance to 
succession planning. In contrast, (1) health problems, (2) other interests, (3) 
ability to dissociate from the firm, (4) delegation of responsibilities to others, (5) 
opportunity for new life and career planning, (6) capacity for self-reflection, and 
(7) pursuit of technical advice and consultation are factors that reduce resistance 
to succession planning. The influences of these variables on resistance to 
succession planning in the succession processes at the Molson family business 
are evaluated next. 
Health 
Health issues played a role in several succession planning processes. In 
the first generation, as John Molson's health deteriorated he wrote a letter asking 
Thomas to come back and take care of the brewery. For John Molson, this was a 
last attempt to convince the prodigal son to return to Montreal and take the role 
he was best at and for which he had trained for, the management of the brewery. 
Health problems associated with JHR also played a role in the transition 
from the second to the third generation. As a child, JHR developed health 
problems and this created a dilemma to Thomas Molson. In the event that JHR 
did not live to age 21, John Jr.'s eldest son would be next in line to inherit the 
brewery. While JHR's health had recuperated as he became an adult, he lived 
with the knowledge that his younger brother John Thomas was the backup heir. 
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This knowledge combined with the fact that he did not have any children were 
factors that reduced his resistance for succession. 
John Thomas also delegated power and management responsibilities to 
his eldest son when his health started deteriorating. At a young age, Herbert 
became the head of the family and of the family business when John Thomas 
became incapacitated. When Herbert was stricken with cancer, his health 
problems were important factors that reduced his resistance to succession 
planning. In effect, it seems that Herbert may have used his illness as a ploy to 
get Hartland to come back to the family business. It can be deduced that when 
Herbert was in the hospital with cancer, he subtly challenged Hartland to give up 
his carefree life by wondering aloud if he was fit to work in the family business. 
By accepting his father's challenge, Hartland followed in the footsteps of his 
great-grandfather Thomas and his grandfather John Thomas as prodigal sons 
that returned to play key roles in the survival of the family business. 
Interests 
The Molson family business case analysis shows that all the leaders, 
except for Bert, developed interests outside the business. For example when 
John Molson's sons got more involved in the management and direction of the 
business, John Molson became involved in public service activities (philanthropy 
and politics), which took time away from the brewery and his other business 
activities. According to Tagiuri and Davis (1992) and Handler and Kram (1988), 
when leaders have other interests, leaders are more willing to plan for 
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succession. In the case of Thomas Molson, he did not have many interests 
outside the business. He was deeply religious and his faith played a part in 
reducing his resistance to succession planning. 
As in the case of his grandfather, JHR also developed interests in public 
and community service (Montreal General Hospital, McGill University) and in his 
latter years, he was more active in the family banking business, than in the 
brewery business. In the fourth generation, Herbert became involved in public 
and community services, such as the Bank of Montreal, McGill University and as 
President of the Montreal General Hospital, of which John Molson was one of the 
original founders. Like his great-grandfather, John Molson, Herbert also 
developed a strong interest in public service to the country. In his thirties, he 
joined other Canadians to fight in World War I, where he distinguished himself in 
battle. Fred on the other hand became involved with the Molson Bank, while still 
managing the brewery. 
Although having interests outside the business can be beneficial in 
reducing resistance to succession planning, Malone and Jenster (1992) cautions 
that when leaders seek outside activities such as hobbies, and/or involvement in 
civic and church groups, this may be a sign that the leader is becoming bored 
with the business and has started to neglect business performance. Malone and 
Jenster called this phenomenon the plateaued owner-manager. This condition 
was observed in John Molson, Thomas Molson, and JHR who towards the end of 
their lives, had started to devote less time to the brewery operations. 
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The analysis also found that there was no distinction in the level of 
plateauing between the founder and successors. This finding did not concur with 
Malone and Jenster (1992)'s proposition that there may be a difference between 
the founder and the successor in terms of plateauing effect. One explanation for 
this is that in the Molson family business, John Molson started the business with 
his inheritance money (contrary to the popular notion of entrepreneurs starting a 
business with little capital and only the strength of their ideas). Furthermore, 
Thomas Molson only came back to manage the brewery after he had 
successfully started his own brewery in Kingston, Ontario. 
In the case of JHR, he had little choice in terms of whether to join the 
family business or not. He inherited the brewery at a young age and throughout 
his life, he saw his role as a steward of the family patrimony. Malone and Jenster 
(1992) argue that successors often wished they could become something else, 
instead of being part of the family business; however, there was no evidence 
from the case that JHR wanted to become something else, but to lead the family 
business. 
According to Malone and Jenster (1992) very little research has been 
done to study the plateauing effect in successors. Ambrose (1983) found that 
children perceived lower levels of satisfaction in joining the family business and 
this perception may be related to plateauing symptoms in the owner-manager. 
The case analysis found that in the Molson family business, plateauing effects 
were manifested in the first three generations, but that in latter generations, 
business performance was not affected by the leaders' outside interests. 
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Of the leaders in the fifth generation, only Bert lacked interests outside the 
business. Handler and Kram (1988) noted that lack of interests contributes to 
resistance for succession planning. However, in the case of Bert, the case 
analysis shows the opposite result. Bert voluntarily retired in 1953, after guiding 
the company through the end of the economic recession and World War II. Two 
factors that may help explain Bert's decision to retire earlier was that he was a 
minority partner and the second factor was that under his leadership, the family 
business became a public company, which resulted in stricter governance. 
The other leaders of the fifth generation, Tom and Hartland Molson and 
his cousins Stuart and John Henry all followed in the family tradition of 
developing interests outside the family business. For example, they all served in 
the Canadian army, just like John Molson and Herbert Molson before them. In 
addition, they also followed the family tradition of serving the community. Tom 
and John Henry were involved as board members in hospital institutions such as 
the Montreal General Hospital. Hartland, on the other hand, inherited John 
Molson's penchant for politics, when he was appointed an independent Canadian 
senator. Eric Molson of the sixth generation has also become involved in 
philanthropic and community service activities. 
Identity with Business 
The case analysis discovered that in the Molson family business, some leaders 
showed a strong emotional attachment to the brewery and others did not. 
According to Levinson (1971), the entrepreneur's identification with the business 
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is an important success factor because these entrepreneurs view the business 
as their 'baby', something they created and which became a part of their life. 
However, some of these entrepreneurs have difficulty giving up authority or 
control and may view anyone raising the subject of succession with distrust (Kets 
deVries, 1975). 
During the early stages of the business John Molson demonstrated an 
emotional attachment to the brewery, as suggested by his commitment to 
produce a quality product and his need to control all aspects of the business. 
But, far from hanging onto power as long as possible, John Molson gave up 
management control of the family business by setting up a partnership with his 
three sons. On the other hand, John Molson maintained ownership of the 
brewery until the day he died. Handler and Kram (1988) proposed that ability for 
the founder to dissociate from the firm is an important factor that helps in 
reducing the resistance to succession planning. 
Thomas Molson did not inherit the brewery, but he nonetheless had a 
strong emotional attachment to the business, partly because he was seen as the 
brewer in the family. Even though Although Thomas Molson exhibited 
authoritarian and autocratic traits in both his personal and business life, he did 
not try to hang onto power to the detriment of the business. 
Unlike his father and grandfather, JHR's strong attachment to the brewery 
was not as a result of creating or growing the business, but rather because he 
understood his grandfather's vision of the role of the brewery as a family 
patrimony. As he got older JHR's management style changed from an 
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authoritarian style to one where he delegated responsibilities to other family and 
non-family members. This transformation suggests a change in the way he 
viewed the business, where at the beginning JHR saw the business as an 
extension of himself and then at a later stage as a family patrimony. JHR's 
childhood conflicts with his father may have affected the way he treated the 
business. According to Zaleznik and Kets de Vries (1985) the business becomes 
an extension of the leader's reality and a way for the leader to deal with 
childhood identification issues and conflicts. Nonetheless, JHR was able to 
dissociate himself from the firm and unselfishly bequeathed in his will the 
brewery to his younger brother John Thomas and ensured that John Thomas' 
eldest son (Herbert) was next in line to continue the family business. However, 
just like his grandfather, JHR maintained the full ownership of the brewery until 
his death. 
As the youngest son, John Thomas' interests were more focused on 
enjoying life and spending his share of the family fortune. The evidence from the 
case study research suggests that although John Thomas inherited the 
ownership of the brewery, he saw himself as a caretaker leader of the family 
business (similar to the role his father Thomas played in taking care of the 
brewery until JHR reached majority age). As a result John Thomas had a low 
emotional attachment to the business; and he was able to dissociate himself from 
the firm preferring instead to let Herbert and Fred manage the business. 
After the death of John Thomas, Herbert inherited the majority ownership 
of the brewery; however, just like his father he had a low emotional attachment to 
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the business and preferred to let his cousin and minority owner, Fred, manage 
the business. Although he was minority owner, Fred had a stronger emotional 
attachment to the business as suggested by his actions to modernize the 
operations of the brewery and guide the business while his cousin Herbert was 
being groomed. A possible explanation may be because he felt duty to follow 
JHR's family testament and saw himself as a caretaker leader. Both Herbert and 
Fred treated the brewery as a family patrimony and were able to dissociate 
themselves from the firm. 
Fred's eldest son Bert took over the leadership of the company after the 
death of Herbert and guided the company during the late 1930's to the early part 
of 1950's. Although Bert got involved in the family business at a young age, he 
did not display an emotional attachment to the family business. Bert was a 
minority shareholder in the business and played a role similar to that of his father; 
that is, the stewardship of the family business while his cousins Tom and 
Hartland were being groomed. 
As a majority shareholder in the family business, Tom had an emotional 
attachment to the business, as suggested by his disappointment for not being 
selected President of the company. Under Hartland's vision, the business grew 
from a local brewery to a multinational conglomerate. However, just like in the 
previous three generations, both Tom and Hartland treated the business as a 
family patrimony and were able to dissociate from the firm's identity. 
When Eric Molson of the sixth generation took over the Chairmanship of 
the company, he became the first member of the Molson family not to have held 
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the President's position in the company. However, this did not prevent him from 
developing an emotional attachment to the business. For instance, during the 
late 1970's and early 1980's he continued his father's strategy of gaining more 
control of the family business by acquiring voting shares in exchange for non-
voting shares. Nonetheless, Eric has been able to dissociate himself from the 
identity of the firm and has managed to navigate the family firm into a merger of 
equals with the Coors family business. 
Control 
The case analysis shows that the issue of control has been a key factor in 
the Molson family business. However, a distinction should be made between 
ownership control and management control. Ownership control will be analyzed 
and discussed in a separate section. The analysis in this section will focus on 
management control and how this was manifested in the different leaders of the 
Molson family business. Previous research has painted a picture of 
entrepreneurs who are paranoid and distrustful of subordinates and family 
members (Kets de Vries, 1985). For them, a high need for control means 
authority and power over subordinates, whether family or non-family, as well as 
sense that one can control one's destiny (Kets de Vries, 1985; Zaleznik and Kets 
de Vries, 1985; Brockhaus, 1975; Shapero, 1975). 
All the leaders in the Molson family business, starting from John Molson to 
Eric Molson have separated ownership control from management control. 
Handler and Kram (1988) proposed that retention of control over time is a factor 
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that promotes resistance to succession planning, while delegation of 
responsibilities to others reduces resistance. As his three sons entered the 
business, John Molson was able to start delegating more responsibilities to each 
of the sons. After the marriages of John Jr. and Thomas, John Molson set-up a 
partnership that gave more management control of the business to his three 
sons. Delegation of responsibilities to younger family members was a gradual 
process, and often involved training from the shop floor up the ranks. 
In the second generation, Thomas Molson retained control of the family 
business over time, even though he was not owner of the brewery. Nonetheless, 
in his partnership with his son JHR, Thomas specified that JHR's responsibility 
was the full management of the brewery to the exclusion of other activities. While 
JHR also exhibited some retention of control over time, he delegated 
responsibilities to both younger brothers, Markland and John Thomas. John 
Thomas focused on the brewing operations while Markland handled the distilling 
side of the business. 
When John Thomas inherited the brewery, his illness prevented him from 
working much in the family business. As a result, he delegated responsibilities to 
his son Herbert and to his nephew Fred, with Herbert responsible for the brewing 
operations and Fred responsible for the administration of the brewery. This split 
in responsibilities also applied to Herbert's son Tom and Fred's son Herbert. Both 
entered the business when they were young and delegation of responsibilities 
started early in their careers. However, younger members also learned early in 
their careers that decisions of the elders could not be questioned. 
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After the family business became public, the operations became more 
complex and delegation of responsibilities was shared not only with family 
members, but also with non-family executives. During Hartland's tenure as 
leader, the family business grew into a large multinational and this resulted in an 
overseer type of board of directors that maintained management control of the 
operations, including delegation of leadership duties to non-family professional 
managers. 
Under the leadership of Eric Molson, the Molson family business is ranked 
as one of the world's largest breweries. Eric Molson chairs the board of directors, 
but professional managers run the family business. Ward (1987) proposed a 
model of family business transition to professional management. This process 
involves three steps: founder, family and professional management. In the case 
of the Molson family business, the shift towards delegation of responsibilities to 
professional managers started with Bert, continued with Hartland, and has 
become the norm under Eric's leadership. Family businesses turn to professional 
management when the business becomes more complex, when a growth 
strategy is required, when leadership succession is being planned, and when the 
norms and values of the company need changes (Dyer Jr., 1989; Matthews, 
1984). 
Fear of aging, Retirement, and Death 
In the Molson family business, all leaders, except for Fred Molson, were 
able to deal with aging and retirement without any fear. This finding is contrary to 
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studies that have shown that founders resist letting go of the business because 
of fear of aging, retirement, and death (Lansberg, 1988; Zaleznik and Kets de 
Vries, 1985; Alcorn, 1982; Levinson, 1971). Founders also may react with fear 
and suspicion when the topic of succession is raised (Kets de Vries, 1996; 
Lansberg, 1988; Danco, 1982). However in the case of John Molson, the 
marriages of his sons were another step in the succession process. Moreover, he 
had willingly retired from the business to attend to his new horticulture hobby, but 
was forced to return to the management of the brewery when John Jr. and 
William started to neglect the brewing operations of the business. Handler and 
Kram (1988) suggested that the opportunity to start a new life and career 
planning is a factor that reduces the resistance to succession planning. Fear of 
retirement is particularly strong when founders lack hobbies to keep them busy 
(Ibrahim and Ellis, 1994). 
Subsequent leaders of the Molson family business have shown an ability 
to find new opportunities or hobbies to reduce the fear of aging, retirement and 
death. For example, Tomas Molson was a religious person; JHR served as 
Governor of McGill University; Herbert was involved with the Montreal General 
Hospital; Tom was also involved with the Montreal General Hospital; and 
Hartland became involved in politics. One member who showed a fear of 
retirement was Fred who died suddenly at age 69 while he was still President of 
the family business and planning for expansion of the business. One explanation 
for his behaviour is that he was a caretaker leader who felt a duty and obligation 
to his uncle JHR to manage the family business. 
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Fred's son Bert was another caretaker leader who was not afraid to retire 
at age 70, but there was no evidence from the case analysis research that he 
had other opportunities or hobbies. At age 70, current Chairman of the Board 
Eric Molson also shows no sign that he will be retiring soon. This is not an 
indication of a fear of retirement, given that Eric keeps busy with philanthropic 
work, but more of a tradition in the family business where the patriarch decides 
the time for retirement (usually past the age of 65). In addition, Eric seems to be 
following in the footsteps of previous leaders who waited until the successor was 
ready to take over the family business leadership. 
Self-learning and Self-reflection 
The case analysis shows that several Molson leaders reached a point 
where they accepted their own mortality and reduced their own sense of loss 
during the succession process. Towards the end of is life, John Molson reflected 
on the conflicts that drove Thomas away from the family business. His reaction 
was to put aside his own ego and write a letter to Thomas expressing his regret 
for not having done more for his second son. Lansberg (1988) suggests that the 
founder's capacity for self-reflection creates awareness on the founder and 
eases his reluctance let go of the business. Thomas Molson also had his own 
moment of self-reflection, as he neared the end of his life. For Thomas, the issue 
was in questioning his own profession as a brewer and to reconcile this with his 
religion. In the case of Herbert Molson, his moment of self-reflection happened 
when he was dying of cancer in the hospital and used the occasion to have a 
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conversation with Hartland and to persuade him to join the family business. 
According to Handler and Kram (1988), the avoidance of self-learning is a factor 
that promotes resistance to succession planning, while the capacity for self-
reflection is a factor that reduces the resistance to succession planning. The 
analysis of the Molson family business found that none of the leaders avoided 
self-learning and that on the contrary, each leader was aware of the importance 
of succession planning. 
Technical Advice and Consultation 
Seeking technical advice and consultation regarding inheritance, tax, 
ownership and succession issues can help the founder and/or leader plan for 
succession. John Molson learned a lesson from the inheritance battles with his 
grandfather that followed after he had reached majority age. To avoid the same 
problems with his sons, he frequently updated his will. Handler and Kram (1988) 
proposed that the founder's avoidance of technical advice and consultation is a 
sign that the founder is reluctant to let go of the business. In contrast, founders 
who pursue technical advice and consultation reduce the resistance to 
succession planning. Other Molson family leaders that followed John Molson 
have also prepared wills and inheritance plans to reduce offspring's conflicts, 
from Thomas Molson to Hartland Molson. Moreover, both JHR and John Thomas 
Molson's wills had clauses in the will stating that decisions could not be 
challenged by the offspring. 
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Interpersonal and Group Level Factors 
At the interpersonal and group level, there are some factors that have also 
played a role in the succession processes at the Molson family business. The 
case analysis found that there was a high level of trust in the offspring. For 
example, John Molson actively relied on his three sons to run and expand the 
family business. John Jr. who was his right-hand man focused on growing the 
transportation business, while Thomas and William focused on growing the 
brewery and banking business. JHR and John Thomas not only trusted in the 
abilities of Herbert and Fred, but also gradually increased their responsibilities 
within the family business. Herbert also had a high level of trust in the leadership 
abilities of his son, Tom and nephew Bert. This included making them a part of 
strategic decision-making situations, such as expansion of the brewery 
operations. According to Handler and Kram (1988), a high level of trust, open 
informed communication, and heirs actively involved in the business are factors 
that reduce resistance to succession planning. 
Of all the Molson family leaders, Thomas Molson showed mistrust in his 
eldest son, JHR whom he treated in an autocratic fashion. The case analysis 
found that conflicts between father and son contributed to this mistrust in each 
other. Conflicts arise in relationships between an overpowering father and an 
overachieving son (Alcorn, 1982). Davis (1968) also noted that conflicts arise 
between a conservative father and a progressive son. In the case of Thomas and 
JHR, the conflicts centered on the operations and strategic direction of the 
brewery, in particular Thomas Molson refusing to accept new ideas from JHR on 
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how to improve the brewery operations. Mistrust of offspring (lack of confidence 
in the offspring) is a factor that promotes reluctance to let go by the owner 
(Goldberg and Wooldridge, 1993), as well as resistance to succession planning 
(Handler and Kram, 1988). 
In summary, the case analysis found that the founder and subsequent 
leaders of the business displayed in general low resistance to succession 
planning. In certain leaders health problem was a factor, while in others their 
strong identity with the business was compensated by outside interests, such as 
philanthropy, community and public service. Moreover in general, leaders of the 
family business have been able to differentiate ownership control from 
management control. Contrary to other research findings, fear of retirement was 
not a factor in the leaders of the Molson family business. Leaders were open for 
consultation and self-reflection. In addition leaders took time to mentor the next 
generation, and in general they had a high level of trust in the competencies of 
the offspring. 
The Grooming Process 
The grooming of next generation members is a process that the Molson 
family business has continuously done effectively. This grooming process 
consisted of ensuring that potential successors received good business 
education, specific training in the brewing business, management training that 
led to leadership positions in the family business, and understanding the vision of 
the family business. Ward (1986) noted that succession planning is a key part of 
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the strategic planning of family businesses in order to ensure survival to the next 
generation. 
However, while training and mentoring of next-generation members is 
important, the key in the grooming process at the Molson family business has 
been the ability to share the family's vision with the next generation. Lansberg 
(1999) proposed that the vision or 'shared dream' provides direction for the 
succession process; and this shared dream evolves over time as the family 
members define the values of the business, the type of business they want to 
become, and how they wish to be perceived by others. 
At the Molson family business, the foundation of the vision started with 
John Molson, who wanted to create not just a good quality product, but also an 
organization that was socially responsible. So as part of his social and economic 
contribution to the city of Montreal, John Molson became of the leading 
supporters for the construction of the Montreal General Hospital. Dyer Jr. (1986) 
noted that the founder of the business plays a key role in shaping the culture of 
the organization and in instilling this vision on his followers. 
Social responsibility as a tenet of the family business vision has 
manifested in every subsequent generation after John Molson. For example, 
John Jr., Thomas, and William Molson were instrumental in supporting the 
creation of McGill University. JHR also supported Montreal General Hospital and 
McGill University, a tradition that was continued by Herbert and his sons Tom 
and Hartland. Through the Molson Foundation, Eric Molson continues to support 
philanthropic activities. Danco and Ward (1990) noted that family foundations 
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provide a vehicle to carry on the founder's vision, as well as provide creative 
ways to achieve the family's social and philanthropic goals. 
Moreover, the case analysis also found that in John Molson's will, the 
founder may have also embedded the importance of the grooming process for 
future generations of the family. By bequeathing the brewery to his grandson, 
John Henry Robinson Molson (JHR) and with the condition that JHR should be 
trained in the brewing business, John Molson stressed the importance of 
preparing the offspring of future successors as an important element of the 
grooming process. Handler (1990) proposed that there is a mutual adjustment 
between the older and the younger generation members. This grooming process 
involves preparing and integrating the offspring for entry into the business, 
mutual role adjustment between the older and younger generation, decoupling 
the family-business system, quality of relationships, and the successor's ability to 
lead (Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Stavrou, 1999; Lansberg and Astrachan, 1994; 
Handler, 1991 & 1990; Churchill and Hatten, 1987; Beckhard and Dyer, 1983; 
Barnes and Hershon, 1976). Based on the case study research, these factors 
associated with the grooming process will be evaluated in the following sections 
of the Molson family business. 
Preparing the Offspring for Entry 
With the exception of Fred Molson (who grew up in Oregon), the family 
tradition was to bring the boys early in their life to the brewery offices so they 
would become aware of the family business. The next step was for offspring to 
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start working on the family business during summers. Barach, Ganitsky, Carson, 
and Doochin (1988) found that successors who started working in summer jobs 
in the family business gained more valuable experience and insights about the 
family business, than if they had entered the family business straight into a 
management position. 
Geoff Molson of the seventh generation has continued in the tradition of 
summer jobs (his first job was driving trucks) as a first step in getting to know the 
business, the operations, and the workers. This also reinforces another family 
tradition that offspring's hands-on apprenticeships start from the shop floor or 
low-level jobs and move up the ranks, based on their skills. Scranton (1992) 
noted that private and partnership family businesses in the 19th century often 
encouraged sons to start work in the business from an early age. This 
apprenticeship started from the shop floor and would last from five to eight years 
while the sons were still going to school. The goal of the apprenticeship was not 
only to prepare the offspring's technical skills in the production function and to 
help the offspring learn about the organization's culture, but also to help the 
father to assess the offspring's future roles in the company. 
Based on the tradition set by John Molson, future successors were trained 
in brewing practices. Thomas Molson, JHR Molson, John Thomas, Herbert 
Molson, Tom Molson, and Eric Molson all have followed in the tradition of being 
trained as brewmasters of the company. While John Molson taught himself how 
to brew beer from Richardson's manual, Thomas and JHR were trained in-house 
brewmaster techniques that had been passed from John Molson. In the case of 
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JHR, his brewmaster apprenticeship was stipulated in a formal business contract. 
Herbert, Tom and Eric received additional brewmaster training from specialized 
guilds or academies. After finishing his brewmaster academy training, Eric 
Molson's apprenticeship continued at another family-owned brewery (Moosehead 
Breweries Ltd in New Brunswick). Herbert Molson, who was the first leader to get 
a university degree in chemistry, also followed up this education with brewing 
academy training. Herbert's son Tom also went for special brewing academy 
training after finishing his university studies. According to Scranton (1992), as 
manufacturing practices improved, direct apprenticeship to impart technical skill 
in family firms required more complex training specialization. 
Preparing the offspring for entry into the family business may also involve 
the offspring working outside the family business. In the Molson family business, 
Fred Molson, Bert Molson and Hartland Molson gained managerial experience 
working in other businesses. For example, Fred worked as a manager in Ontario 
in a family business owned by his cousins on his mother's side before joining the 
brewery. Fred's experience as a successful manager gave him the credibility to 
join the family business and implement a modernization plan to improve the 
operations of the brewery. Barach, Ganitsky, Carson, and Doochin (1988) found 
that after entering the business potential successors needed to earn credibility by 
demonstrating sound decision-making skills, and to do the job better than anyone 
else. 
Amongst Fred's sons, John Henry joined the brewery at a young age, but 
Bert Molson worked as a stockbroker before joining the family business. Fred 
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and Bert were the first members of the family business who gained additional 
expertise from other industries and apply the knowledge to the brewing business. 
While Fred's previous experience helped with the operations of the brewery, 
Bert's financial expertise became an advantage when the company changed 
from a limited partnership to a public company. According to Ibrahim and Ellis 
(2004), the grooming process has placed emphasis on members of the younger 
generation getting training and gaining new expertise outside of the family 
business before being integrated into the family business. 
In contrast to his elder brother Tom, Hartland's grooming also did not 
follow the tradition of joining the brewery at a young age. He trained as an 
accountant and financial analyst in a bank and in an accounting firm before 
joining the business. In addition, Hartland's entrepreneurial traits were enhanced 
as he started and ran his own independent businesses. This experience provided 
Hartland with a different view of business, which he was able to apply later in his 
career after joining the family business. Barach, Ganitsky, Carson, and Doochin 
(1988) suggested that offspring who choose to work outside the family business 
after their schooling gain a sense of self-accomplishment, self-confidence, and 
independence that otherwise may not have been attained if they had stayed in 
the family business. Moreover, working outside the family business allows the 
offspring to be judged objectively and develop a sense of achievement that 
provides credibility to the offspring if he returns to the family business. 
Eric, who was groomed for a leadership position from a young age at the 
brewery, preferred his sons to be groomed outside the business. Both of Eric's 
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sons are now being groomed for leadership positions with Geoff (age 37) on the 
operations side and Andrew (age 40) at the board level. According to Barach, 
Ganitsky, Carson, and Doochin (1988), it could take ten years for potential 
successors to gain the credibility required to assume top management positions; 
and there's no rule whether the potential successors gained their experience 
inside or outside the family business. In the case, of Andrew and Geoff Molson, 
both have gained experience and different expertise by working inside and 
outside the family business. This finding suggests that experience gained inside 
and outside the business may be a necessary requirement for potential 
successors of family businesses. 
Mutual Role Adjustment 
The case analysis found that in general the grooming process of younger 
Molson generation members by the older generation followed a stepwise process 
in which the offspring enter the business at a young age, starting from low-level 
positions and moving up the rank for potential leadership positions. This pattern 
was observed in the first four generations. For example, John Molson mentored 
all three sons in the family business operations and developed a collaborative 
relationship with each son. This mutual role adjustment started when John 
Molson created a business partnership with his three sons that lasted seven 
years (from 1816 to 1823). He slowly delegated management control to each son 
and nurtured their talents. This 'succession dance' between the founder/leader 
and the successor requires a mutual role adjustment based on respect and 
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understanding, whereby the founder gradually shifts more responsibilities to the 
successor (Handler, 1990; Ward, 1990; Davis and Tagiuri, 1989). Alcorn (1982) 
noted that one of the important factors in the succession process is the role 
played by the founder and the next generation successor, and that collaborative 
management between the father and son is a key factor in the succession 
process. 
However, this collaborative management between father and son was 
lacking in the second generation. The relationship between Thomas and JHR 
was full of conflicts and described as a master-servant type of relationship. 
Seymour (1993) found that the quality of the work relationship between the 
owner-manager and the successor is a significant factor to achieve a positive 
succession because it allows both the owner-manager and the successor to 
appreciate each other's contributions. In the relationship between Thomas and 
JHR, neither Thomas nor JHR were willing to compromise and work together. 
Thomas may have seen JHR as someone who inherited the brewery without 
earning it and as a result imposed a very strict and autocratic training program for 
his son. JHR, on the other hand, saw his father as someone who was inflexible 
and did not accord to his father the recognition of his accomplishments. 
According to Seymour, this type of confusion or failure to recognize the different 
roles of the family members may lead to poor quality relationships and affect the 
succession process. The differences between JHR and Thomas were also 
attributed to JHR's education and progressive views, which may have been 
opposite to Thomas' conservative views. Seymour also noted that the owner-
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manager may resent the education and knowledge that the offspring brings to the 
business. 
The case analysis showed that the relationship between Thomas and JHR 
was the only father-son relationship with conflicts. Nonetheless, in the first three 
generations, the succession process from older generation to younger generation 
involved a transfer of values; for example, the patriarchal upbringing that has 
carried over from the founder John Molson. The business mentorship allowed the 
older generation to transmit to the younger generation personal and family 
conservative values that have been carried from one generation to the next. 
Handler (1989) proposed a mutual role adjustment between the older and 
younger generation. According to Handler, this 'succession dance' involves a 
gradual transfer of leadership experience, decision-making power, authority, and 
equity. Also this mutual adjustment involves an adjustment of roles between the 
leader and the successor. According to this model, the predecessor and the next-
generation member trade roles in a process involving four stages. In the first 
stage, the leader is the sole operator and the successor has no role. In the 
second stage the leader is the monarch while the successor is a helper. In the 
third stage the leaders becomes an overseer/delegator, and the successor 
becomes a manager. In the last phase, the leader gives up authority and power 
and becomes a consultant, while the successor assumes the leadership role and 
becomes chief decision-maker. 
This succession dance was observed between John Molson and his sons; 
however it did not follow the Handler model entirely. As the sole operator of the 
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business, John Molson brought his sons early into the business as helpers, and 
gradually delegated more responsibilities to each son until each was managing 
separate activities in the business. However, before dying, John Molson did not 
appoint a leader or Chief decision-maker to govern the family business. Instead, 
the different business activities were split and bequeathed to each son, with the 
core of the business, the brewery, passing to his grandchild. 
The case analysis also shows the lack of a succession dance between 
Thomas and JHR. While, Thomas ensured that JHR was properly trained in the 
brewery business, the lifelong conflicts between father and son prevented a 
mutual role adjustment. Most of Thomas' assets went to Markland and John 
Thomas, while JHR received very little from Thomas' estate. This lack of a 
mutual role adjustment between the second and the third generation is an 
interesting finding in the research. There is no evidence from the case study 
research to suggest that John Molson knew JHR well enough to trust his abilities 
to manage the brewery, given that JHR was still a child. John Molson's 
stipulation in his will to ensure that the brewery would go to another 'John 
Molson', whether Thomas's eldest son (JHR) or John Jr.'s eldest son (John III) 
suggests that John Molson had in mind a patrilineal succession for the brewery. 
The conflicts between John Jr. and Thomas, as well as John Jr.'s disinterest in 
the brewery business and Thomas' lack of a marriage contract may have 
influenced John Molson's decision to bequeath the brewery directly to a 
grandchild. Habamata (1990) found that many typically Japanese family 
159 
businesses follow a patriarchal and patrilineal tradition, where the successor is 
the eldest son who becomes the head of the family and of the business. 
The mutual role adjustment between the third and fourth generation also 
did not follow Handler's model entirely. JHR had no offspring and had promised 
to leave the brewery to John Thomas, who returned to the business at age 43 
after spending about 12 years traveling around the world. Because John Thomas 
was already familiar with the brewing operations, he assumed more management 
responsibilities in the business while JHR focused on the banking business and 
philanthropic activities. John Thomas became the leader and Chief decision-
maker only after the death of JHR. But by that time, John Thomas's illness 
prevented him from managing the business, so the succession dance involved 
John Thomas and his son Herbert. At age 22 Herbert was too young to assume 
leadership of the business, so his cousin Fred who already had experience as a 
business manager was brought in as a caretaker leader and minority partner. 
According to Ibrahim and Ellis (2004), a caretaker leader is brought in when the 
successor is still young or still not ready to assume the leadership of the family 
business. Lansberg (1999) noted that in a cousin consortium, the process of 
taking charge takes longer; is more political; and the lead cousin needs to 
balance the interests of the family branches. Fred not only had to balance the 
interests between majority and minority partners, but also the interests of the 
younger generation members, his sons Fred and John Henry, as well as the 
interests of Herbert's eldest son Tom who was the potential heir to the family 
business. 
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The succession pattern between the fourth and fifth generation was very 
similar to the previous succession. A new cousin consortium replaced the old 
one; however, just like in the previous generation, the majority owners were too 
young to assume the leadership of the business, so another cousin (Fred's son 
Bert) joined the business and became its caretaker leader. The case analysis 
shows that this succession also did not fit entirely Handler's model of a mutual 
role adjustment between the older and younger generation. The ages of the 
leader and the successors seem to influence this mutual role adjustment. When 
successors are too young to become managers or take over leadership, the 
incumbent leader needs to consider bringing in a caretaker leader, who may or 
may not hold shares in the family business. Previous research by Ibrahim, 
Soufani, Lam, and Poutziouris (2004) found that in the Eaton's family business, 
the sudden death of the second generation leader created a vacuum in the family 
business because the leader's offspring were too young to join the business. As 
result, a cousin was brought in as a caretaker leader, but this selection created a 
bitter conflict between the widow and the new leader. 
The collaborative relationship that existed between the two family 
branches of the Molson family business was a key factor in the transition 
processes observed in the fourth and fifth generations. This finding supports 
Lansberg (1999)'s suggestion that collaborative management is a key factor in 
cousin consortiums. Just as his father had played a key role in the survival of the 
family business, Bert also played a key role in the growth of the family business. 
As a caretaker leader, he mentored both Tom and Hartland. In this particular 
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case, the analysis shows a mutual role adjustment between the older cousin 
(minority owner) and the younger cousins (majority owners), where both Tom 
and Hartland gradually became Vice Presidents of the family business. 
Tom's path to Chairman of the Board follows closely Handler's mutual role 
adjustment model (phase one to four). According to Handler (1990), the mutual 
role adjustment between the older and younger generation also involves 
minimizing sibling rivalry conflicts through accommodation and commitment from 
the family to focus on the long-term survival of the business. The consultant's 
recommendation for Tom to take over the newly created Chairman of the Board 
position was done to accommodate the interests of the two brothers and to 
reduce potential conflict that may arise from the appointment of Hartland as 
President of the family business. Rosenblatt, de Mik, Anderson, and Johnson 
(1985) noted that tensions that arise over succession issues may be reduced by 
bringing in an independent consultant who can provide objectivity to the process. 
Hartland entered the family business as a manager, after gaining 
experience outside the family firm. The transfer of leadership from Bert to 
Hartland closely matches stage three and four of Handler's mutual role 
adjustment model (he only joined the management of the family business after 
the death of his father). Hartland's experience as an entrepreneur and his 
extrovert personality likely played an important role in the consultant's 
recommendation. According to Rosenblatt, de Mik, Anderson and Johnston 
(1985), it is important for the family to know when to call in an outside expert who 
can help in the decision-making process. As the youngest of three candidates 
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groomed to succeed Bert, Hartland's selection was consistent with the family's 
tradition of choosing capable successors. Lansberg (1999) noted that in cousin 
consortiums the age of the cousins play a role in determining which cousins get 
top management positions. The older cousins have an advantage over the 
younger cousins in that they may get all the key positions, leaving younger 
cousins without opportunities for promotion. 
When Hartland retired as President of the company, he had been 
grooming his younger cousin P.T. Molson for more than a decade and during this 
process, there was also a mutual role adjustment between the two cousins. P.T. 
Molson who left a diplomatic career to join the family business was brought in as 
a potential caretaker leader because Eric Molson was still young. P.T.'s path to 
top leadership position did not follow Handler's model, as he was accepted into 
top management position without much prior experience in the family business. 
However, Hartland and the Board did not realize that P.T.'s interests were in his 
diplomatic career, rather than the brewery business. Davis and Tagiuri (1989) 
have suggested that the relationship between father and son need to take into 
account the heir's psychological needs, his lifestyle, as well as his career's 
interests. In this particular case, the short succession dance between the older 
cousin (Hartland) and the younger cousin (P.T.) failed to recognize P.T.'s lack of 
interest in the brewery business. 
Eric Molson, on the other hand, followed closely Handler's mutual role 
adjustment model. However, Eric never became President of the company. 
Instead his mutual role adjustment led him to the Chairmanship of the Board. He 
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succeeded a non-family member, Bud Willmot, who had replaced Hartland as 
Chairman, after the latter's retirement in 1974. By the time Eric became 
Chairman, the family business had evolved into a large diversified multinational 
operation that required professional management. However, the evolution of the 
business into a more professional company started after the death of P.T. and 
with the appointment of the first non-family President, Dave Chenoweth, to lead 
the company. Mr. Chenoweth was a qualified manager who had first turned down 
the Board's recommendation for him to become the President of the company. 
Dyer (1989) noted that family businesses may use an evolutionary or a 
revolutionary approach to bring professional management into the firm. In the 
evolutionary approach, the family brings in a non-family executive that has been 
working already in the family firm and who knows the culture of the company. In 
the revolutionary approach, the family firm brings in outside management as a 
strategy to professionalize the firm. In the case of the Molson family business, an 
evolutionary approach was used, consistent with the family business 
conservative tradition. 
Eric is currently Chairman of the Molson-Coors Brewing Company. Just 
like his predecessors had done with the younger generation, Eric has taken time 
to mentor his two sons Geoff and Andrew. A mutual role adjustment is underway 
between Eric and his two sons; however, this succession dance partly fits 
Handler's model. The eldest son Andrew has an education in corporate 
governance, is a partner in a consulting company, and sits with his father as a 
Board member. Andrew's entry into the family business follows a common 
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pattern established by previous leaders such Fred, Hartland, and P.T., family 
members who entered the business after establishing their own career outside 
the family business. 
In contrast, Geoff has followed the footsteps of typical sons who entered 
the business at a young age in order to become familiar with the operations and 
culture of the business. However, rather than starting from a low-level position 
and earn his way up, Geoff left the family business to earn an MBA and gain 
additional managerial experience. Geoff's experience included working for Coca-
Cola and gaining additional distribution channel experience before returning to 
the family business and assuming a top management position. This finding 
supports Handler (1990)'s model of mutual role adjustment between the older 
and younger generation. However, one deviation from the model is the common 
pattern that the younger members seek managerial expertise outside the family 
business before returning coming back. Lansberg (1999) suggested that family 
businesses should develop policies that set strict entry requirements for offspring 
to join the family business and that ideally offspring must work outside the family 
business for three to five years to earn professional credibility and managerial 
experience. 
In summary, the Molson family business has ensured through grooming 
processes that only those who are qualified are promoted to leadership positions. 
Every generation has integrated offspring at an early age into the family 
business. In certain cases, family members worked outside the family business, 
where they gained experience and additional skills. The integration and grooming 
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of offspring was not only restricted to sons of majority shareholders, but also 
included nephews of minority shareholders. 
The analysis showed that the succession transfer from the older to the 
younger generation in the Molson family business did not follow the exact mutual 
role adjustment model outlined by Handler (1990). The succession dance 
between the second and the third generation was the most problematic and 
challenging because of a lack of collaboration between the father and the son. 
Nonetheless, except in the transfer from the first to the second generation, a role 
adjustment manifested in a gradual succession process, rather than a single 
transfer of leadership event, has been observed between the older and younger 
generation in the Molson family business. 
Moreover when potential heirs were not ready to take over the leadership 
of the family business, the family business relied on caretaker leaders to manage 
the business. Collaborative management (except during the transition between 
Thomas and JHR of the second generation) and gradual shifts of power are 
characteristics that influenced the 'succession dances' between the older and 
younger generations. In addition, the mutual role adjustment that has taken place 
from the third generation to the present sixth generation has been able to 
minimize sibling rivalry feuds and has succeeded in instilling in each of the 
younger generations a commitment to perpetuate the long term success of the 
family business. This role adjustment reflected the patriarchal upbringing that has 
carried over from the founder John Molson and allowed the older generation to 
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transmit to the younger generation personal and family conservative values that 
have been carried from one generation to the next. 
After becoming a public company, a mutual role adjustment between the 
older and younger generation was less evident. This can be attributed to the role 
of non-family professionals who have had a greater involvement in the operations 
and management of the company. Furthermore, the findings suggested that 
before and after the family business turned to professional management, the 
mutual role adjustment between the older and younger generation included the 
offspring working outside the family business and gaining managerial credibility 
before returning to the family business. 
Decoupling the Family-Business System 
The Molson family business in general has not been immune to tensions 
arising from the overlap between the family and the business system. However, 
the strength of the family vision that John Molson first laid and which was later 
reinforced by JHR represents the cornerstone of how the Molson family views the 
family business. According to Ibrahim and Ellis (2004) and Lansberg (1999), the 
common goals and shared dreams are a necessary step in successfully 
managing the dual identity of family firms and ensuring an effective succession 
process. The inability to decouple the family-business system may result in family 
and organizational conflicts that can lead to business failure (Ibrahim and Ellis, 
1994; Davis and Tagiuri, 1989). 
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Problems of Carry-Over 
The case analysis shows that the Molson family business has also 
experienced problems decoupling the family-business system, notably in the 
earlier generations. John Molson wanted to treat all three sons as equals, but 
had problems dealing with sibling rivalry between John Jr. and Thomas. 
According to Friedman (1991), sibling rivalry may develop in the family as 
offspring compete for parental approval and a role in the family business. This 
disagreement between the two sons over the direction of the business led to 
Thomas departure from the family business and John's regret of not having been 
able to support Thomas, who was considered the brewer of the family. Problems 
of carry-over occur when family business members are unable to separate family 
issues from business issues. As a result, this can lead to confusion, as well as 
family conflicts and spill-over from one system (rational) to the other (emotional) 
or vice-versa (Davis and Tagiuri, 1989; Miller and Rice, 1988; Rosenblatt, de Mik, 
Anderson, and Johnson, 1985; Lansberg, 1983; Davis, 1983; Alcorn, 1982; 
Levinson; 1971; Davis, 1968). 
The business rivalry between John Jr. and Thomas was a carry-over from 
Thomas' competitive nature against his older brother, from the time they were 
young. As the eldest of the siblings, John Jr. expected Thomas and William to 
conform to his authority. Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg (1997) noted 
that birth order and differentiation forces influence sibling relationships and 
dynamics. The case analysis shows that John Jr. expected to be the heir of the 
family business, while John Molson vacillated between primogeniture and a 
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coparcenary approach, where all siblings are treated equally and assigned 
different tasks in the business. According to Ibrahim and Ellis (2004), a 
coparcenary approach amongst siblings works if all siblings can work as a team, 
but when competition arises amongst the siblings, this can lead to sibling 
conflicts. In effect, sibling conflicts emerged again after the death of the patriarch. 
Although John's three sons were friendly to each other, this dynamic did not 
prevent a family feud from arising during the settlement of John Molson's will and 
the conflict was only resolved after John Jr. launched a legal action suit. 
In order to reduce sibling conflicts, John Molson also created zones of 
comfort where each son focused on business areas that fit his strengths. John Jr. 
managed the business' transportation activities, Thomas concentrated on 
brewing, and William focused on real estate and banking. Ibrahim and Ellis 
(1994) suggested that zones of comfort provide clear organizational boundaries 
to offspring and helps in reducing conflicts amongst different family members 
working in the business. According to Levinson (1971), the business may set up 
separate operations or divisions for each family member in order to reduce 
conflicts. 
Conflicts as a result of sibling competition are a common pattern that was 
also observed in the second and fifth generation. In the second generation, JHR 
had family and business conflicts with his younger brother Markland, whom he 
neither thought highly of, nor respected his business opinions. The carry-over 
problems may have been compounded by Thomas' favouritism towards the less 
competent Markland and may have used this preference to play the two sons 
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against each other. Ibrahim and Ellis (2004) called this construct the 'favorite son 
syndrome'. Donnelley (1964) also suggested that favouritism towards a less 
competent family member may be conducive to internecine feuds. According to 
Donnelley, a balance between family and managerial interests is required to 
avoid problems resulting from favouritism. This was not the case between JHR 
and Markland because the carry-over conflicts between the two brothers affected 
the performance of the business, and the departure of Markland and John 
Thomas from the partnership. 
In the fifth generation, sibling rivalry from the time they were young was 
also evident between Tom and Hartland. The two brothers were competitive and 
excelled at school. Friedman (1991) noted that competition amongst sibling for 
parental love and attention always leads to sibling conflicts. In this particular 
case, the solution was for the younger brother to earn credibility outside the 
family business. The conflicts between Tom and Hartland were renewed after the 
appointment of Hartland as President of the company, and may have created 
friction between the two family branches that carried into the sixth generation. 
The case analysis shows that conflicts amongst cousins were few, even 
while the family business was ruled by cousin consortiums. Some conflicts may 
have arisen between John Henry and Hartland over the latter's appointment as 
President of the company. However, the use of the independent consultant may 
have contained the conflicts from spilling-over. The second cousin-cousin conflict 
occurred in the sixth generation between majority-owner Eric Molson and 
minority-owner Ian Molson over the merger between the Molson and Coors 
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family businesses. However, this conflict was also a power struggle between the 
two cousins, as Ian had intentions of succeeding Eric as Chairman of the Board. 
Lansberg (1999) noted that cousin to cousin successions are dynastic in nature, 
but also rare. Cousin consortium may not last more than one generation because 
as shares are diluted, family members may start selling shares to one of the 
family branches. In the case of the Molson family business, the entry of Ian 
Molson into the business moved the company into the third cousin consortium. 
Unlike the first two cousin consortiums that were characterized by collaborative 
management, the third one was marred by a power struggle over the strategic 
direction of the company. 
An interesting finding in the case analysis is the lack of many carry-over 
problems between fathers and sons. The only case of carry-over problem 
observed was in the second generation between Thomas and JHR. Family and 
business conflicts characterized their relationship from the time JHR became the 
owner of the brewery until Thomas passed away. The conflicts between father 
and son were managed in a civil way, but the feud was bitter and lifelong, and led 
to JHR resigning his position as executor of the Thomas estate. Conflicts can 
arise between fathers and sons (Levinson, 1971) and can be observed in 
situation between a conservative father and a progressive son (Davis, 1968), or 
between an overpowering father and a weak son (Alcorn, 1982). This may be 
attributed to the fact that John Molson bequeathed the brewery directly to JHR 
and bypassing Thomas in the process. JHR may have learned from the family 
feuds that had erupted over the estate wills of his father and grandfather and laid 
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the foundation in his own will to eliminate or avoid future family in-fighting over 
estate wills. 
The case analysis found that conflicts between family and non-family 
members were rare, but a case of nepotism observed in the fifth generation 
involving David Molson illustrates the difficulty of decoupling the family-business 
systems. David joined the brewery at a young age in 1949, but did not reach a 
top management position because of lack of competency. This issue led to a 
feud between David's father John Henry and a non-family executive Campbell 
Smart. Nonetheless, Hartland promoted David, who could not move further up at 
the brewery, to head the Canadian Arena Company. According to Dyer Jr. 
(1986), conflicts between family and non-family professionals emerge as a result 
of the clash between the family's adherence to a paternalistic culture dominated 
by old family values and the professional's culture based on individual 
competence and achievement. 
Path of Self-validation 
The case analysis shows that offspring in different generations charted 
their own path of self-validation. For example, in the first generation all three of 
John Molson's sons were ambitious, competitive, and business driven. However, 
the second son Thomas not only had to grow out of his father's shadow, but also 
out of his older brother John Jr.'s control. Offspring grow under the shadow of the 
founder/leader and often experience difficulties to develop their own identities 
(Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Dyer Jr., 1986; Alcorn, 1982; Levinson, 1971; Davis, 
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1968). In the case of Thomas, his path of self-validation led to his self-imposed 
exile from the family business and his decision to start his own brewery in 
Kingston, Ontario. When he returned to the family business, it was at the urging 
of his father who needed him to manage the brewing side of the business. 
Between JHR and his father Thomas, the relationship was characterized 
by conflicts and in-fighting. As the designated heir, JHR grew under a 
domineering father who treated him in an autocratic fashion. The path of self-
validation refers to the offspring's need for independence and desire to leave 
their own imprint in the business. This may be hard to achieve for the offspring 
when the founder/leader has an overpowering personality, or in situations 
characterized by a strong father/weak son and conservative father/progressive 
son (Alcorn, 1982; Davis, 1968). 
Fred's path to self-validation was the most interesting in the Molson family 
business. Growing up under his father's failures in business influenced Fred's 
personality. Offspring who have competencies, skills, and abilities and who have 
been groomed by family members for leadership positions can not only lead to 
an effective succession process, but also benefit the family business in the long 
term (Lansberg and Astrachan, 1994; Danco, 1982; Alcorn, 1982; Donnelley, 
1964). Even though the relationship between JHR and his brother Markland was 
characterized by conflicts over Markland's competences, JHR took Fred under 
his wings and mentored him. Fred's identity was also shaped by his experiences 
working for a family business from his mother's side that taught him the skills and 
competencies required in managing a business. 
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Herbert's offspring, Tom and Hartland, also illustrates the importance for a 
younger offspring to form his own identity and chart his own path of self-
validation. Unlike Tom who was conservative in nature, Hartland was considered 
a high-risk taker and developed an entrepreneurial personality. His path towards 
self-validation involved working outside the family business, as well as starting 
his own business. According to Barnes (1988) younger siblings can work outside 
the family business and gain not just experience, but also a track record. 
Hartland's work experience outside the family business coupled with his 
entrepreneurial and risk taking personality provided the family business with a 
leader that transformed the company from a small local brewery into a 
multinational conglomerate during the 1970's. 
In summary, the Molson family business has followed since its inception a 
traditional patriarchal and patrilineal system in which the head of the family and 
of the business is the male member and the business has passed down from one 
Molson heir to the next Molson heir. Offspring from various generations of the 
Molson family business have chosen their own path to self-validation, including 
the founder John Molson. In general problems of carry-over arising in one system 
(family or business) carrying over to the other system were observed in the 
Molson family business. The most common types of conflicts observed were 
sibling rivalries, cousin-cousin conflicts and father-son conflicts. The Molson 
family has been relatively successful in managing conflicts and preventing carry-
over and spill-over problems. Creating zones of comfort for the offspring is a 
strategy that allowed the family to promote the offspring that were the most 
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capable to lead the business, while allowing other offspring to pursue careers 
outside the family business. 
Selection of Next-generation Leader 
The case analysis shows that one of the main factors that influenced the 
success of the Molson family business has been its ability not only in maintaining 
biological continuity, but also in selecting capable successors. With the exception 
of JHR, each of the leaders who controlled majority ownership of the brewery 
had at least two sons. John Molson and Thomas Molson each had three sons. 
John Thomas Molson had four sons, Herbert Molson and Tom Molson each had 
two sons, and Eric Molson has three sons (see Fig. 3). According to Ibrahim and 
Ellis (2004) and Churchill and Hatten (1987), succession in family businesses is 
a biological inevitability. 
An analysis of the selection of successors from the second generation to 
the sixth generation shows that only the sons were considered for grooming and 
leadership positions. This finding is consistent with Kuratko, Hornsby and 
Montagno (1993)'s conclusions that the majority of family business owners chose 
their sons over their daughters as potential successors. Table 3 provides a 
summary of generational leadership who has played key roles at the Molson 
family business (brewery). In most cases primogeniture played a role in the 
selection of successors, although this rule was not always followed because a 
grooming process was in place to prepare the most capable sons and nephews. 
This finding is consistent with the research suggesting that family businesses 
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resemble monarchies in which succession is ruled by primogeniture (Alcorn, 
1982, Levinson, 1971). Of the leaders listed in the Table, JHR, Herbert, Fred, 
Bert, Tom, and Eric were all the eldest sons in the family. Nonetheless, the 
selection of Thomas, John Thomas, Hartland, and P.T. also suggests that the 
characteristics of the successor were also considered as criteria for selection. 
This finding supports Goldberg and Wooldridge (1993)'s conclusions that 
characteristics and capabilities of the successor, rather than primogeniture, is 
critical to family business succession. 
Table 3. Summary of Generational Leadership in the Molson Family Business 
Generation Leader Title Birth Order 
1 
2 
John Molson (1763-1836) 
Thomas Molson (1791-1863) 
William Molson (1793-1875) 
John H. R. Molson (1826-1897) 
John Thomas Molson (1837-1910) 
Herbert Molson (1875-1938) 
FrederikW. Molson (1860-1929) 
Thomas H. P. Molson (1901-1978) 
Hartland Molson (1907-2002) 
Bert Molson (1882-1955) 
P.T. Molson (1921-1966) 

























In the Molson family business, the key leader may have been JHR, who 
inherited the brewery from his grandfather. John Molson intended to pass the 
brewery to his second son, Thomas, but could not do it because Thomas' lack of 
a marriage contract created a succession problem. The case analysis could not 
determine the type of relationship that John Molson had with his grandson, JHR 
who was nine years old at the time of John Molson's death. In bypassing his son 
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Thomas, John Molson may have also increased the survival odds of the brewery. 
Research on family businesses have found that many family businesses do not 
survive past the second generation (Ward, 1987; Birley, 1986). 
In the case of the Molson family business, lack of biological continuity 
could have threatened the survival of the family business beyond the third 
generation, as JHR did not produce offspring. Research on family business 
succession has shown that many businesses did not survive past the second or 
third generation because of a lack of biological continuity (Ibrahim and Ellis, 
2004). In this particular case, just like his grandfather John Molson had done in 
bequeathing the brewery to the third generation (and bypassing his son 
Thomas), JHR looked to his younger brother John Thomas to carry on the 
business. JHR's unselfish act of bequeathing the brewery to John Thomas spoke 
not just of the close relationship between the two brothers, but also of the 
importance of the brewery as a family patrimony that needed to be preserved. 
The selection of John Thomas did not guarantee that the brewery could 
pass to a fourth generation because his first wife died while delivering a daughter 
(Lilias). It is very unlikely that John Thomas eldest daughter could have been 
considered to one day take over the business. Stavrou (1996) found that 
exclusion of daughters from the business is typical of family businesses where 
the owner is male. Subsequent generations of the Molson family business have 
consistently chosen sons as successors, a factor that may be attributed to the 
patriarchal family culture set by John Molson. This finding supports previous 
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research that the founder plays an important role in shaping the culture of the 
business (Dyer Jr., 1986 & 1988). 
The family member or members who had ownership and control of the 
brewery also influenced the choice of successors. However, the successor was 
not always a majority owner. For example in the fourth generation, Herbert was 
the majority owner, but his older cousin Fred was appointed leader of the family 
business. This scenario repeated itself in the fifth generation. Although both Tom 
and Hartland were majority owners, they respected the hierarchy and chose their 
older cousin Bert as the next leader not only because Bert was the most capable 
businessperson but also because for them the business came first before 
personal or family considerations. This finding is also consistent with Dyer Jr. 
(1986)'s suggestions that in a patriarchal and paternalistic family business 
culture, the hierarchy is respected. 
After becoming a public company, the process for selecting the next 
successor became more formal when Fred retired as President of the business. 
Instead of selecting the next successor according to hierarchy (Fred's brother 
John Henry or Stuart), primogeniture (Tom) or ownership control (Tom), Fred 
engaged an independent consultant to recommend the best person as the next 
President of the business. Although Fred considered Hartland the most capable 
candidate, his evaluation by an independent consultant confirmed Fred's choice 
for Hartland to take over the leadership of the family business. The 
recommendation to select Hartland was approved by the Board, but may have 
also created conflicts between the two brothers. Rosenblatt, de Mik, Anderson 
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and Johnson (1985) suggested that a family business may bring in an outside 
consultant to deal with a strategic decision, such as succession. The 
independent consultant's intervention may help avoid potential conflicts and 
disagreements amongst family members. According to Trow (1961), outside 
evaluation of the potential successor's capabilities ensures that the person is 
competent for leadership position. Moreover, the use of non-family executives or 
independent advisors brings an objective view during the succession process 
(Ibrahim and Ellis, 2004; Dyer Jr., 1986; Lansberg, 1983; Levinson, 1974). 
As the new leader of the family business, Hartland brought more liberal 
and progressive views to the family business. Compared to previous leaders in 
the family business, Hartland was a charismatic leader whose leadership style 
resembled John Molson's. Under Hartland's tenure as President, Chairman, and 
patriarch of the family business, the company grew from a local brewery in the 
1950's to a multinational conglomerate in the 1970's. According to Dyer Jr. 
(1986), leaders of firms consciously or subconsciously become agents of 
change, and catalysts for cultural change in the business. When Hartland was 
first appointed as President, the brewery industry was undergoing changes, 
including increasing consumer demand and consolidation of smaller breweries 
into regional and national breweries. In addition to changing business patterns in 
the way the company functioned, Hartland also transformed some of the family 
patterns that were embedded in the family business, while still maintaining family 
core values. For example, the company became less paternalistic and less 
patriarchal with the introduction of professional management to manage the 
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business. Dyer Jr. (1986) suggested that a leader that comes in as a catalyst for 
change replaces old beliefs, symbols, and structures with new ones. 
In effect, the Molson family business' evolution to professional 
management is typical of large family businesses that become public. This 
transformation came as a result of two factors colliding together in the 
preparation for the next family business succession. The next leadership 
transition was from Hartland to P.T. Molson, whose selection was approved by 
the Board of Directors. P.T. Molson entered the business after a distinguished 
career in diplomacy. The death of P.T. Molson three months after being 
appointed President highlighted the first serious succession problem in the 
family. Prior to P.T. joining the family business, the only other member of the next 
generation who was being groomed was Eric Molson, but he was too young at 
the time. The case analysis shows that this particular transition experienced 
difficulties because of the lack of enough offspring to come in as caretaker 
leaders. Churchill and Hatten (1987) suggested that succession in family 
business is a non-market based transfer of leadership and in which long term 
planning is an important consideration. The transition from Hartland to P.T. is 
consistent with Churchill and Hatten's finding. 
The death of P.T. Molson, the lack of a qualified family member to replace 
him, and the company's plan to implement a growth strategy resulted in the 
Board of Directors choosing for the first time a non-family executive to take over 
as President of the company. According to Dyer Jr. (1986), leadership change is 
triggered by a crisis and professional managers are brought in to change the 
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structure of the business. This finding supports Ibrahim and Ellis (2004)'s 
suggestions that family businesses adopt professional management when there 
is lack of qualified successors and when the business is contemplating 
implementing aggressive growth strategies. 
After the death of Tom, Hartland succeeded him as Honorary Chairman 
and a non-family executive replaced Hartland as Chairman. Since 1966 to 2007, 
non-family executives have held the President's position. The new business and 
organizational structure that was set-up after P.T.'s death has become 
institutionalized in the family business. This is consistent with Dyer Jr. (1986)'s 
suggestions that with the new professional management leadership, the power is 
concentrated in headquarters. Moreover the success of the company after the 
introduction of the new leadership allows the new leaders to institutionalize the 
new set of beliefs, symbols and structures. Furthermore, according to Hunt and 
Handler (1999), the selection of next-generation leaders focuses on the effective 
leadership of the successors who consider business interests first, as a critical 
element of the succession process. Ever since the death of P.T. Molson, the 
company has chosen professional executives as President of the family firm. 
Eric Molson, who has held the Chairman position since 1982 has led the 
family business through another major transformation, from the diversified 
conglomerate of the 1970's and 1980's to becoming the fifth largest brewer in the 
world. This change in corporate strategy was influenced by two forces: one was 
the lack of strategic focus in the operations of the family business, and the 
second one was the increased competition and consolidation in the brewery 
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industry leading to mergers and acquisitions. The Molson family business 
diversification strategy that was initiated with the appointment of the first non-
family President helped grow the company, but also took the company away from 
its core business, the brewery. Dyer Jr. (1986) suggested that professional 
leadership in a public company bring a more interpersonal approach to running 
the business and a short term focus that often conflicts with the family's own 
goals, aspirations, and profit expectations. 
In summary, the Molson family has run the business in a professional 
manner. Selection of next-generation leaders have been based on the 
successors' abilities and competencies. In certain cases, primogeniture was 
followed, while in other cases caretakers leaders were chosen to manage the 
business. The family business also has consistently chosen sons over daughters 
as successors of the business. But, nepotism was not a factor in the selection of 
these leaders. The family business culture has also evolved into a professional 
one, after the business became public. Moreover, in the Molson family business 
the leaders in the different generations have placed the well being of the 
business above personal gains. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
The present case study research explored and examined qualitatively the 
succession process in each of the six generations of the Molson family business. 
It also evaluated the leadership transition process in each of those generations. 
As stated in the introduction section, only one in three family businesses are 
successful in transferring leadership to the second generation and of these 12% 
will make it to the third generation, and only 3% of them will survive to the fourth 
generation and beyond (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Kets de Vries, 1993; 
Ward, 1987; Birley, 1986; Dyer, 1986).The major goal of this study was to 
determine not only how the Molson family business has managed to survive to 
the current seventh generation, but also what could be learned from their 
experience that other family firms may be able to apply to their own particular 
situations. 
Furthermore as an emerging field of study, other researchers have 
suggested the use of longitudinal analysis to study family businesses and 
succession processes in these firms (Murray, 2003; Litz, 1997; Goffee, 1996). 
The use of a historical longitudinal case study approach to study the oldest 
Canadian family business makes a contribution to the growing body of research 
on family business, family business succession, and family business dynasties. 
For the past 220 years the Molson family business has played an 
important role in Montreal and Canada, not only from an economic point of view, 
but also from a social one. As a successful entrepreneur, John Molson fits 
Schumpeter's description of the entrepreneur as an agent of change. As a young 
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immigrant to a new land, John Molson was able to perceive an opportunity and 
take risks to exploit the opportunity. John Molson's life was also guided by 
principles and values that were imparted to his descendants. Some of these 
values included philanthropic activities and service to the community. 
Subsequent leaders have understood John Molson's vision and the 
importance of the brewery as a family patrimony. Each of the leaders of the 
family business had his own management style, but these leaders have been 
effective in growing the business from a local brewery to one of the world's 
largest breweries. 
The founder and subsequent leaders of the family business all played 
influential roles in the succession processes. Resistance from the founder or 
leader to succession planning has been mentioned in the literature as a factor 
that may contribute to failure of the business. The present research found that 
John Molson and subsequent leaders had in general low resistance to 
succession planning. For some leaders, poor health was a factor that 
encouraged succession planning; while for others developing interests outside 
the family business helped them reduce fear of retirement. Moreover, a leader's 
strong identification with the business may be an asset that helps grow the 
company; but it could also be a liability by increasing the resistance to 
succession planning. The findings suggest that leaders of the family business 
have been able to prepare for the succession process, through self-reflection, 
consultation, and the ability to delegate management control to the offspring. 
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Furthermore, leaders had a high level of trust in the capabilities of the offspring 
that joined the family business and took the time to mentor potential heirs. 
Preparing for succession not only involves the founder/leader, but also the 
successor, as well as other members of the family. This research found that 
every generation of the Molson family business has prepared the offspring for 
entry into the business. The preparation of the offspring started from the first 
generation and the process has continued to the present seventh generation. 
The training started from the shop floor so that potential successors knew every 
aspect of the business' operations. However, technical knowledge did not 
guarantee top management positions. In order to be considered for top 
management positions, the candidate had to show that he had the capabilities 
and leadership skills. 
In general the preparation of both the incumbent leader and the successor 
also involved a mutual role adjustment whereby the successor gradually gained 
management control and responsibilities, while the incumbent leader delegated 
gradually his management authority and eventually his ownership control to the 
heir through wills. This research found that, except between the second and third 
generation, collaborative management dominated the relationship between father 
and son. Offspring were also encouraged to work outside the family business in 
order to gain additional expertise and managerial credibility. 
The Molson family business was not immune to family conflicts; however, 
this research found that in general the family was able to manage conflicts 
relatively well. The Molson family's ability to decouple the family-business system 
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and place the interests of the business first shows an understanding of effective 
succession planning. Carry-over conflicts were evident in the first generations, 
notably sibling conflicts and father-son conflicts. But as the family business 
evolved into a cousin consortium, the research found surprisingly that the two 
cousin consortiums that dominated the business in the fourth and fifth generation 
worked well. Creating zones of comfort for the offspring was a strategy that the 
family used to reduce sibling conflicts and to define the offspring's role within the 
family business. This strategy also allowed the family to promote only the 
offspring who were the most capable to become members of the top 
management team. This research also found that since its inception, the Molson 
family business has followed a traditional patriarchal and patrilineal system, 
where male offspring were introduced early in their lives to the business. It must 
be noted that there was no evidence from the research to suggest that wives or 
daughters played any role in the succession process in the Molson family 
business. 
Succession in family business is a biological continuity, and the Molson 
family business has produced many male offspring who went to assume the 
leadership position. The selection of these next-generation successors was often 
done according to primogeniture, but this was not always the rule. In other cases, 
heirs who were selected to inherit the majority ownership of the business were 
then groomed for the leadership position, but also this was not the rule as several 
minority owners were chosen as caretaker leaders. The common pattern 
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observed in all the generations is that the standard criteria for selection were 
based on the abilities and competencies of the successor. 
In conclusion, the Molson family business case study research illustrates 
how the business has successfully survived over 220 years, as well as why this 
business is Canada's oldest family firm. Family businesses that make it through 
one succession process are better prepared for future successions. The Molson 
family business has survived to the current seventh generation through effective 
succession planning. Both John Molson and his grandson JHR Molson played 
key roles in creating a vision that instilled the culture, values, and beliefs guiding 
the family. JHR Molson further solidified John Molson's vision and set principles 
for the family and the business in his testament. 
The Molson family business has undergone five generational leadership 
transitions by ensuring grooming of the offspring, a mutual role adjustment 
between the older and younger generations, and selection of next-generation 
leader based on abilities and competencies. The experience of the first 
succession process and the conflicts that dominated during the first three 
generations helped the family understand the dual identity of family businesses 
and the importance of decoupling the family-business system. Leaders of the 
Molson family business have treated the brewery as a family patrimony, where 
the business interests come first. In the Molson family business, the brewery and 
its ownership has been the key to the longevity of the business and the 
foundation that built the business into a global firm. 
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Implications for Future Research 
This dissertation used case study research methodology to explore and 
examine the succession processes that have taken place in the Molson family 
business dynasty. Family business scholars have recently called for more studies 
about long-lived family business dynasties and their intergenerational transfer in 
order to learn from these successful family firms (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2005; Jaffe and Lane, 2004; Miller, Steier and Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Lansberg, 
1999; Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg, 1997). The present study used a 
historical longitudinal approach to examine critical events in the Molson family 
business and evaluate its effect on succession processes. More longitudinal 
studies on succession processes of family business dynasties are needed to 
better understand the factors that influence intergenerational leadership transfer 
in family business dynasties. 
The longevity of the Molson family business brings forth the success of 
this particular Canadian family business. This is a major accomplishment given 
the low survival rates of family businesses (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Kets 
de Vries, 1993; Birley, 1986; Ward, 1987). While family businesses fail for 
various reasons, lack of succession planning is seen as a major factor 
(Lansberg, 1988). More research is needed to understand the reasons 
influencing family businesses to plan for or avoid succession planning. Studies to 
compare the succession processes between Canadian family business dynasties 
and other family business dynasties may provide more information that can help 
family businesses in general. 
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Limitations of the Study 
The main limitations of the case study method include lack of 
generalizability beyond the case (Stake, 2005, 1994), as well as lack of precision 
(quantitative), objectivity and rigor (Yin, 1984). One of the main weaknesses of 
the case study is that the case is an intrinsic study of a specific object, event, 
and/or system; it can assist the researcher in explaining how or why things 
happened or got done, but it only applies to the individual case and is not 
intended to obtain generalizations (Stake, 1995). Nonetheless, while 
generalization is difficult to achieve from the results of this case, this may be 
offset by the in-depth longitudinal nature of the present case study research that 
provides a more in-depth analysis of the succession process over several 
generations in a family firm . Replication of the methodology could be done in 
different settings. 
In the present study, while the results are limited to a single case study-
how and why the Molson family business has been able to survive to the present 
seventh generation-, conclusions from this rare longitudinal investigation of a 
family dynasty will contribute to the growing research body on family business 
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
These questions were based on previous family business research. 
1) How would you describe your role at Molson's? 
2) How would you describe corporate governance at Molson? 
• What do you think of it? 
• What are the key governance issues that the company is facing? 
• What is the key point in the company's governance process? 
3) How would you describe the role of non-family executive in the decision-
making process of the family firm? 
4) Does the company have a succession plan in place? 
5) How would you describe the succession process at Molson? 
6) What events and issues have been most important in shaping the firm as it is 
today? [Holland, 1981] 
• Which individuals have had key roles in this process? 
7) What was the firm like when you first became associated with it? [Holland, 
1981] 
• How has it changed over the years? 
• What was the family like? 
• What changes have you observed in it? 
8) What role does the family play (collectively or as individuals) in the 
management and decision-making in the firm? [Holland, 1981] 
• Would changes in this role be beneficial to the firm in your opinion? 
9) What was the firm's strategy when you first became involved? [Holland, 1981] 
• How has it changed over the years? 
10) How would you describe the competitive situation in the industry? [Holland, 
1981] 
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• How has it changed? 
• What are your expectations for the future of the industry? 
11) How do you feel about the merger with another family firm (Coors). 
• Do you think it makes it difficult to run a family firm or strengthen family 
values? 
12) What events stand out in your mind as particularly critical in the history of the 
firm? [Holland, 1981] 
• What times have been particularly difficult? Why? 
13) What is the family's role in the business? [Holland, 1981] 
• How has it changed over the years? 
• What changes do you see in the future? 
14) How would you evaluate the contributions of the family association with the 
business? [Holland, 1981] 
• What difficulties does it create? 
• What impact do family factors have on the decisions that are made? 
• On the process of decision-making? 
15) What events or issues over the years have aroused family concern or interest 
in the firm? [Holland, 1981] 
16) Do you see any changes in the association of the family and the business in 
the future? [Holland, 1981] 
17) How has the company's dual class structure benefited the family and the 
shareholders? 
18) What kind of process was required to merge the company's dual class 
structure with Coors' class structure? 
Please Note: If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant, you may contact: 
Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at 
(514) 848-2424 x7481 or by email at areid@alcor.concordia.ca. 
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Entrepreneur's characteristics and traits 
Founder's characteristics, traits and culture 




Estate planning and inheritance 





Death of leader, partner, and/or family member 




Business ownership and control 
Offspring 
1. Offspring's characteristics, traits and competence 
2. Offspring entering family business 
3. Offspring roles, responsibilities and abilities 
4. Offspring's professional experience outside family business 
5. Offspring lack of competency 
6. Grooming and mentoring of the next-generation members 
7. Younger generation's outside interests 
Non-family members 
1. Non-family partner 
2. Non-family professionals 
3. Independent consultant 
4. Selection of successor 
5. Caretaker leader 
Group level relationships/conflicts 
1. Father-son relationships and conflicts 
1. Father-offspring relationship and conflicts 
2. Role adjustment between older and younger generation 
3. Intergenerational cooperation 
4. Family business partnership, contracts and agreements 
5. Marriage contracts 
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6. Family/sibling conflicts 
7. Family and sibling cooperation 
8. Business ownership and control 
9. Family and non-family conflicts 
10. Family and non-family cooperation 
11. Family testament, principles and values 
12. Cousin consortium 
13. Nepotism 
14. Succession planning 
15. Selection of successor 
